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A Note on Transliteration
The transcribing of words and phrases in Modern Standard Arabic into Eng-
lish is in conformity with the transliteration system of the International Jour-
nal of Middle East Studies, with a few modifications that cater to the guide-
lines of the highly simplified transliteration system of Amsterdam University 
Press, where all diacritical marks have been omitted save for the ‘ayn (‘) and 
hamza (’). Concerning the translation of controversial terms, the author gave 
the English equivalent and included the original Arabic word in transliterated 
form in brackets beside each term.
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Summary
The Lebanese resistance movement Hizbullah changes as circumstances 
change. Since its inception, Hizbullah has been keen to control the Lebanese 
political system, initially through a top-down revolutionary process aimed at 
obtaining power by military force. This radicalism proved futile in the 1980s. 
From a Realpolitik perspective, Hizbullah reconstructed its identity, altered 
its political strategy, and recognized the 1990 Ta’if Agreement, Lebanon’s new 
constitution.
 Benefiting from the Syrian influence that controlled Lebanon militarily, 
Hizbullah played its cards well and was able to extract an important conces-
sion from the Lebanese government by being classified as a resistance move-
ment and not a militia. This meant that it was able to keep its arms and con-
tinue resisting the Israeli occupation, while the militias of all the Lebanese 
political parties – which had participated in the sixteen-year civil war – had to 
disband and surrender their weapons to the Lebanese Army. This exception 
made Hizbullah the strongest military player in Lebanon, even more power-
ful than the Lebanese Army and security forces. Hizbullah continues to hold 
a considerable arsenal even after the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon in May 2000 and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005.
 From the early 1990s onwards, Hizbullah readjusted its identity by endeav-
oring to control the political system through a bottom-up process of gradual 
participation and integration into the democratic system, starting with the 
parliament, the municipal councils, and the cabinet or council of ministers, 
the main executive body of the country. Thus, Hizbullah shifted to acceptance 
of, and engagement in, the democratic process under a sectarian-confessional 
political and administrative system that it previously regarded as an apos-
tate. More dramatically, Hizbullah modified its demand from the abolition 
of political sectarianism to the adoption of the political Maronite (Christian) 
discourse, which stresses abolishing political sectarianism in one’s mentality, 
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before officially abolishing it in written laws. The party also called for uphold-
ing the principle of consensual democracy. However, based on its demo-
graphic strength, Hizbullah called for reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 
and changing the electoral system to proportional representation, which the 
party believed would give the 18 ethno-confessional communities more equi-
table representation.
 Hizbullah’s identity has undergone a considerable transformation from 
the propagation of its first Manifesto in February 1985, passing through its 
eight clandestine conclaves, to the dissemination of its second Manifesto a 
quarter of a century later, in November 2009. The party has gone a long way 
in its attempt to display its new face. This book studies Hizbullah’s identity 
construction and reconstruction within these contours by surveying time-
less concepts and themes, such as tolerance and discrimination; interpreta-
tion and authority; political violence; as well as cooptation, integration, and 
empowerment.
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Introduction and Analytical 
Framework
1 Prologue: Brief history over the past three 
decades1
The Lebanese Shi‘ite resistance movement Hizbullah (Party of God) is going 
through a remarkable transformation, where its identity is constantly under-
going reconstruction. Hizbullah was founded in 1978 as an Islamic struggle 
(jihadi) movement of social and political protest by various sectors of Leb-
anese Shi‘ite clergy and cadres, with Iranian ideological backing. Over the 
period 1985 to 1991 Hizbullah became a full-fledged social movement in the 
sense of having a broad overall organization, structure, and ideology aiming 
at social change and social justice. In the early 1990s, it became a parliamen-
tary political party.
 Hizbullah defines its identity as an Islamic jihadi (struggle) movement, 
“whose emergence is based on an ideological, social, political and economi-
cal mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context”.2 Its roots can be 
traced back to 1978, which coincided with the disappearance of Imam Musa 
al-Sadr3 and the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon. By the efforts and under 
the auspices of leading Iranian hard-line clergy and military figures such as 
‘Ali Akbar Muhtashami and Mustafa Shamran, combined with the endeavors 
of the first and second Hizbullah secretary-generals, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli 
and Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbullah’s nucleus was established. With the 
victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, many Lebanese Shi‘ites saw 
in Imam Khumayni their new leader. During the same period, Sayyid ‘Abbas 
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al-Musawi officially founded “The Hizbullah of Lebanon”, supported by his 
students and other leading ‘ulama (religious scholars).4
 The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the spark that reig-
nited Hizbullah and led to its formation as an Islamic jihadi movement. The 
Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah’s military wing, made some breakthroughs in 
the face of the Israeli army that advanced towards Beirut and led a campaign 
of resistance against the Israeli forces after they occupied the Lebanese capital. 
Leading Hizbullah cadres such as Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the current secre-
tary-general, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, the current head of Hizbullah’s 
political council (Politburo), and Husayn al-Musawi5 – currently a member 
of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc after the 7 June 2009 legislature elections – 
were all Amal6 members. These, among others, were later totally against Amal 
joining the Lebanese cabinet.7 Therefore, these radicals abandoned Amal and 
joined the ranks of existing Islamic Shi‘ite groups – including members of the 
Hizb Al-Da‘wa Al-Islamiyya (‘The Islamic Call Party’), Itihad al-Lubnani lil 
Talaba al-Muslimin (‘The Lebanese Union of Muslim Students’)8, as well as 
independent active Islamic figures and clerics – and established Hizbullah to 
oppose the Israeli occupation, with the material support of Iran and backing 
from Syria.9 These groups came together in fighting the Israeli occupation 
and built the backbone of the party, and most importantly its ‘resistance iden-
tity’. Their later achievements in addressing the socio-economic grievances, 
resulting from the Israeli occupation, gained the party a solid ground among 
the grassroots of Lebanese society.
 On 16 February 1985, Hizbullah became a noticeable player in the Leba-
nese political system when it publicly revealed its Political Manifesto or Open 
Letter, which disclosed its religio-political ideology, thus signalling its open 
engagement in Lebanese political life after operating clandestinely10 for some 
years.11 In the Open Letter Hizbullah disclosed a radical-militant approach 
that regarded the Lebanese political system as infidel by nature, and consid-
ered the Lebanese government as being an apostate, that should be uprooted 
by a top-down revolutionary process and be replaced by the rule of Islam.
 Hizbullah’s reputation as an Islamic resistance movement has been marred 
by the West’s accusation of ‘terrorist’ operations of global reach; the major-
ity of which were claimed by the Islamic Jihad.12 Some of the attacks which 
made Hizbullah gain global attention were the US embassy suicide attacks 
on 18 April 198313 and 20 September 1984; the 23 October 1983 twin-suicide 
attacks that led to the death of 241 US marines14 and 58 French paratroopers; 
the Buenos Aires bombing of the Israeli embassy on 17 March 199215; and the 
holding of Western hostages. The Israeli government and the US Administra-
tion claim that Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance constitutes a semi-clandestine 
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organization and that Islamic Jihad is its clandestine wing.16 In an endeavor to 
ward off the charges of terrorism, Hizbullah’s ideologues, leaders, cadres and 
intellectuals voice a consensus that has systematically and constantly denied 
any connection or link to Islamic Jihad or acts it has claimed as its own.
 And so, in the 1980s Hizbullah became a closed sectarian social movement. 
Through heavy reliance on a strict application of Imam Khumayni’s wilayat 
al-faqih (guardianship by the jurisprudent), ‘Hizbullah – The Islamic Revolu-
tion in Lebanon’ emerged as an internally strong organization with limited 
following. Al-Tufayli repeatedly stressed Hizbullah’s aim of establishing an 
Islamic state in Lebanon as part of an all-encompassing regional Islamic state, 
headed by Iran. This unprecedented commitment to the Islamic state in Leb-
anese political discourse backfired domestically alienating Hizbullah from 
other political and social movements, and from an effective position within 
the Lebanese political sphere. Thus, Hizbullah’s policies were counterproduc-
tive, leading to the failure of its integration into Lebanese political life.
 Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Hizbullah has confronted major 
developments in Lebanon: most prominently, the emergence of a pluralist 
public sphere and increasing openness toward other communities, politi-
cal parties, and interest groups in the Lebanese myriad. This resulted in a 
change in Hizbullah’s discourse and priorities. The mixed confessional space 
in Lebanon led Hizbullah to move from marginalization to integration (infi-
tah or ‘opening-up’) where the party became a major player in the Lebanese 
milieu, thus altering its stance and changing the political rules of the game 
from Islamization to ‘Lebanonization’ by propagating a down-to-earth politi-
cal program. So since the 1990s, Hizbullah has shed its irredentist ideology 
and evolved, more and more, into an ‘ordinary’ political party, with an exten-
sive network of social services (open to both Muslims and Christians), and 
participated in parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work. Although 
Hizbullah is still primarily an Islamic movement, it displays, more and more, 
the characteristics of a nationalist-patriotic political party pursuing Realpoli-
tik, if this is required by the circumstances and serves its interest (maslaha).
 Hizbullah shifted its political strategy from a gradual integration in the 
Lebanese public sphere in the 1990s, to attempting to manipulate the Lebanese 
public sphere after the assassination of PM Hariri and the Syrian withdrawal 
in 2005, and to endeavoring to exercise hegemony over the Lebanese pub-
lic sphere after the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 by means 
of changing the political system through obtaining the one-third veto power 
in the cabinet, the main executive branch of government. Tensions reached 
unprecedented highs and the snowball exploded in May 2008 into violent 
military confrontations in the streets of the Lebanese capital and Mount 
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Lebanon. Hizbullah flexed its military muscle in order to gain veto power, 
which proved to be a short-term political gain. However, the experience was 
negative in the cabinet since it led to the paralysis of the state institutions, 
an eventuality that convinced the party to discard this newly gained politi-
cal capital. The hegemony wave subsided after the Hizbullah-led opposition 
lost the 2009 legislative elections. Hizbullah took a reality pill and contended 
itself with minor political gains for the sake of upholding the fragile con-
sensual democracy, the fulcrum of the political system. In an atmosphere of 
optimism, Hizbullah revealed its new face in November 2009 when it recon-
structed its identity by forging a second Manifesto, which presents a complete 
overhaul to its 1985 founding document, the Open Letter.
1.1 A continuous process of identity construction
In the 1980s, Hizbullah pursued the establishment of an Islamic state both 
from a religious ideology and a political ideology perspective. This era was 
characterized by Hizbullah’s religious capital (Iranian marja’iyya, or author-
ity of emulation); political and symbolic capital (Islamic Resistance’s war and 
suicide (‘martyrdom’) operations against Israel in the south and the Biqa‘, 
north-east part of Lebanon); economic and social capital (social institutions 
targeting only Shi‘ite grassroots); and Islamic Jihad’s acts as symbolic capital.
 Fragmented public spheres existed in Lebanon as cantons – confessionally 
based mini-states within the Lebanese state. During the mid-1980s the issue 
of establishing cantons along sectarian lines was high on the agenda of many 
political parties, including the Christian ones. For instance, Habib Matar17 
stated in 1986 that his call to the Vatican of establishing a Christian state in 
Lebanon should not be viewed as a call for the disintegration of Lebanon; 
rather, he clarified that the Christian state would be erected on all Lebanese 
soil. Matar questioned, “Why don’t the Christians in the East have a shelter or 
a small state?” When he was asked what the Muslims should do, he replied: 
“It’s their own problem. There are a lot of vacant areas in the Arab world 
[where they can go], or let them be governed by the Christian state, and this 
is better for them”.18 A similar view was earlier announced by the Phalan-
gist Leader, the late ex-President Bashir Gemayyel who said in 1982 that the 
Maronites were aiming at converting Lebanon into a Christian state where all 
the Christian Arabs could reside in.19
 In Hizbullah’s case, founding a Shi‘ite canton in the areas under its control, 
would have implied establishing a replica of an Islamic state in miniature. For 
instance, unlike the Lebanese Forces and Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)20, 
Hizbullah neither established a mini-state – with its own ports, airports, taxa-
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tion, and civil administration – within the Lebanese state, nor did Hizbul-
lah call for federalism. In 1986, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s current 
secretary-general, stressed that the Muslims have no right whatsoever to even 
entertain the idea of a Muslim canton, a Shi‘ite canton, or a Sunni canton… 
Talking about cantons annihilates the Muslims, destroys their potential pow-
er, and leads them from one internal war to another. Only the Islamic state 
upholds their unity.21
 In the 1990s, Hizbullah’s leading cadres took great care to ward off charg-
es of the party being a state within a state. Hizbullah’s leading cadres, most 
notably, Nasrallah and Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, Shura (consultative) council 
member and the current head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, told me that 
the party never took part in the Lebanese civil war22 and affirmed that it has 
never imposed (by force) its ideas, opinions, ideology or political program on 
anyone.23 On the contrary, Hizbullah cadres claimed that the party has always 
respected the opinions, beliefs and ideas of others.24 MP ‘Ali Ammar told me 
that in parliament Hizbullah’s MPs do not participate in the debates about the 
budget of Casino du Liban or anything that has to do with alcoholic drinks 
or legislations contrary to Islamic law (the Shari‘a). He added that the party 
honors its parliamentary alliances in accordance with its religious obligations. 
The party is concerned about keeping civil order and does not intervene in 
the judicial process; it just advocates due process and helps the Lebanese state 
in conducting its work in a satisfactory manner.25 Nasrallah added that the 
party views the existence of 18 ethno-confessional communities in Lebanon 
as an asset, and that it aspires to openness and dialogue among all the Leba-
nese. Hizbullah has repeatedly refused to be a social, political, judicial, or 
security alternative to the Lebanese state and its institutions.26 If nothing else, 
intellectual Hajj ‘Imad Faqih has said, a mid-ranking cadre, assuming func-
tions of the state would eventually dirty the party’s hands, which Hizbullah 
cannot afford, having spent years nurturing a reputation for probity.27 So it 
would appear that the logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese 
state has prevailed over the logic of revolution. As such, Hizbullah’s entry into 
Lebanese politics as a major player helped to bring back some kind of a coher-
ent public sphere, which, more or less, existed before the civil war erupted in 
April 1975.
 However, Hizbullah’s Islamic state remained as a political ideology, a ‘legal 
abstraction’, but not as a political program. In the early 1990s, Hizbullah start-
ed promoting its Islamic identity and agenda by following a pragmatic politi-
cal program, mainly to lull Christians and other Muslims who were opposed 
to the Islamic state. In the meantime, Hizbullah remained faithful to its Shi‘ite 
constituency by employing a bottom-up Islamization process through work-
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   23 26-4-2011   13:42:09
24 Introduction and Analytical Framework
ing within the Lebanese state’s political and administrative structures, while, 
at the same time establishing Islamic institutions within the civil society. Reli-
gious capital was consolidated when Khamina’i conferred upon Nasrallah 
and Yazbik28 the taklif shar‘i (religious and legal obligation) by nominating 
them as his wakilayn shar‘iyyan (religious deputies in Lebanon); the addition 
of electoral politics to political capital (Sunnis and Christians on Hizbullah’s 
electoral ballot); the disappearance of Islamic Jihad from symbolic capital; 
and the accumulation of more social and economic capital through the ben-
efits for Sunni and Christian grassroots from Hizbullah’s NGO services.
***
By employing the analytical framework outlined below, my purpose is to give 
a better and clearer reading of Hizbullah’s metamorphosis and identity over-
haul throughout the whirlwind of changes.
2 Analytical Framework
2.1 Identity construction
Working definition of identity
Since I am interested in examining the changing identity of Hizbullah, I will 
rely on concepts of constructed identities and their relationship with ide-
ology as laid down by the constructivist theory of identity. Constructivists 
seek to construe the world in a better way “by listening to voices silenced by 
power – the voices… of oppressed ethnic minorities”29, who as downtrodden 
people, found a sense of collective identity, which led them to mobilize in 
order to redress their grievances. This behavior seems to be warranted by the 
following analytical considerations. “Constructivism posits that social (and 
international) structures are alloyed with normative and material elements, 
that social structures constitute actors’ identities and interests, and that the 
practices of actors embedded in the social structure not only reproduce the 
structure but also sometimes transform it”.30
 Collective (social) identity is defined as: “‘An identity is the understand-
ing of oneself in relation to others’. Identity is inherently relational – one 
defines oneself or groups define themselves in part by who belongs and, as 
important, by who does not belong.”31 In short, social identities are “identi-
ties that political actors generate through interaction with other actors.”32 As 
a working definition of identity construction, I employ Castells’ definition: 
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“Identity is people’s source of meaning and experience… [it is] the process of 
construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of 
cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning.”33 
In Castells’ theory of identity, the concepts of ‘resistance identity’ and ‘project 
identity’ play a salient role in exemplifying resistance and defiance to estab-
lished authority. His definition of resistance identity addresses the question 
of oppression and resistance, which influence the identity of a social move-
ment.34 According to Castells, conceptually, resistance identity is “generated 
by those actors that are in positions/conditions devaluated and/or stigmatized 
by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival 
on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating 
the institutions of society.”35 He adds that empirically resistance identities are 
not confined to traditional values since they could be molded by progressive 
social movements that opt for the alternative to set up an independent com-
munal resistance as long as they possess the strength and resources to launch 
an assault on the oppressive institutions they are resisting. However, accord-
ing to Castells, these identities resist and hardly ever communicate with the 
state, except to struggle, negotiate, and bargain on behalf of their specific 
interests and values, so as to grant vital services to their constituencies. Cas-
tells concludes that communal (resistance) identity seems appealing to people 
resisting social, economic, cultural, and political oppression.36
 Castells distinguishes between resistance identity and project identity. 
According to him, project identity is constructed “when social actors, on the 
basis of whichever cultural materials available to them, build a new identity 
that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transforma-
tion of overall social structure”.37 He explains how conceptually this process 
might take place, especially when social movements might acquire a leading 
role in the founding of a better society, a good life, and a good political order. 
In that case, the construction of identity is conducive to the realization of 
their project. Although their project might originate from or be based upon 
an oppressed identity, it aims at the construction and the subsequent trans-
formation of society as an extension of this project identity on the basis of 
communal resistance38, thus leading to a shared, reconstructed identity. Is 
Hizbullah capable of transforming itself from a resistance identity to a project 
identity?
Relationship between identity and ideology
Linking identity to ideology, Telhami and Barnett argue, “Identity appears 
most prominently as an ideological device to justify self-interested politics... 
[Identity] makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so.”39 
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My working definition of ideology is that it is, “… ‘world views’ of any social 
groups which justify their actions but which cannot be counterpoised to 
truth. However, they can be subject to re-description and thus do not have 
to be accepted… ‘intellectual’ ideology is understood as a [formal system of 
belief and] coherent system of thought: political programmes/manifestos, 
philosophical orientations and religious codification.”40 Thus, broadly speak-
ing, I aim to analyze Hizbullah’s identity by examining its mobilization activi-
ties focusing on depicting the religious or Islamic aspect of identity.
Hinnebusch’s three levels and the dynamic between identity and state sovereignty
In order to accomplish that, I employ Hinnebusch’s “three conceptually 
distinct environments”, which distinguish among the “domestic level”, the 
“regional systematic level”, and the “global (or international) level”.41 In Hiz-
bullah’s case, the domestic level corresponds to Lebanon; the regional level 
comprises Israel/Palestine, Syria, and Iran; and the international level, in 
addition to pan-Islamism, refers to Hizbullah’s stance towards the US. This is 
done in order to study why and how the three levels or environments effect 
Hizbullah’s identity construction. In this respect, Hinnebusch argues, “Con-
structivists insist that interstate relations are contingent on the way identity is 
constructed; in the Middle East, sub- and suprastate identities compete with 
state identity, inspire transstate movements [transnational Islamic move-
ments such as Hizbullah], and constrain purely state-centric behavior.”42 In 
a similar vein, Telhami and Barnett state that constructivism considers “that 
identity essentially constructs the world so that perceptions of one’s state and 
others are defined by one’s identity.”43 Likening this to resource mobiliza-
tion, internationally and regionally, Hinnebusch argues that in the Middle 
East, “populations have remained mobilizable by transstate and irredentist44 
ideology.”45 In this perspective the effect of the Islamic Revolution’s ideology 
is clearly salient on Hizbullah’s ideology and identity. Domestically, Hin-
nebusch comes out with the following hypothesis: “the more the state system 
thwarted indigenous interests and identity [Shi‘ite interests and Hizbullah’s 
identity], the more status quo social forces inside the states were weakened 
[for instance, the Christian Lebanese Forces and Sunni political parties] and 
the more radical, middle class, or even plebeian forces were mobilized [for 
example, the Hizbullahis].”46
 Since Hinnebusch based his argument on the distinction between iden-
tity and state sovereignty47, an important challenge is to study and evaluate 
the dynamic between Hizbullah’s Islamist identity and Lebanese state sov-
ereignty. According to Hinnebusch, “the unique feature of the Middle East 
state system, specifically the uneasy relation of identity and state sovereignty, 
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immensely complicate foreign policymaking in the Middle East… [because] 
Middle Eastern states lack impermeability and secure national  identity.”48 
Moreover, Hinnebusch adds, “loyalty to the individual states is contested by 
substate and suprastate identities. The resultant embedding of the state sys-
tem is a matrix of fluid multiple identities.”49 And so, “built-in” anomalies of 
irredentist tendencies are characteristic of the region. They are reflected in 
the expression of the practices and worldviews of various ethnic and religious 
milieus, which challenge the immutability of territorial borders, thus simu-
lating territorial conflict between states. Added to this is the immense and 
complicated power that political Islam possesses as a transnational, suprastate 
identity, which structures and commands the lives and worldviews of the peo-
ple in the region. This makes the resort to the juncture of political identity and 
state sovereignty legitimate and wanting. Thus, the generated duality, which 
the ruling elite have to grapple with between asserting raison de la nation 
(pan-Arabism/pan-Islamism) and raison d’état (state sovereignty), is what has 
compelled them to treat the region as an arena of transstate political competi-
tion.50
2.2 Resource mobilization as a bridge between identity 
and Pierre Bourdieu’s capitals
In studying Hizbullah’s identity formation, I mainly employ the concept of 
resource mobilization in relation to Ousmane Kane’s interpretation of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of different kinds of capitals: religious, political, symbolic, 
social, and economic capitals. I do this in order to investigate how and why 
a shift in Hizbullah’s identity is taking place. “The term resource mobiliza-
tion is used to refer to the ways a social movement utilizes such resources as 
money, political influence, access to the media, and personnel. The success 
of a movement for change [identity reconstruction] will depend in good part 
on how effectively it mobilizes its resources… Unlike the relative-deprivation 
approach, the resource-mobilization perspective focuses on strategic difficul-
ties [challenges] facing social movements.”51 Recourse mobilization plays a 
central role since the success of a social movement for change or identity con-
struction depends on how well it mobilizes its resources in order to face stra-
tegic difficulties or challenges. I examine Hizbullah’s use of resource mobili-
zation focusing on how Hizbullah employs different types of capital in this 
process and the shifting balances among them.
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2.3 Pierre Bourdieu’s capitals as interpreted and 
employed by Ousmane Kane
Ousmane Kane52 readjusted and applied Bourdieu’s religious, political, sym-
bolic, social, and economic capitals to the study of Islamic movements. In this 
book I follow Kane’s formulation of Bourdieu’s capitals.
1 Religious capital: According to Bourdieu, religious capital refers to the 
way religious knowledge is appropriated and disseminated.53 Kane 
broadens Bourdieu’s mandate by making the distinction between 
“ancient religious capital” and “new religious capital”. He labels the for-
mer as “non formally certified cultural capital”, and the latter as “formally 
certified cultural capital”. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital refers 
mainly to education, culture, and related skills. Kane adds, “Non for-
mally certified cultural capital refers to the religious expertise, which… 
includes a combination of both exoteric religious knowledge (Koran, 
Islamic law, Islamic exegesis) and esoteric sciences [Shi‘ite theosophy 
for instance]… This capital is not based on the possession of a university 
degree, thus it is not formally certified. It tends to be the prerogative of 
traditional religious authorities…”54 Kane continues, “formally certified 
cultural capital is based on expertise in exoteric knowledge, … but it 
equally includes knowledge of the Koran (the mastery of the art of its 
recitation, knowledge of its conventional exegesis and Islamic jurispru-
dence) as well as knowledge of some secular subject matters (foreign 
languages, history, geography, mathematics, etc.). More importantly, 
formally certified cultural capital requires the possession of a degree 
delivered by a university or another formal institution of learning.”55 I 
adjust and apply Kane’s analysis to Hizbullah’s ‘ulama who still play an 
important role in the crystallization and dissemination of the party’s 
religious ideology. Thus, I study Hizbullah’s religious ideology from the 
perspective of Kane’s interpretation and use of Bourdieu’s religious capi-
tal.
2 Symbolic capital: Simply stated, symbolic capital corresponds to ‘your 
reputation and honor’, distinction, and prestige.56 Bourdieu defines 
symbolic capital as the “degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, con-
secration or honour [possessed by someone and] founded on the dia-
lectic of knowledge and recognition”.57 Since Hizbullah labels itself as 
an Islamic jihadi movement, symbolic capital acquires vital importance. 
According to Kane, “symbolic capital refers here to the status of a fighter 
for the cause of ‘true Islam’ whatever that means.58 The Koranic verse 
[4:95]…, which states that ‘God hath granted a grade higher to those 
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who strive and fight with their goods and persons’ conveys this idea of 
symbolic capital. The more one fights with one’s ‘goods’ or ‘one’s ‘per-
son’, the more one accumulates symbolic capital.”59 Although symbolic 
capital is an indispensable component of Hizbullah’s religious ideology, 
it acquired a substantial importance in Hizbullah’s political ideology, 
and minor importance in the party’s political program. This seems to be 
in conformity with Hizbullah’s accumulation and conversion of capital 
(see below).
3 Political capital: “Political capital is everything that enables leaders to 
get anything done. It’s their reputation, their ability to make the news-
paper, their statutory role, their friends in the community, the amount 
of money they can raise, the number of people who support them, the 
length of time people are willing to pay attention to them and a lot more 
than that as well.”60 Thus, political capital is present in both Hizbullah’s 
political ideology and political program.
4 Social capital: Social capital is “the network or influential patrons that 
you can use to support your actions”.61 Simply stated, social capital is 
contacts, acquaintances, and the practice of durable social networks. 
According to Kane, social capital “is what ordinary language calls ‘con-
nections’. By formalizing this concept, Bourdieu argues, one ‘acquires 
the means of analysing the logic whereby this particular kind of capital 
is accumulated, transmitted and reproduced, the means of understand-
ing how it turns into economic capital and, conversely, what work is 
required to convert economic capital into social capital, the means of 
grasping the function of institutions such as clubs or quite simply the 
family’.”62
5 Economic capital: Economic capital corresponds to “stocks and shares 
but also the surplus present in very high salaries”.63 According to Kane, 
“economic capital refers to material wealth in the most common sense 
of the word.”64
Readjusting Kane’s interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory, I classify and study 
his capitals (religious, symbolic, political, social, and economic) as forms of 
resource mobilization, mainly through accumulation and conversion of cap-
ital. “By accumulation of capital, is meant here the process through which 
social actors (or players) go in order to obtain a given sort of capital. By con-
version, it is meant the act of spending one sort of capital and getting in return 
another sort.”65 (My emphasis). Thus, I endeavor to describe and analyze the 
interplay of the different forms of capital trying to study why and how there 
have been shifting balances among them. And so, by analyzing the changing 
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balance of capitals, I hope to make statements about the different construc-
tions of Hizbullah’s identity.
***
In short, I am not going to discuss identity constructions on an individual 
level; rather, I will look at identity processes of Hizbullah as a socio-political 
movement in which the concept of resource mobilization plays a crucial role.
 The concept of resource mobilization is pivotal to the survival of a social 
movement. Gramsci argued that “all the essential questions of sociology are 
nothing than questions of political science.”66 Paraphrasing Gramsci, social 
movements are nothing but political movements. However, “modern social 
movements are primarily social and not directly political in character. Their 
aim is the mobilization of civil society, not the seizure of power.”67
 As mentioned earlier, resource mobilization refers to the way a social move-
ment mobilizes its resources and/or capitals in order to confront and survive 
strategic difficulties and challenges facing it. A social movement might recon-
struct its identity in order to adjust to a world that is in incessant flux, or else 
it will risk demise or might not remain a viable social movement. By social 
movement is understood, “purposive collective actions whose outcome, in 
victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society”.68 Fuller 
notes that Islamism “represents the single most important [mobilizational] 
force for political change across the Muslim world.”69 He adds, “Islamists are 
good at identifying and articulating the grievances, but to succeed they must 
move beyond their present roles if they wish to remain relevant to societ-
ies’ needs”, and here comes the salient role of resource mobilization. Thus, 
according to Fuller, Islamism is “a religious-cultural-political framework for 
engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims.”70 It 
seems this religious-cultural-political framework constitutes the foundation 
of Hizbullah’s ideology, political program, and cultural politics.
3 The controversy
The following describes some of the questions and themes that I intend to deal 
with in this book. Since Hizbullah labels itself as an Islamic jihadi movement, 
it is no wonder that Hizbullah’s primary concern has been the preservation 
of its identity taking into account the dramatic developments and turmoil 
that rupture the Middle East. Can Hinnebusch’s three levels and the dynamic 
between identity and state sovereignty furnish an explanation and a justifi-
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cation for Hizbullah’s fluctuating identity, which seems to be permanently 
under reconstruction? Why does Hizbullah change as circumstances change? 
What is the role of resource mobilization in this regard? On the regional and 
international level, did Hizbullah broaden the mandate of the domestic con-
cept of mahrumin (downtrodden) to the transnational concept of mustad‘afin 
(oppressed), in line with Imam Khumayni’s bipolarity of oppressors and 
oppressed? How can Hizbullah, which claims to be a Pan-Islamic and a Pan-
Arab jihadi movement, be content with receiving more recognition and votes 
in local Lebanese politics?71 At the domestic level, although social and eco-
nomic capitals were mentioned in Hizbullah’s political programs as ideologi-
cal slogans, little was done to put them into actual practice. However, social 
and economic capitals acquired substantial importance in Hizbullah’s politi-
cal program through the sprouting of the party’s NGOs and civil institutions. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to study to what extent Hizbullah was 
able to accumulate and transform (convert) social and economic capital into 
political capital, through integration into the Lebanese public sphere. What 
has led Hizbullah, which embraces an ideological-revolutionary version of 
Islam, to review its political ideology or to sometimes place it on the shelf and 
develop a secular political program? Is it the domestic level, i.e. the Lebanese 
status quo ante and specificities (khususiyyat)? Does the regional or interna-
tional level have a bearing on this apparent change? What happened to Hiz-
bullah’s identity, as an Islamic jihadi movement, in this perspective? Why and 
how did Hizbullah revise and update its domestic, regional, and international 
identity in its second Manifesto of November 2009?
4 Synopsis of the book
The chapters in this book reveal different stages of Hizbullah’s identity con-
struction and are arranged in a thematic way. The first chapter surveys the 
concepts of tolerance and discrimination in relation to the status of minorities 
in the Islamic order. The second chapter deals with the thematic of interpreta-
tion and authority in relation to Hizbullah’s adoption of the Iranian theory of 
governance and applying it in a pluralistic setting like Lebanon. The third and 
fourth chapters address the polemics of political violence from the stances of 
terrorism, 9/11, and suicide operations. The fifth chapter highlights how Hiz-
bullah moved from integration in the 1990s to manipulation through empow-
erment in the early 21st century. The sixth chapter analyzes the new dynam-
ics that resulted from the 2008 Doha Accord and its aftermath. The seventh 
chapter presents the proof par excellence of Hizbullah’s identity construction 
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by examining how the party employed its resource mobilization in such a way 
to survive domestic, regional, and international changes from forging its first 
Manifesto, the Open Letter in 1985, passing through all of its eight conclaves 
that culminated in a groundbreaking new Manifesto a quarter of a century 
later. The concluding chapter summarizes how Hizbullah negotiated its con-
tinuous renaissance in the whirlwind of change in Lebanon and the Middle 
East, highlighting the shift from resistance identity to project identity.
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1 Tolerance and Discrimination: 
Ahl Al-Dhimma in the 
Islamic Order1
Introduction
This chapter highlights the shift in Hizbullah’s relationship with Lebanese 
Christians from regarding them as potential dhimmis2 within its conception 
of an Islamic state to citizens in a pluralistic polity. The author discusses in 
some detail, relying on primary sources and discourses, the place of Chris-
tians in Hizbullah’s Islamic state, stressing points of agreement with and 
departure from the Prophetic tradition, and surveying how these influenced 
Hizbullah’s policies in the 1980s. I will explain the seminal role of the 1990 
Ta’if Agreement in helping to furnish these changes, in which the mixed con-
fessional space led to the creation of pluralist politics and the emergence of 
a more or less ‘open’ public sphere. Hizbullah’s second secretary-general laid 
the cornerstone of the party’s transformation in his 1991 political program. 
Although Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres paid lip service to an Islamic state, 
eventually Hizbullah dropped that notion from all its political programs by 
regarding it as a ‘legal abstraction’. Even its November 2009 Manifesto has 
no mention of the Islamic state. And so, Hizbullah engaged in dialogue with 
the Lebanese Christians on the basis of the Vatican’s Papal Guidance, and 
included Christians and Sunnis in its legislative and municipal election slates. 
Through a series of interviews with the party’s intellectuals and policymak-
ers, I demonstrate that, starting in the 1990s, Hizbullah dropped the dhimmi 
categorization and replaced it with the concept of muwatana (citizenship).
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   33 26-4-2011   13:42:11
34 Tolerance and Discrimination: Ahl Al-Dhimma in the Islamic order
1.1 Hizbullah’s relations with the Lebanese myriad: 
The Christians as a prominent example
Although there has been dialogue between Hizbullah and the Sunnis, most 
notably through the prominent role of the Union of Muslim ‘Ulama3, this 
was not the case with the Christians. From the early 1980s till 1990 hardly 
any political dialogue or high level contact was established between Hizbul-
lah and Christians.4 Although on face value it appears that Hizbullah’s call 
(da‘wa)5 in its Open Letter was addressed to all Christians, in reality Hiz-
bullah shunned any contact with political Maronism6, Maronites, and any 
collaborator with Israel. Though some Hizbullah cadres had some low-level 
contacts with Christians living in the party’s constituencies – especially in 
the Biqa‘ region, in the northeast of Lebanon and the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s den 
in Beirut’s southern suburb, which houses more than one million Shi‘ites – 
nonetheless no tangible high-level dialogue materialized between Hizbullah 
and the Christians.7 Indeed, Hizbullah’s political ideology was selective in its 
treatment of Lebanese Christians. By addressing the Lebanese Christians in 
general and the Maronites in particular, the Open Letter set apart the Maroni-
tes from the rest of the Christians. The Open Letter also differentiated within 
Maronites on the following grounds: 1) the leading Maronite notables and 
their retinue who constitute the symbols of the then political system, i.e. rep-
resentatives of political Maronism, or those with blatant connections with 
Israel; and 2) the rest of the Maronite notables and ordinary citizens. Hizbul-
lah’s 1985 Manifesto considered that the party’s primary problem was with 
the symbols of the political system, i.e. political Maronism and the collabora-
tors with Israel. The document called upon the chiefs of political Maronism 
to stop using their Christian militias to exercise ‘oppressive’ policies against 
Muslims. As such, Hizbullah contended that these policies would backfire on 
the Christians, endangering their peace and security, especially since such 
exploitation of force was based on “narrow-minded particularism, sectar-
ian privileges, and collaboration with colonialism and Israel”. Also, the Open 
Letter enjoined Christians to liberate their thoughts, minds, and hearts from 
what it described as “the despicable sectarianism, fanaticism and parochi-
alism”.8 In addition, Hizbullah clarified in its 1985 Manifesto, that its views 
against political Maronism do not imply that it is seeking revenge against all 
Christians, stressing that it does not wish any inconvenience or harm, neither 
to the Christians who live peacefully in the areas that are under its control nor 
to those who are ‘patriotic’ and live elsewhere.9
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1.2 Phase I: The place of the Christians in the Islamic 
state
In the 1980s, Hizbullah considered the Christians as dhimmis or ahl al-
dhimma who would have to pay the poll tax (jizya) as residents of an Islamic 
state.10 This attitude might have been based upon a specific interpretation 
of the Prophet’s political constitution of Medina, and might also have been 
inspired by the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In conformity to 
the Open Letter, Hizbullah’s 1985 Manifesto, in one of its political declarations 
Hizbullah stated that it saw in the presence of the peace-loving Christians, 
residing in the areas under its control, the credible possibility of its ‘opening-
up’ (infitah) or becoming more inclusive as permitted by the tolerant values 
of Islam. Hizbullah stressed that ahl al-dhimma share with the Muslims the 
social values of overt and purposeful tolerance such as love, fraternity, and 
solidarity. However, Hizbullah clarified in its political declaration that politi-
cal Maronism is exempted from such tolerance since they were regarded as 
hypocrites:11 “When the hypocrites came to you, they say: ‘We bear witness 
that you are indeed Allah’s Apostle.’ Allah knows that you are indeed his 
Apostle and Allah bears witness that the hypocrites are liars.” (63:1)12
 The late Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (died 4 July 
2010)13, who was the ‘godfather’ of many Lebanese Islamists, might have left 
his imprints on Hizbullah’s thought, especially in the 1980s. Sayyid Fadlallah 
explained that the first constitution of Islam, the Constitution of al-Medina 
(al-Sahifa), stressed the security as well as the protection of the persons and 
property of ahl al-dhimma as long as they were not treacherous. Fadlallah 
clarified that in the Medinan Islamic state the relations between the Muslims, 
on the one hand, and the Jews and Christians, on the other, were governed 
by the ‘dhimmi contract’, which, based upon mutual consent, regulated those 
relations and enforced specific contractual obligations, by which the Jews 
and Christians held the same rights and duties as Muslim citizens. Fadlallah 
added that justice14 in Islam has always been closely related to freedom, the 
freedom that grants benefits and precludes harm15, and the dhimmi contract 
granted ahl al-dhimma such freedom, especially freedom of religion and the 
protection of their religious practices.16
 In turn, ‘Ali Kurani, a Hizbullah middle-rank cadre, stated that the free-
dom accorded to ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic state is within the confines of 
the safeguards of Islamic shari‘a. He clarified that the Christian minorities 
who live under Muslim governance are accorded all their civil and religious 
rights, but not their political privilege since they are governed and not ruling 
anymore, as was the case with political Maronism.17
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   35 26-4-2011   13:42:12
36 Tolerance and Discrimination: Ahl Al-Dhimma in the Islamic order
 According to Muhammad Z‘aytir18, the Islamic republic that the Muslims 
are striving to establish in Lebanon does not impose a duty upon the Chris-
tians, in general, or the political Maronites, in particular, to convert to Islam 
because Islam has no need for them to be in its ranks; rather, he believed, 
they need Islam. He warned that governance and administration of the umma 
(Islamic community) should be the prerogative of Muslims, and the Muslims 
must not allow others authority in their affairs:
O believers, do not take as close friends other than your own people [co-religion-
ists]; they will spare no effort to corrupt you and wish to see you suffer. Hatred has 
already been manifested in what they utter, but what their hearts conceal is greater 
still. We have made clear our signs to you if only you understand. (Q.3:118)
Based on this Qur’anic verse, Z‘aytir posed the following question: since it is a 
religious imperative not to allow the Christians to participate in government, 
then how could the Muslims accept to be ruled by them?19
 In this respect, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbullah’s founder and second 
secretary-general, argued that compulsion in religion is not allowed since 
Prophet Muhammad would not have established the Constitution of Medi-
na (al-Sahifa) if it were. Sayyid Abbas considered the Prophet as the inter-
religious arbitrator among the Muslims, ahl al-dhimma, and others. Sayyid 
Abbas emphasized that the Constitution of Medina confirmed that although 
that city consisted of many religious communities, Medina became a unified 
political community headed by Prophet Muhammad. Thus, non-Muslims 
had conferred legitimacy to the Prophet as the political leader and final arbi-
trator. Sayyid Abbas stressed that since the Prophet’s religious authority over 
non-Muslims was restricted, al-Sahifa granted each religious community full 
rights to follow its own religion and to practice its own internal affairs as it 
deemed fit. Sayyid Abbas conveyed the belief that Hizbullah would treat the 
People of the Book in accordance with the Constitution of Medina, which dis-
tinguished between religious authority and political authority or leadership.20
 Nevertheless, in the Open Letter, Hizbullah practiced its Islamic propaga-
tion by exhorting all the Christians to convert to Islam in order to have felicity 
in this world and the world to come: “Open your hearts to our Call, which we 
address to you. Open yourselves up to Islam where you will find salvation and 
happiness upon earth and in the hereafter”. Hizbullah called on the Chris-
tians to rid themselves of narrow denominational allegiance and monopo-
lizing privileges that disadvantaged other communities. Hizbullah stressed 
that the Christians should answer the appeal from heaven and have recourse 
to reason instead of arms; to persuasion instead of sectarianism. Hizbullah 
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encouraged Christians to review their thinking and they might come to know 
that their best interest lies in what they decide, by their own free will and not 
by what might be imposed upon them: “Say: O People of the Book, come 
to an equitable world (kalimat siwa’) between you and us, that we worship 
none but Allah, do not associate anything with Him and do not set up each 
other as lords besides Allah”.21 In an attempt to convey Hizbullah’s tolerance 
towards non-Muslims, Z‘aytir argued that Prophet Muhammad always placed 
the Qur’anic verse 3:64 as a header on all the letters he addressed to them. 
Z‘aytir stressed that this conveys the “absolute freedom granted to non-Mus-
lims, freedom that ruptures the chains of slavery, freedom that is based upon 
human solidarity, intuitive trends, and the spiritual dimension of human exis-
tence”22, i.e. religious and social freedom, but not unrestricted political free-
dom, as was explained in the previous section. The Open Letter added that if 
the Christians refuse to adhere to Islam, Hizbullah would not force them to 
do otherwise, rather they were expected to respect and honor their covenants 
with Muslims and not to aggress against them.23 Most importantly, Hizbullah 
stressed in the Open Letter that there is “no compulsion in religion”.24
 Z‘aytir refined his position and explained the reason for excluding some 
Maronites from the tolerance described in Hizbullah’s policy by reasoning 
that Islam rejects dialogue between an oppressed Muslim and an ‘oppres-
sor crusader’ (political Maronism), and claimed, somewhat figuratively, that 
these crusaders have been conspiring for centuries against the Muslims with 
the ‘Zionists’. He stressed that it is a well-known fact that anyone who allies 
himself with the enemies of Islam becomes an enemy of Islam even though 
he was not classified as such originally. Thus, according to Z‘aytir, the friend 
of my enemy is my enemy: “O believers, do not take the Jews and Christians 
as friends; some of them are friends of each other. Whoever of you takes them 
as friends is surely one of them. Allah indeed does not guide the wrongdoers 
(al-zalimin)”.25 He added that in reality the political Maronites do not aspire 
to dialogue; rather they need allies. As such, dialogue was only a contrived 
means for them to establish control over the Muslims:
Neither the Jews nor the Christians will be pleased with you until you follow their 
religion. Say: Allah’s guidance is the [only] guidance. And were you to follow their 
desires after the Knowledge that came down to you, you will have no guardian or 
helper [to save you] from Allah.26
Z‘aytir affirmed that the political Maronites do not mind holding meetings, 
with all the militia leaders, that arrive at conclusions calling for political settle-
ments and stress upholding, what they call, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘constitutionality’. 
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By this, he saw, the political Maronites trying to deceive the populace, absorb 
the rising discontent against Maronism, and deceive God: “The devils shall 
insinuate to their followers to dispute with you; but if you obey them, then 
you will surely be polytheists.”27 He concluded by posing a rhetorical ques-
tion, namely that if the political Maronites are responsible for the ‘destruc-
tion’28 of Lebanon, then why would anybody negotiate with them, and about 
what?29
 Hizbullah echoed the Open Letter’s views towards the Christians in its 
political declarations. In 1986 Hizbullah issued a political declaration stat-
ing that it does not find itself obliged to conduct dialogue with a political 
Maronism that is collaborating with its enemies; rather Hizbullah claimed 
that it opens its heart and extends its hands in dialogue and understanding 
towards Christians and other religious confessions based on the unshakable 
conviction of enmity to the US and Israel.30
 Some writers claimed that Hizbullah was abiding by a political ideology 
that was not only intolerant towards the Christians, but served Hizbullah’s 
aim of imposing its will and its version of Islam on all the Lebanese from 
whatever denomination, sect, or religion.31 I acknowledge that there appears 
to be a certain tension between Hizbullah’s two propositions: 1) Hizbullah’s 
intention not to impose Islam nor coerce the Christians to adhere to its call; 
and 2) Hizbullah’s mission of establishing an Islamic order. Maybe the confu-
sion has to do with Z‘aytir’s denial of the need to convert Christians and the 
Hizbullah establishment’s call for conversion through peaceful means. Never-
theless, in conformity with the Prophetic tradition, both Z‘aytir and the Hiz-
bullah establishment agreed that there should be ‘no compulsion in religion’ 
in accord with verse 2:256 and an ‘equitable world’ or common grounds, as 
stated in verse 3:64, should guide the relationship of Muslims with Christians.
1.3 Phase II: The 1990s till the present
Background to Hizbullah’s change in the 1990s
The Ta’if Agreement was adopted as Lebanon’s new constitution in Septem-
ber 1990. The new constitution specified the need to share political office 
on a fifty-fifty basis between Christians and Muslims, most notably in the 
legislature and cabinet. The Ta’if Agreement officially marked the end of the 
civil war since it stipulated the disbanding of all militias and the surrender 
of their weapons to the Lebanese state. It also called for the integration of 
militia members into Lebanese civil society and Lebanese state institutions, 
most prominently, the Lebanese army. Nevertheless, the Ta’if Agreement also 
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allowed the militias to transform themselves into political parties. Since the 
Lebanese government classified Hizbullah as a resistance movement, and not 
a militia, it granted permission for it to keep its arms and continue its struggle 
against Israel.32 By abandoning its irredentist ideology, Hizbullah adjusted to 
its new dual role of confronting the Israeli occupiers in the south and gradu-
ally integrating into the newly created Lebanese public sphere, which was a 
result of peace.
 In May 1991 Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid ‘Abbas 
Al-Musawi as its second secretary-general. In his political program, Sayyid 
Abbas initiated the policy of infitah and dialogue, especially with the Chris-
tians. On 16 February 1992 Sayyid Abbas, his wife, and his son were assassi-
nated by the Israeli airforce. Two days later, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbul-
lah’s third secretary-general, was elected together with Shaykh Na‘im Qasim 
as deputy secretary-general.33 Both Nasrallah and Qasim currently retain 
their posts.
 Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Hizbullah has confronted major 
developments in Lebanon: prominently, the emergence of pluralist politics 
and increasing openness toward other communities, political parties, and 
interest groups. This has motivated a change in Hizbullah’s discourse and pri-
orities. The mixed confessional space led Hizbullah to move from marginal-
ization to integration, during which the party became a major player in the 
public sphere. Thus by altering its stance and changing the political rules of 
its game from Islamization to integration and propagating a ‘down-to-earth’ 
political program Hizbullah has evolved, more and more, into an ‘ordinary’ 
political party, but with an extensive network of social services (provided to 
Muslims and Christians), and has participated in parliamentary, municipal, 
and governmental work.
 By engaging in a pluralistic process, Hizbullah shifted its political strategy 
from cooptation34 to contestation35, and finally to exercising empowerment.36 
Hizbullah’s participation in electoral politics might be regarded as coopta-
tion, while its gradual integration into Lebanese politics may be considered as 
contestation. Hizbullah’s move to the political scene and becoming a ‘whole 
nation’ political party may also be considered in terms of human empower-
ment (tamkin)37. The shift to electoral politics helped to foment a national 
politics, instead of the fragmented politics or ‘states within the state’, which 
each political party or denominational group endeavored to establish in Leba-
non during the civil war era (1975-1990). Thus, Hizbullah moved from being 
a closed sectarian social movement to an open national actor employing the 
policy of infitah and engagement in Lebanese domestic political life.
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Hizbullah’s views on the Islamic State
None of Hizbullah’s 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2005, 2009, and 2010 
parliamentary and municipal election programs, including its 30 November 
2009 Manifesto, mention, refer to, or advocate the founding of an Islamic state 
in Lebanon. Hizbullah emphasized that the establishment of an Islamic state 
could not be the result of the logic or adoption by a certain group or faction 
of people, who enforce it or enforce their own opinions on other groups or 
factions in society. Hizbullah neither applies nor accepts coercion in its proj-
ect of Islamization; rather they propose that the establishment of an Islamic 
state should be the result of freedom, will, and direct choice of the people. 
Thus, Hizbullah asserts it will only move in the direction of implementing an 
Islamic State in Lebanon on the basis of a democratic, tolerant process sanc-
tioned by the majority of non-Muslims and Muslims.38
 It seems that due to a pragmatic change in political strategy, Hizbullah has 
put to rest, once and for all, the issue of the establishment or implementa-
tion of an Islamic state in Lebanon. That is why its political program can be 
regarded as pragmatic. This accounts for Hizbullah’s participation in electoral 
politics, and its decision to take an active part in the Lebanese public sphere. 
There is a probability that Hizbullah embraced its down-to-earth and practi-
cal political programs since it is apparent that it was counterproductive and 
politically unwise to remain committed to its earlier conception of an Islamic 
order. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between these political pro-
grams and the discourse of its leaders who continue to give lip service to the 
old ideological commitment of establishing an Islamic order. It is most likely 
that Hizbullah was guided by political necessity since in its political programs 
it has accepted the fact that the majority of the Lebanese do not wish to opt for 
an Islamic order, and imposing it by compulsion is an unacceptable option.
Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Lebanese Christians
In conformity to Sayyid Abbas’s 1991 political program, which called for a 
Lebanization process, infitah, and dialogue, most notably, with the Christians, 
Hizbullah took the initiative in 1992 and visited the Maronite patriarch. The 
talks centered mostly upon Christian-Muslim dialogue and Hizbullah’s grad-
ual integration into the Lebanese public sphere. However, with the passage of 
time, Hizbullah’s dialogue did not remain confined to Maronites and it was 
extended to encompass the rest of the Christians that comprise the Lebanese 
mosaic. Hizbullah conducted dialogue with the Christians and other groups 
on the basis of transparency in order to define common grounds. As to the 
content and subjects of the dialogue, Hizbullah tried to avoid engagement in 
theological or religious issues, which have specific and particular meaning for 
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every sect of religion in Lebanon, and concentrated on nurturing dialogue 
dealing with political, socio-economic, civic and societal issues. In its political 
program, Hizbullah blamed political sectarianism for Lebanon’s malaise, call-
ing for its abolishment in line with Lebanon’s 1990 new constitution. Hizbul-
lah embarked on an open, peaceful, and constructive dialogue with all sects, 
political parties, civil society groups and organizations in order to tackle the 
source or origin of cultural, political, theoretical, and practical differences. 
The 2006 national dialogue sessions conducted by the fourteen leading politi-
cians in Lebanon dealt with such issues, including taboos such as Hizbullah’s 
weapons and its defense strategy. Nasrallah, in person, took care to convey 
Hizbullah’s stance, being in a strong position after his party managed, on 6 
February 2006, to strike a ten-point understanding with the Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) headed by the Maronite general Michel ‘Aun, who claimed 
to have received 70 percent of the Christian votes in the 2005 legislative elec-
tions and 50 percent of the Christian votes in the 2009 legislative elections.39
  Hizbullah tried to portray itself as a principal promoter of Muslim-
Christian coexistence stressing the importance of pluralism through multi-
confessional representation. It incorporated Christians, including Maronites, 
in its parliamentary elections lists and granted them the right to speak in its 
name as long as they do not deflect from the party’s established doctrines. 
Also, it shared municipal council seats with Christians. Thus, Hizbullah made 
it clear that the only condition for a sympathizer to speak in its name is to abide 
by its policy guidelines. Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Christians, as stipulated 
in its political program, garnered the party support for its resistance against 
Israel and its infitah policies, especially among the Christians. By adopting 
what many observers might consider a ‘Christian discourse’, namely, the abo-
lition of political sectarianism in the people’s mentality, before abolishing 
it in the texts, Hizbullah is portraying a progressive-liberal, and pragmatic 
view towards the abolishment of political sectarianism, which is in confor-
mity with the stance of the Maronite church and the papal guidance. The late 
pope’s call for fraternity and the inculcation of dialogue and tolerance among 
the Lebanese had a responsive cord in Hizbullah’s circles since most of it was 
reminiscent of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s discourse on Christian-Muslim under-
standing, mutual coexistence, and open and permanent dialogue.40 Hence, in 
an endeavor of rapprochement towards the Lebanese Christians, Hizbullah 
based its political program of dialogue with them on the papal guidance.41
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1.4 Tolerance and acceptance
According to a Hizbullah ideologue Shaykh Shafiq Jaradi42, the Rector of 
Al-Ma‘arif Al-Hikmiyya College, the concept of the ahl al-dhimma – which 
constituted part of the Prophetic tradition in the nascent Islamic state and 
continued to be practised throughout Islamic history, and in which dhimmis 
were obliged to pay the poll tax (jizya) – no longer informs Hizbullah’s ideol-
ogy. He and the intellectual Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah43 contended that Hizbul-
lah replaced the dhimmi concept by the concept of citizenship (muwatana), 
where both Muslims and non-Muslims should be treated equally under the 
umbrella of promulgated standing laws. As such the concept of jizya became 
unnecessary due to the removal of the need that gave rise to it in the first 
place. Both stressed that, even in the Islamic state, the dhimmis enjoy the 
same rights and privileges as any Muslim citizen. Like Jaradi, Fadlallah reiter-
ated that Islam is a tolerant religion: no compulsion in religion;44 quoting the 
Prophet, “There is no difference between a Muslim and a non-Muslim except 
on the grounds of piety… all believers are brothers.”
 Jaradi emphasized that Hizbullah’s discourse and practice convey toler-
ance and acceptance of the other. Quoting a saying attributed to Imam ‘Ali, 
he stressed that Hizbullah is primarily concerned with the human being and 
humanity at large: “People are of two types: either a brother in religion or a 
peer in morality, either a brother in Islam or an equal in humanity”. (Al-Nass 
sinfan: imma ahkun laka fi al-din, aww nadhirun laka fi al-khalaq). Building 
on Imam ‘Ali’s statement, Abd Al-Halim Fadlallah employed his own ijtihad 
(independent reasoning) stressing, “we are all brothers in humanity” (“kuluna 
ikhwa fi al-insaniyya”).45 Jaradi portrayed Islam as a way of life and a message 
(risala). He added that only through dialogue could a common understand-
ing be reached. Jaradi cited verse 16:125 of the Qur’an:
Call to the way of your Lord with 1) wisdom and 2) mild exhortation, and 3) argue 
with them in the best manner. Your Lord surely knows best those who stray from 
His path, and He knows well those who are rightly guided (id‘i ila sabili rabik bi 
al-hikma wa al-maw‘iza al-hasana, wa jadilhum bi al-lati hiya ahsan…).
So da‘wa may only be with the Qur’an, not the ‘sword’46 or other compulsion 
(Jadiluhum bi al-lati hiya ahsan: debate with them on the basis of that which 
is better).
 In the political sphere, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Musawi, a Hizbullah intellectual, 
argued that Hizbullah applies the concept of citizenship in actual practice 
since the party had agreed to participate in the political system as it is, abiding 
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by the Ta’if stipulation of evenly dividing political office between Christians 
and Muslims, although demographically the latter constitute the majority 
of the population. As he puts it: “Hizbullah has accepted, and continues to 
accept, to give a larger share of the political representation to the Christians 
in Lebanon, more than their real proportion to the total population, as a way 
to ensure the social and political stability of the country.” According to al-
Musawi this demonstrates the party’s ability to give priority to preserving the 
concept of citizenship and civil society through the practice of tolerance and 
acceptance of the ‘other’: “All people are the family of God, and the most cher-
ished by God is the one who is good to them.”47
 It seems that the Hizbullah cadres quoted above agree with Gebran Khalil 
Gebran: “Pity the nation that is full of beliefs and empty of religion.” Gebran 
regarded sects/denominations as social phenomena that rely on human inter-
ests. He considered belief/faith as love, the love of God.48
 In its 30 November 2009 Manifesto, Hizbullah paid special attention to the 
plight of the Christian Arabs and admonished against discord and sectarian 
strife that are rupturing the umma:
Our societal cohesion is threatened by heightened sectarian tensions and insti-
gated confessional frictions, especially between the Sunnis and the Shi‘ites. The 
fabrication of national contradictions between the Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs, 
and between the Iranians and the Arabs, the intimidation of minorities, the continu-
ous hemorrhage suffered by Christian Arabs in the East and especially in Palestine, 
Iraq, and Lebanon, are all factors that menace our societal structure, reduce collec-
tive immunity, and intensify those barriers against renaissance and development.49
1.5 Conclusion: From dhimmis to citizens
In the 1980s, Hizbullah advocated the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Lebanon and maintained the potential of an ahl al-dhimmi category. In spite 
of Hizbullah’s exhortation of the Christians to convert to Islam, it did not 
seek to impose this conversion by force. Rather, the party applied its theory 
of tolerance to those Christians living in its constituencies, as well as to other 
Christians, as long as they were not ‘treacherous or aggressive’. In conformity 
with the Prophetic tradition and the Qur’an, Hizbullah stressed that there 
should be “no compulsion in religion” and an “equitable world” or common 
grounds that should guide relationships between Muslims and Christians. As 
such, Hizbullah stressed that the common grounds between ahl al-dhimma 
and Muslims are the social values of mutual tolerance, respect, brotherhood, 
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and solidarity. On this basis, Hizbullah recognized the human freedom, i.e. 
social and religious freedom of Christians, but not the political autonomy 
as was the case in the 1926 French Mandate Constitution and 1943 Indepen-
dence Constitution. Thus, in the 1980s, contrary to the Prophetic tradition 
that granted non-Muslims partnership in political structures, Hizbullah’s tol-
erance or ‘inclusiveness’ excluded Christians from political life, which could 
be regarded as a discriminatory practice. Hizbullah’s then policy seemed to 
imply that tolerance is the responsibility of the ‘majority’ and integration is 
the responsibility of the ‘minority’. Most likely Hizbullah’s attitude towards 
Christians as dhimmis was a specific interpretation of the Prophet’s political 
Constitution of Medina, but it may also have been inspired by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s constitution. It is a further possibility that Hizbullah might 
have been influenced towards change by the late leading Lebanese marja‘ 
(religious authority) Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah who, 
grounding his argument in the Qur’an, argued that the Muslim stance towards 
Christians is anchored upon the horizon of mutual coexistence, cooperation, 
and dialogue that should be based on points of convergence and common 
grounds with which all parties agree.
 Since the early 1990s, Hizbullah regarded founding an Islamic state as a 
‘legal abstraction’ and dropped their demands for its implementation in Leba-
non. This paved the way for the party to employ the concept of muwatana 
(citizenship) instead of ahl al-dhimma. Hizbullah’s intellectuals based this 
current practice on a new interpretation of the Prophetic tradition as sanc-
tioned by Shi‘ite jurisprudence. And so, from the 1980s to the 1990s and into 
the 21st century, Hizbullah has made great strides forward in acknowledging 
the human, civil, economic, social, cultural, and most importantly the politi-
cal rights of the so called ex-dhimmis, recognizing their right to full citizen-
ship, citizens of equal status and rights. This is not a rhetorical shift, rather it is 
a major policy alteration being implemented and aimed at making the ‘other’ 
secure in a shared Lebanese polity that might one day be dominated by the 
Shi‘ite majority.
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   44 26-4-2011   13:42:14
45
2 Interpretation and Authority: 
Wilayat Al-Faqih1
Abstract
After three decades of the ‘victory’ of the Islamic Revolution in Iran it is 
worthwhile to study how Imam Khumayni’s initial theory of wilayat al-faqih 
has developed in the political thought of Hizbullah as regards to the frame-
work of molding and interpreting the original theory to make it adaptable to 
the Lebanese social and political conditions. Hizbullah employed wilayat al-
faqih as a cornerstone in its religious-political ideology from 1978 to the pres-
ent. The party managed to mold the doctrine through the successive changes 
in the political system by shifting its ideology in order to become a key player 
capable of affecting the dynamic changes taking place in the Lebanese public 
sphere. Although it is assumed in many circles that Hizbullah is the proxy of 
Syria and Iran, concentrating on the assumed Iranian influence, this chapter 
argues that Hizbullah pursued an independent course of action in its attempt 
to influence the Lebanese political system.
2.1 Introduction
Most secondary sources brand Iran and its contended “brainchild”, the Leba-
nese resistance movement Hizbullah, with militant revolutionary tendencies, 
which do not conform to the tenets of the international community’s stan-
dards of democratic values that govern civil society. Is Hizbullah an Iranian 
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party operating in Lebanon, or a Lebanese militant party supported by Iran, 
which has to obey Iran and be its tool of policy in the Middle East?
 Hizbullah was able to modify its identity from its founding as an Islamic 
movement of social and political protest (1978-1985), to a full-fledged social 
movement (1985-1991), to a parliamentary political party (1992 to the pres-
ent). Hizbullah tried to preserve its Islamic identity, and at the same time, 
work within the confines of the Lebanese political system. On these grounds, 
the party recognized the Lebanese state. In spite of being perceived as having 
a political-strategic partnership with Syria2 and a strategic-ideological alli-
ance with Iran3, Hizbullah is not a mere tool of policy in Syrian and Iranian 
hands. On the contrary, the party has pursued an independent course of deci-
sion making in conformity with the specificities (khususiyyat) of the Lebanese 
political equation, until it succeeded in May 2008 in obtaining veto power in 
the cabinet, the council of ministers, the main executive body of the country, 
thus controlling the political system to a greater extent. After its defeat in the 
June 2009 legislative elections, it backtracked and contented itself with the 
participation of two of their ministers in a power-sharing cabinet, waiving its 
earlier gain of veto power for the sake of consensual democracy, as it revealed 
in its 2009 Manifesto.
 After three decades of the ‘victory’ of the Islamic Revolution in Iran it is 
worthwhile to study how Imam Khumayni’s initial theory of wilayat al-faqih 
(guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult) has developed in the politi-
cal thought of the Lebanese Hizbullah regarding the framework of molding 
and interpreting the original theory to make it adaptable to the Lebanese 
social and political conditions. In the 1980s, Hizbullah regarded wilayat al-
faqih, as defined by Khumayni, as its true Islamic cultural identity and adopt-
ed it, in its original formulation, under the motto of: “The Islamic Revolution 
in Lebanon”. Hizbullah recognized Khumayni as the official marja‘ al-taqlid 
(religious-legal authority of emulation) of the Islamic Republic and as the 
first faqih (jurisprudent, jurisconsult) after al-ghayba al-kubra (Great Occul-
tation), and in contemporary history, to assume the title of the deputy of 
Imam al-Mahdi and to establish an Islamic state. As such, Hizbullah followed 
the religious authority of Iran and paid homage and allegiance to Khumayni 
as the political and religious leader of the umma, and abided by his wilayat 
al-faqih as a major pillar in its religious-political ideology. Hizbullah clari-
fied that from a religious and ideological stance, it regarded Khumayni with 
high esteem; after his death, the same allegiance and respect was accorded 
to Khamina’i, his officially chosen successor. Hizbullah based its argument, 
in the Lebanese context, on demographic realities (the fact that the Muslims 
constitute the majority of the population) and proposed that Lebanon become 
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part of the overall encompassing Islamic state. Hizbullah’s cadres argued for 
the necessity of establishing an Islamic order, stressing that social change 
must begin from the top by changing the political system and annihilating 
the ruling elite through a top-down revolutionary process.
 With the end of the sixteen-year civil war in 1990, Hizbullah’s post-Ta’if4 
discourse continues to portray a different image of its buttressing of civil 
society and democratic processes that encourage more social and political 
integration, rather than violence. Although the liberalization process in Iran 
might have affected Hizbullah’s policies, it did not at the expense of Hizbul-
lah’s autonomy of decision making and the Lebanese specificities. Is the Leba-
nese political structure forcing Hizbullah to take decisions that are not popu-
lar to the rank, file, and leaders? Is the Lebanese public sphere dictating a new 
strategy on Hizbullah, or is it transnational influences from Iran, or a little bit 
of both?
 Starting in the 1990s, Hizbullah portrayed a post-Islamist phase moving 
from exclusion to inclusion through interpreting the doctrine of wilayat al-
faqih in such a way that allows the party to maintain authority in the Lebanese 
sectarian-confessional system, apparently without compromising its doctri-
nal foundations. Employing a bottom-up Islamization strategy5, the party 
stressed that its religious and political ideology defends the establishment of 
an Islamic state, but as a political program it is not practical because of the 
confessional and sectarian nature of Lebanon, on the one hand, and opposi-
tion by the majority of the Lebanese, both Christians and Muslims, on the 
other. In other words, Hizbullah shelved its political ideology and practiced a 
down-to-earth pragmatic political program in an endeavor to reach out to the 
largest possible sector of the Lebanese populace. This resulted in a dramatic 
change in Hizbullah’s involvement in the Lebanese political system as it is. It 
not only participated in the parliamentary and municipal elections, but also, 
in 2005 joined the cabinet.
 In order to question the alleged ‘democratic character’ of political Shi‘ism 
and the ‘authoritarian nature’ of political Sunnism an anecdote is invoked. 
This is followed by Khumayni’s 1988 religious edict (fatwa), which suggests 
an authoritarian nature of wilayat al-faqih. Based on these insights this chap-
ter is divided into three parts demonstrating how Hizbullah employed the 
wilayat al-faqih doctrine in Lebanon as a cornerstone in its religious-political 
ideology from 1978 to the present, and how the party managed to mold the 
doctrine through the successive changes in the political system by shifting 
its ideology in order to become a key player capable of affecting the dynamic 
changes taking place in the Lebanese public sphere. Although it is assumed in 
many circles that Hizbullah is the proxy of Syria and Iran, concentrating on 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   47 26-4-2011   13:42:14
48 Interpretation and Authority: Wilayat Al-Faqih
the Iranian influence, this chapter shows that the party pursued an indepen-
dent course of action in its attempt to control the Lebanese political system.
2.2 Anecdote: Michel Foucault in Karbala’!
23 April 2003 coincided with the fortieth day in the commemoration of the 
‘martyrdom’ of Imam Husayn that occurred centuries ago in Karbala’ in 61 
AH/ 680 AD. It was the first time in around 35 years that the Iraqi Shi‘ites were 
free to participate in the pilgrimage to the holy city of Karbala’. A crowd of 
people estimated to be at least one million celebrated the occasion. Ritual is 
indeed a construction of the sacred6: the barefooted pilgrims beat their chests, 
slashed their scalps with swords, and whipped themselves with chains. They 
were not alone; Michel Foucault7 was there!
 Foucault’s reading of the Islamic Revolution is noteworthy since he saw in 
it a spiritual-esoteric dimension embedded in the heart of the political realm, 
in the sense that spiritualism takes from politics an eventuality or a place in 
which to ferment. It seems that Foucault judged rather fast in his reading 
and vision of the revolution when he made the analogy between democracy 
and Shi‘ism, on the one hand, and Sunnism and tyranny, on the other. Not 
only that, Foucault considered that there are safeguards militating against 
the Shi‘ite ‘ulama – the leaders of the theoretic republic – to keep it from 
transforming into tyranny. However, these bones of contention should not 
prevent the reader from seeing Foucault’s new vision at the time; namely, his 
innovation of the concept of ‘political spiritualism’. According to him, ‘politi-
cal spiritualism’ is based upon the premise that the esoteric dimension of the 
revolution would, in the final analysis, outweigh its exoteric aspect, especially 
since the ‘holy commemorational dimension’ and ‘political opposition’ are 
intertwined. Foucault considered Shi‘ism not only to be an ideological tool 
used by the revolutionaries against the authority8, but also to be rooted in 
resistance and opposition to power and tyranny as such. He contended that 
Shi‘ism contains a political stance different from any other because it is based 
on the desire of the self to be completely “different from what it is now.”9 Fou-
cault’s religious discourse gives room for humanistic ambitions since these 
ambitions are not only economical or nationalistic, but also based on a meta-
physical dimension. This explains, across Shi‘ite history, the transformation 
of mobilization to a political force, which became a model for an ‘extreme 
desire’ in social and organic solidarity, in the Durkheimian sense. The Islamic 
Revolution afforded fundamental importance to the Foucaultian problematic, 
even if it later on took a different twist than his original expectations. What 
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can be expected today from the Karbala’ populace? Could there be any mate-
rialization of either the esoteric dimension or ‘political spiritualism’? On this 
occasion Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-general, argued, “The 
US wants us to witness only defeat”, insinuating that the Karbala’ populace 
would mark a ‘spirited resistance’ to the US presence in Iraq.10 It is most likely 
that the aforementioned statement could be construed along the lines of Fou-
cault’s notions. Not surprisingly, Nasrallah’s annual ‘Ashura discourse embeds 
the esoteric dimension, especially spiritualism. In January 2009, he invoked 
what remains of God on earth: “ya baqiyya min Allah ‘ala al-ard”.
2.3 The controversy surrounding the interpretation 
of Wilayat Al-Faqih doctrine: Khumayni’s 1988 
Fatwa
During Khumayni’s final days, there appeared to be a kind of emerging prob-
lem vis-à-vis the prerogatives of the jurisprudent (al-waliyy al-faqih)11. Sayyid 
‘Ali Khamina’i, the president of the Islamic Republic at the time and the current 
faqih, declared in his Friday speech of 31 December 198812 his condemnation 
of the expanded prerogatives of the Minister of Labor, thus indirectly criticiz-
ing the theory of absolute wilaya (al-wilaya al-mutlaqa) or the comprehensive 
authority of the faqih. Khamina’i remarked that the comprehensive authority 
of the faqih is something separate from the function of the state. He added 
that it is still unclear, even to those who were supposed to preach it, let alone 
to rule according to it. The incident outraged Khumayni and prompted him 
to write a letter aimed at clarifying and defending his theory, thus introducing 
new prerogatives pertaining to the space of authority the faqih is entitled to.
 Among other things, in his fatwa Khumayni stressed,
it is incumbent upon me to clarify that government branches from the Prophet’s 
absolute wilaya and is one of the primary injunctions of Islam, thus takes prece-
dence over all secondary ordinances, even over prayer, pilgrimage, and fasting… 
the government can one-sidedly annul any shari‘i [religious] treaties conducted 
with the populace, if it considers it in opposition to the interests [masalih, sing. 
maslaha] of the umma or Islam. Further, the government could thwart any reli-
gious or non-religious practice if it regards it detrimental to the interests of Islam 
or if it deems it so. 13
Therefore, Khumayni stipulated that the maslaha of the Islamic order, or its 
agencies, gains priority over any other principle in social and political affairs. 
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As such, Khumayni developed the theory of absolute wilaya in a way that 
could perfectly serve his political ends through giving the faqih absolute 
political and religious power. Khumayni’s innovation was to unequivocally 
and cogently transform wilayat al-faqih into a system of political admin-
istration. Thus, Khumayni in his capacity as the faqih and marja‘ al-taqlid, 
blended Imama (Imamate) with wilaya and marja‘iyya (religious author-
ity), which is a precedent in Shi‘ite religio-political ideology. This is of vital 
importance since in Shi‘ite jurisprudence “the ruler’s injunction abrogates the 
jurist’s fatwa” (hukum al-hakim yanqud fatwa al-mujtahid), if the maslaha of 
the Islamic order requires such a course of action.14 Thus, Khumayni believed 
in and practiced absolute wilaya. And so, it seems that Khumayni’s 1988 fatwa 
qualified Foucault’s claim of democratic aspects and lack of tyranny in politi-
cal Shi‘ism.
2.4 First stage (1978-1985)
Wilayat al-faqih
Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih was successfully imported to Lebanon, serving 
as a blue print of a progressive Islamic state that was emulated to the letter 
by Hizbullah in its constituencies. Illustrating the vital importance given to 
becoming a member of ‘Ummat Hizbullah’, a Hizbullah cadre told me on con-
dition of anonymity that a person, who tried to join the party but failed the 
process of screening (ta’tir) that Hizbullah’s prospective members undergo 
three times, came with a bomb action assault rifle and killed his recruiting 
officer. Another member told me that as practice of indoctrination and as a 
baptism/initiation ceremony, new Hizbullah recruits had to repeatedly state: 
“If the jurisprudent told you to kill yourself, then you have to do it” (idha qala 
laka al-waliyy al-faqih ‘an auqtul nafsak, fa ‘alayka dhalik).15 This not only 
illustrates indoctrination, but also the total obedience to the faqih.
 In the early 1980s, Khumayni instructed Khamina’i, who was at the time 
deputy Minister of Defense, to take full responsibility of the Lebanese Hizbul-
lah. Since then, Khamina’i became Hizbullah’s ‘godfather’. That is why, since its 
inception, Hizbullah, based on a religious and ideological stance, fully abides 
by the ideas and opinions of Khumayni as communicated by Khamina’i. Dur-
ing that period, the religious-ideological bond between the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Lebanon could be examined from the following declarations by 
Hizbullah and Iranian officials. Shaykh Hasan Trad: “Iran and Lebanon are 
one people in one country”; Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid: “We do not 
say that we are part of Iran, we are Iran in Lebanon and Lebanon in Iran”; 
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Ali Akbar Muhtashami: “We are going to support Lebanon politically and 
militarily like we buttress one of our own Iranian districts”; Shaykh Hasan 
Srur: “We declare to the whole world that the Islamic Republic of Iran is our 
mother, religion, Ka‘ba, and our veins”.16
2.5 Second Stage (1985-1991)
Wilayat al-faqih
In stages one and two, Hizbullah argued that during the early phase of its 
formation, it needed a unifying religious-political ideology, rather than an 
elaborate political program. So Hizbullah based itself on wilayat al-faqih and 
regarded Khumayni as the jurisconsult of all the Muslims.17 In stage one, Hiz-
bullah was, ideologically, completely dependent on Khumayni. In stage two 
this dependency witnessed some leeway in the sense that Hizbullah did not 
blindly follow the Iranian regime; rather it had some specificity (khususiyya), 
since in his capacity as the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) he was endowed with 
the sole right to determine the legitimacy (legitimate authority) to Hizbullah. 
Khumayni highlighted certain precepts within which Hizbullah could move 
freely; however, he left their implementation to the party’s discretion. Thus, 
although Hizbullah was ideologically dependent on the Iranian regime, it had 
some room to maneuver in its decisions pertaining to some cases in Lebanese 
domestic issues. Even though the multiplicity of marja‘s among the Shi‘ites 
continued after Khumayni’s death, in Hizbullah’s case the issue of marja’iyya 
has been determined on the doctrinal-ideological basis of following the offi-
cial marja‘ al-taqlid, who is recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, 
Hizbullah’s religious authority was, still is, and will continue to be the Iranian 
faqih. This made the transition after Khumayni’s death smoother in the end of 
the second stage and the beginning of the third stage.
2.6 Islamic state in relation to wilayat al-faqih 
(stages I and II)
In the first and second stages (1978-1991), Hizbullah considered the Qur’an 
as the constitution of the Islamic umma, and Islam both a religious as well 
as a governmental order (din wa dawla). Hizbullah enjoined the Muslims to 
strive, using all legitimate means, in order to implement the Islamic order, 
wherever they might be.18
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 In stages one and two, Hizbullah considered the Lebanese political sys-
tem, which is dominated by the political Maronites, as a jahiliyya (pre-Islamic 
pagan) system. Hizbullah applied this classification to every non-Islamic sys-
tem: be it patriotic, democratic, or nationalistic, even if it were to be governed 
by Muslims.19 In other words, in the first and second stages, Hizbullah pur-
sued the establishment of an Islamic state, respectively from the perspective 
of a religious and a political ideology. Religious ideology, as Hizbullah’s lead-
ing cadres argued, was to instate God’s sovereignty and divine governance 
on earth through hakimiyya and the execution of God’s law by instituting an 
Islamic order as a taklif shar‘i (religious and legal obligation).20 As a political 
ideology, Hizbullah did not want to impose the Islamic order by force unless 
an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese voted in its favor through a refer-
endum. This should be taken with apprehension since Hizbullah’s rhetoric, in 
stages one and two, was different from what it was actually doing in reality; in 
the sense of being actively engaged in preparing the ground for establishing 
an Islamic order, at least in its constituencies.
2.7 Third Stage (1992 to the present)
Wilayat al-faqih
The year of 1992 was a central year in shaping Hizbullah’s evolving identity. 
The party faced a challenge in deciding whether to participate in the par-
liamentary elections or not. Hizbullah’s 12-member committee took a posi-
tive decision after much heated internal debate and discussions,21 followed 
by Iranian arbitration (tahkim). Since the faqih is the one who determines 
‘legitimacy’ (even in practical political matters), Khamina’i had to intercede 
and grant legitimacy for participation.22 This caused a considerable schism 
within Hizbullah because Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizbullah’s first secretary-general, 
contested the decision and pursued a confrontational stance with both the 
party and the Lebanese state.23
 By interpreting the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih in a new light, the commit-
tee recommended that participation in the elections be a beneficiary must, 
which is in harmony with Hizbullah’s holistic vision that favors living up to 
the expectations of the people by serving their socio-economic and political 
interests. It added that Hizbullah’s greater jihad and dedication to addressing 
the plight of the people does not contradict its priority of smaller military 
jihad for the sake of the liberation of occupied land. As such, participating 
in the elections leads to the achievement of good political results, and is also 
regarded as a leading step towards interaction with others. By this Hizbullah 
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presents a novel experience in the infitah (‘opening-up’) of a young Islamic 
party. The committee stressed that this participation is in accordance with the 
Lebanese specificities as well as the nature of the proposed elections, which 
allow for a considerable margin of freedom of choice. In short, the committee 
concluded that the sum total of the pros (masalih) outweighs the cons (mafa-
sid) by far. That is why participation in the parliament is worthwhile since it is 
viewed as one of the ways of influencing change and making Hizbullah’s voice 
heard, not only domestically, but also regionally and internationally through 
the podiums made available to the members of parliament.24 Thus, it seems 
that Hizbullah was forced by the political circumstances, the Ta‘if Agreement, 
Lebanon’s new 1990 constitution, and the end of the civil war, to change to a 
new phase in its history by propagating a matter-of-fact political program and 
by co-opting with the Lebanese system.
2.8 Hizbullah gains more independence in decision 
making, consolidating its financial resources: 
NGOs and civil institutions25
A further shift occurred in the interpretation of the authority of the faqih in 
the third stage when Hizbullah argued that it does not consider the regime 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran as the jurisconsult of all the Muslims, and 
in consequence, not all Islamic movements have to abide by the orders and 
directives of the faqih or the regime.26 Another shift occurred, when, in May 
1995, Khamina’i appointed Nasrallah, and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, head 
of the religio-judicial council, as his religious deputies (wakilayn shar‘iyyan) 
in Lebanon. This move granted Hizbullah special prerogatives and delegated 
responsibilities (taklif shar‘i) that reflect a great independence in practical 
performance. Thus, Hizbullah consolidated its financial resources since the 
one-fifth religious tax (khums) imposed on those Lebanese Shi‘ites who fol-
low Khamina’i as their authority of emulation (marja‘), as well as their alms 
(zakat) and religious (shar‘i) monies have poured directly into Hizbullah cof-
fers, instead of being channeled through Iran, as had been the case. Already 
before 1995, these monies had allowed Hizbullah to found an efficient network 
of NGOs and social welfare institutions that are open to the public irrespective 
of communal origin. These include the Martyr’s Association, the Association 
of the Wounded, the Association of Lebanese Prisoners27, the Islamic Resis-
tance Support Association, the Institution of the Good Loan, the Associa-
tion of Islamic Health, the Institution of Construction and Development, the 
Association of the Relief Committees of Imam Khumayni, and the Associa-
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tion of Islamic Pedagogy and Education, all established over the period 1982-
1991. In addition, Hizbullah boasts its own media and research institutions. Its 
weekly mouthpiece al-‘Ahd, established in 1984, was renamed al-Intiqad28 (in 
2001); it founded Baqiyyat Allah Journal in 1991 with the aim of inculcating 
Islamic values and culture. Its think tank, the Consultative Center for Stud-
ies and Documentation (CCSD), and its al-Nour satellite radio station were 
both founded in 1988. The flagship al-Manar29 TV, the only satellite channel 
belonging to an Islamist movement in the Middle East, was watched by 18 
million people in 2009.30
 The interpretation of authority took another dramatic shift after the Syrian 
withdrawal in April 2005. In conformity with its policy to change when cir-
cumstances change, Hizbullah seems to switch from Iranian to local authority 
when it suits its purposes. Although the watershed decision to participate in 
the Lebanese cabinet ideologically required the shar‘i judgment and legiti-
macy of the faqih, Hizbullah set a precedent by apparently securing the legiti-
macy from Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi31 – the head of the Association of Shi‘ite 
Religious Scholars of Jabal ‘Amil (Ra’is Hay’at ‘Ulama’ Jabal ‘Amil)32 in south 
Lebanon – and not Khamina‘i, which indicates more independence in deci-
sion making. Thus, Hizbullah heeds Lebanese religious authority in addition 
to the Iranian one and therefore, Hizbullah’s participation in the Lebanese 
cabinet was relegated to an administrative matter. As a consequence, Hiz-
bullah’s leadership was capable of taking independent decisions. Instantly, 
Hizbullah joined the cabinet with two ministers and proliferated in Lebanese 
state institutions and the administrative structure just before the conservative 
Iranian president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, and his government were sworn 
to power in Iran. This led to increased Lebanonization that is more in line 
with the specificities of the Lebanese society, rather than blind adherence to 
Iran. And so, Hizbullah moved from complete ideological dependency on 
Khumayni in the first stage, to less dependency after his death in the sec-
ond stage. Finally, in the third stage, Hizbullah gained more independence in 
decision making, not only in practical political issues, but also in military and 
doctrinal issues, to the extent that it seems as if Hizbullah exercised almost 
independent decision making, at least in some cases. Even in military matters 
Hizbullah does not always heed Iranian orders if they do not serve its overall 
interest (maslaha). Two cases in point that illustrate this trend are Sharon’s 
‘April 2002 West Bank counterterrorism offensive’ and Barak’s December 
2008-January 2009 ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in Gaza. Iran strongly urged Hiz-
bullah to open the northern front across the Lebanese-Israeli border in order 
to release pressure on the Palestinians33, but Hizbullah adamantly refused 
because such a move was considered detrimental to its national interest.34 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   54 26-4-2011   13:42:16
55 Lebanonization or infitah (‘opening-up’)
This trend continued after Ahmadinejad won a second term in the controver-
sial June 2009 presidential elections.
 Although Hizbullah was inspired by the Islamic Revolution, it operates 
like any ordinary political party functioning within a non-Islamic state and 
a multireligious, confessional, and sectarian state. While the Iranian Hizbul-
lah was instrumental in building a state, the Lebanese Hizbullah cannot go 
beyond being a political party operating within the Lebanese public sphere. 
That is why, for instance, in the parliamentary elections, Hizbullah reached 
out and allied itself with secular parties and former enemies on the Lebanese 
scene, like any political party that accommodated its protest by negotiations 
and bargaining, making compromises on some doctrinal aspects. By engag-
ing in a pluralistic process, Hizbullah moved from cooptation to contestation, 
and finally to exercising empowerment (tamkin). Hizbullah’s participation in 
electoral politics could be regarded as cooptation. The party’s gradual integra-
tion in the Lebanese public sphere falls under contestation. Hizbullah’s ascen-
dancy to the political scene becoming a nationalistic political party could be 
viewed from the stance of empowerment.
2.9 Lebanonization35 or infitah (‘opening-up’)
In the first two stages Hizbullah viewed its mission to liberate Lebanon from 
the shackles of political Maronism and the Lebanese sectarian-confessional 
political system that is based upon ‘situational laws’ – (al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya), 
that is to say, positive (man-made) laws and legislations such as state consti-
tutions – and establish instead the shari‘a (Islamic law), which could only be 
instated by hakimiyya through a pure and uncompromising Islamic order. 
Hizbullah argued that abiding by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya instead of Islamic 
shari‘a is entirely prohibited both from a religious and political ideological 
perspective. In stage one, under the influence of Khumayni, Hizbullah argued 
that abiding by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya instead of Islamic shari‘a, is totally un-
Islamic.36 In stage two, in line with Khumayni, Hizbullah argued that abiding 
by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya instead of Islamic shari‘a, is the second out of four 
ways colonialism seeks to distort Islam.37
 The major shift in the third stage is that Hizbullah became satisfied with al-
qawanin al-wad‘iyya and even contributed to their legislation through its MPs 
in the parliament. Hizbullah stressed that although the Qur’an, Sunna, and 
the shari‘a are the sources and bases of legislation, some issues in life could 
be referred to other sources, which stands in direct contrast to Hizbullah’s 
interpretation of wilayat al-faqih in the first two stages. Hizbullah argued that 
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the shari‘a, as a socially constructed phenomenon is flexible and can account 
for all the complexities of modern life.
 The shift that happened in the third stage could be attributed to the trans-
formation of Iranian politics after the death of Khumayni as well as to a 
change in Hizbullah’s own internal dynamics. For instance, there was a clear 
alteration in the Iranian stance from Khumayni’s 1986 fatwa – which stipu-
lated that the Lebanese system is illegitimate and criminal and Khamina’i’s 
argument for the necessity of the Muslims to rule Lebanon since they com-
prise the majority of the population38 – to Khamina’i’s 1992 ruling in favor 
of participation in the parliamentary elections, which Hizbullah interpreted 
as its unequivocal right to proliferate in the Lebanese political system as a 
whole, including state institutions and administration. As mentioned earli-
er, Hizbullah made compromises on some doctrinal issues by allying itself, 
in the legislative and municipal elections, on the same election slate, with 
ideological enemies, like any political party that accommodated its protest 
by negotiations and bargaining with a wide spectrum of groups across the 
Lebanese myriad. Thus, Hizbullah compromised its ideology in such a way to 
interpret its authority by shelving its demand for the founding of an Islamic 
state, which might seem contradictory to the tenets of wilayat al-faqih.
2.10 Stage three: An application of the progressive 
nature of Shi‘ite jurisprudence
Lebanon is our country and the country of our fathers and forefathers; it is also the 
country of our children and grandchildren and all future generations. We want it 
sovereign, free, independent, strong and unified… we reject partition and federal-
ism.39
Bearing in mind that there are multiple paths of modernity available to the 
emerging Muslim public sphere leading to the creation of a new civil society, 
where Islamic values can be created and injected into new senses of a public 
space that is “discursive, performative, and participative,”40 Nasrallah clarified 
that Hizbullah benefits from its jurisprudential vision which believes in the 
doctrine of wilayat al-faqih that gives it the legitimacy of having a political 
program in a multicultural, multireligious country characterized by plural-
ist groupings and forces, without encroaching upon its doctrinal-ideological, 
Islamic-religious convictions.41 In May 2008, after the Hizbullah-led opposi-
tion gained veto power in the Lebanese cabinet, Nasrallah reiterated, “I am 
honored to be a member of the party of wilayat al-faqih. The just, knowl-
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edgeable, wise, courageous, righteous, honest, and faithful faqih… Wilayat al-
faqih tells us [Hizbullah] that Lebanon is a multiconfessional, multireligious 
(mutanawwi‘, muta‘adid) country that you have to preserve and uphold”.42 
With this unshakable commitment to wilayat al-faqih, Hizbullah reformu-
lated what it meant by an Islamic state by making a categorical distinction 
between al-fikr al-siyasi (political ideology) that it maintained and al-barn-
amaj al-siyasi (political program) that it promoted. From an ideological per-
spective Hizbullah is committed to an Islamic state, and it will not be dropped 
as a ‘legal abstraction’. However, Hizbullah’s political program has to take into 
account the political status quo and the overall functioning of the Lebanese 
political system. Hizbullah characterizes the Lebanese political situation as 
a complicated mold of sectarian-confessional specificities that prohibit the 
establishment of an Islamic state, not only from a practical perspective, but 
also from a doctrinal one. Hizbullah’s political ideology stipulates that an 
Islamic state should be established on solid foundations having full legitimacy 
and sovereignty from the people. Since the general will of the Lebanese people 
is against the establishment of an Islamic state, then it is not plausible to estab-
lish one.43 On 30 November 2009, after revealing Hizbullah’s new political 
platform/Manifesto, which neither mentioned the Islamic state nor referred 
to wilayat al-faqih, Nasrallah affirmed in answer to a question that there is no 
contradiction/opposition between belief in wilayat al-faqih, on the one hand, 
and the erection of a strong institutionalized Lebanese state, on the other. On 
the contrary, wilayat al-faqih sanctioned and allowed Hizbullah’s integration 
into the political system. Not only that, in line with the Vatican’s position and 
the papal guidance, Nasrallah added that Hizbullah believes that Lebanon is 
a blessing and has accomplished great historical achievements. He reiterated 
Imam Musa al-Sadr’s stance that “Lebanon is the definitive nation to all its 
citizens (Lubnan watan niha’i li-jami‘ abna’ihi)”, which is in conformity with 
the Lebanese constitution.44
 Thus, Hizbullah shifted its position through its acceptance of and engage-
ment in the democratic process under a sectarian-confessional political and 
administrative system. More dramatically, Hizbullah’s political program mod-
ified its demand from the abolition of political sectarianism, to the adoption 
of the political Maronite discourse, which stresses the abolition of political 
sectarianism in mentality, before eradicating it in the texts.45 In line with the 
Ta‘if Agreement, its earlier election programs, and Nabih Berri’s recent call,46 
Hizbullah’s 2009 Manifesto, called for the establishment of the ‘National Body 
for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism’ since sectarianism is perceived as 
a threat to consensual democracy and national coexistence. 47 Although Nas-
rallah deemed the sectarian system a tribal system, he clarified:
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Let us be realistic. The abolition of political sectarianism is one of the most dif-
ficult issues and cannot be accomplished overnight… nobody can dictate how to 
abolish it in a sentence or two. Rather, if after years of debate, ranging from five to 
thirty years, we find out that political sectarianism cannot be abolished, then let 
us be bold enough to say that what we agreed upon in the Ta’if Agreement cannot 
be realized. But till then, the Lebanese need to establish the ‘National Body for the 
Abolishment of Political Sectarianism’ in order to initiate the debate in a construc-
tive manner.48
 On 13 January 2010, Berri laid down his vision on a gradual plan for the 
abolition of political sectarianism by initiating the ‘National Body for the 
Abolishment of Political Sectarianism’. Michel ‘Aun, the leader of the Hizbul-
lah allied Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), voiced his opinion arguing that 
the abolition of political sectarianism should be linked to an overall politi-
cal reform that delineates the effective limitations of the political system. 
According to him, an arbitrary abolition of political sectarianism amounts to 
a complete overhaul in the political system. ‘Aun added that there are many 
constitutional articles that need to be amended before entertaining the idea 
of abolishing political sectarianism or putting it into practice.49 The Maronite 
Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Butrus Sfeir weighed on the debate reiterating the 
need to abolishing political sectarianism from Lebanese people’s mentality 
before removing it from legal texts, or else nothing was bound to change. In 
turn, PM Sa‘d al-Hariri stressed that such an issue required the consensus of 
all the Lebanese.50 Some Christian right-wing parties contended that such a 
move constitutes a threat to consensual democracy. Ironically, others called 
for the establishment of the ‘National Body for the Abolition of Hizbullah’s 
weapons’.51 Basing itself on its demographic strength, Hizbullah called for 
reducing the voting age from 21 to 1852 and changing the electoral system 
to proportional representation, which the party believed would give the 18 
ethno-confessional communities more equitable representation.53
 As a political remuneration for its acclaimed ‘divine victory’ in the July 
2006 war54 with Israel, Hizbullah asked for the formation of a national unity 
cabinet, where the party and its Christian allies, mainly the FPM, wield the 
one-third veto power, thus attempting to dominate the national political are-
na, after wielding power over the legislature and the presidency. The tug of 
war between the Hizbullah-led opposition (March 8 Group), on the one hand, 
and the Lebanese cabinet and its supporters (March 14 Trend), on the other, 
led to a bitter polarization, which plunged Lebanon into 537 days of stalemate 
and political deadlock, from 1 December 2006 to 21 May 2008. The political 
agreement of 21 May – known as the ‘Doha Accord’ between March 14 and 
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March 8, negotiated by the Arab League – granted Hizbullah veto power in 
the next national unity 30-member cabinet55 by a margin of eleven ministers, 
while March 14 acquired sixteen ministers and the president three. Hizbul-
lah ended its sit-in in downtown Beirut and dismantled its tent city. After six 
months of vacuum in the seat of the presidency, something unprecedented in 
Lebanese history, the consensus president army commander general Michel 
Sulayman was elected on 25 May by 118 votes out of 127 MPs. The next day 
Hizbullah celebrated the eighth anniversary of the nearly complete Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon through a fiery speech delivered by Nasrallah, 
who stressed that Hizbullah abides by the Ta’if Agreement and will honor the 
Doha Accord to the letter, and will continue to participate in the political sys-
tem as it is.56 Nasrallah’s stance remained the same after the fiasco of March 
8 to become the majority in the June 2009 legislative elections.57 This culmi-
nated in the formation of a national unity cabinet on 9 November 2009, based 
on the previously agreed power-sharing formula: fifteen seats for March 14; 
five for the centralist coalition of the president; and ten for March 8. Thus, 
contrary to its military power and demographic strength, in an endeavor to 
uphold consensual democracy, Hizbullah contented itself with two ministers.
2.11 Conclusion
Through heavy reliance on a strict application of Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih 
in the 1980s, ‘Hizbullah – The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ emerged as a 
strong internal organization with a limited following. Subhi al-Tufayli’s firm, 
uncompromising political discourse and his repeated references to the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state, which was unprecedented in Lebanese political 
discourse, backfired domestically, alienating the party from other political 
and social movements and from the Lebanese public sphere to a great extent. 
Thus, Hizbullah’s policies were counterproductive, leading to the failure of 
integration into Lebanese political life, especially after the party’s initial vehe-
ment criticisms of the Ta‘if Agreement.
 Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Hizbullah has been confronting 
major developments in Lebanon: prominently, the emergence of a pluralistic 
public sphere and increasing openness toward other communities, political 
parties, and interest groups in the Lebanese myriad. Through a new interpre-
tation of wilayat al-faqih, Hizbullah altered its discourse, priorities, and over-
all political outlook. The mixed confessional space in Lebanon led Hizbullah 
to move from marginalization to infitah, which led the party to become a 
major player in the Lebanese public sphere by participating in the parliamen-
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tary and municipal elections, and even obtaining veto power in PM Sany-
ura’s cabinet of 2008-2009. In short, since the early 1990s, Hizbullah started 
promoting its Islamic identity and agenda by following a pragmatic political 
program, mainly to allay the fears of Christians and other Muslims who were 
opposed to the Islamic state. In the meantime, Hizbullah remained faithful to 
its Shi‘ite constituency by employing a bottom-up Islamization process and 
working within the Lebanese state’s political and administrative structures, 
while, at the same time, establishing Islamic institutions within civil society.
 And so, in the third stage Hizbullah faced the problem of reconciling its 
political ideology with political reality. Thus, the Party shifted from a jihadi 
outlook to a more flexible shari‘a perspective. Hizbullah portrayed a distin-
guished expediency in its political program in an attempt to reconcile, as 
much as possible, among its principles, aims, and political ideology, on the 
one hand, and the circumstances and its objective capabilities, on the other 
hand, by relying heavily on the jurisprudential concepts of necessity, vices, 
and interests as a kind of Islamic prima facie duty. This is how Hizbullah’s 
pragmatism was conducive in forging a marriage of convenience between 
political ideology and political reality, to the extent of pursuing a policy of 
infitah sanctioned by its political program.
 Thus, the logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese state pre-
vailed over the logic of the revolution. The party justifies and legitimizes its 
political program by resorting to Qur‘anic and jurisprudential bases. Signifi-
cantly, the Shi‘ite religio-political heritage conferred upon Hizbullah all the 
authenticity it needed in order to derive from it a political program based on 
flexibility and pragmatism. Relying on the progressive nature of Shi‘ite juris-
prudence, Hizbullah remolded, constructed, and interpreted its authority in 
such a way to render legitimacy to its participation in a pluralist polity based 
upon the quota system and patronage. And so, through this heavy reliance on 
Shi‘ite jurisprudence, especially the concept of maslaha, Hizbullah was able to 
change parallel with the circumstances, through its pragmatic interpretation 
and metamorphosis of wilayat al-faqih. This proved to be flexible, capable 
of functioning in a multiconfessional, multireligious society such as Leba-
non, and not only in, more or less, monolithic Iran where the overwhelming 
majority of the population are Twelver Shi‘ites.
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3 Political Violence: Terrorism 
and 9/111
Abstract
Highlighting the long lineage between Islamic and national resistance, this 
chapter examines the interrelation between the process of Hizbullah’s domes-
tic integration and its regional militancy. It focuses on Hizbullah’s discourse 
on terrorism, particularly after 9/11. The next chapter attempts to analyze 
Hizbullah’s political and religious dimensions of ‘jihad’ and suicide bombing 
(‘martyrdom’) for the different levels of action (domestic and regional) and 
also discusses the party’s view of martyrdom and jihad in relation to the ter-
rorism charge.
3.1 Introduction
The first meeting, after 9/11, of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)2, 
a 57 consortium of Islamic countries currently comprising around 1.6 billion 
Muslims, was held on 11-18 October 2003 in Putrajaya, Malaysia. In addition 
to addressing issues such as the Palestinian Intifada, and the situations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, what topped the agenda was the endeavor to “absolve Islam 
from terrorism”. In its final declaration, the OIC condemned as “criminal ter-
rorist bombings” the attacks that targeted the UN headquarters and the Jorda-
nian and Turkish embassies in Baghdad. Also, the OIC “called for the signing 
of a convention to ‘distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate struggle 
for the right to self-determination of people living under occupation or for-
eign domination’ [resistance]”.3 In a similar vein, Shafiq Masri, a Lebanese 
international law authority, earlier maintained that the international com-
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munity failed to reach a consensus on a unified definition of terrorism. He 
added that international law distinguishes between terrorism and legitimate 
resistance. The latter is considered a legitimate exception to the exercise of 
violence for political aims. From this perspective, national resistance is legiti-
mized in international law in the following two cases: 1) self-determination, 
and 2) resistance to occupation.4 In a similar vein, on 25 August 2003, the 
Arab League endorsed a proposal that distinguishes between resistance and 
terrorism, and adopted it as a resolution. As such, the “Arab Agreement of 
Combating Terrorism” was amended “in order to distinguish between resist-
ing occupation (which is considered a legitimate right and a national-patriot-
ic duty) and terrorist activities”.5
 I suggest the Arabs and Muslims, till now, did not critically think about 
or analytically reflect upon the issue of terrorism. The OIC attempted to do 
that, but fell into the trap of highlighting the cherished distinction between 
“terrorism” and “resistance”, thus retracting the problem to a definitional one. 
On the one hand, while the Arabs and Muslims are still searching for a uni-
fied-universal definition of terrorism, the world moves ahead, while they lag 
behind. Knowing that it is very difficult, if not quite impossible, to reach a 
common understanding of the definition of terrorism between terrorists and 
non-terrorists (resistance or freedom fighters), Arab and Muslim elites por-
tray an ostrich-like behavior by insisting that “terrorism” and “resistance” are 
mutually exclusive. The fear is that this reasoning might boil down in the end 
to the following formula: terrorism is idiotic resistance (9/11), and resistance 
is intelligent terrorism or, as Skaykh Qaradawi puts it, “legitimate terrorism”6 
(Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, for instance). Consequently, the Arabs 
and Muslims are shooting themselves in the foot. On the other hand, in the 
West there is a consensus in condemning terrorism as a means to reach any 
objective, a means that is not sanctioned by any right, goal, or logic since it 
“targets innocent civilians”. The West defines terrorism in a logical, coherent 
way because the “terrorist” is a person who equates a prohibited, illegal, and 
immoral means (terrorism) to an end in itself, which is destruction for the 
sake of destruction, the annihilation of the other by obliterating the self. From 
a theoretical perspective, I propose that terrorism, in general, is defective-
blind violence, a violence not sure of itself, a violence very careful in negating 
“the terrorism charge”, a violence that negates itself through itself. Terrorism 
is defective violence because it always needs a rogue to support it, a money 
launderer to “cleanse” its money, in order to cleanse it from the label of ter-
rorism. Terrorism is defective violence since it extols its own dead as well as 
taking pride in the number of victims it has killed. The rogue tries to prove 
the artificial nature of modernity. Terrorism is violence that has no role in 
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history because it is the negation of the will to live, as well as the will to power. 
Terrorism is neither confined to a specific religion nor to a certain identity.
 In light of what has been said, I question what Hizbullah’s view of terrorism 
is. Why is Hizbullah considered by most Lebanese and almost all Arabs and 
Muslims as a Lebanese national resistance movement, while it is classified by 
Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and others as a “terrorist 
organization”?
Synopsis of the chapter
In this chapter, I am going to put myself in Hizbullah’s shoes to expose the 
party’s own discourse, views, and arguments7 on terrorism and 9/11, and some 
of the responses and polemics dealing with these issues. I follow Hinnebusch’s 
“three conceptually distinct environments”, which distinguish among the 
“domestic level”, the “regional systematic level”, and the “global (or interna-
tional) level”.8 Domestically, Hizbullah pursued cooptation by integrating 
more into the Lebanese public sphere and following liberalization or infitah 
policies9, even by adopting what many observers would consider “Chris-
tian discourse”, namely, the abolition of political sectarianism in the people’s 
mentality, before abolishing it in the texts (ilgha’ al-ta’fiyya al-siyassiyya fi al-
nufus, qabla al-nusus).10 This, along with other moves, sheltered Hizbullah 
with additional legitimacy and gave it a freer hand in the regional confronta-
tion, especially after the Israeli ‘Grapes of Wrath’ of 1996.11 Since then, among 
the Lebanese, irrespective of their denominations, there emerged a national 
consensus that Hizbullah is the Lebanese resistance, not a terrorist organiza-
tion.12 Regionally, contrary to Hizbullah’s elite discourse that claims no altera-
tions have been made in the party’s doctrines as a result of 9/11, I suggest that 
Hizbullah moved from its vocal support of the Intifada to logistically assisting 
the Palestinians by all means, including training and smuggling guns, as well 
as intelligence penetration into Israel proper, as the Israelis conceded. Indeed, 
as Blanford puts it, “Hizbullah’s geopolitical priority is still to defeat Israel, 
and it will not allow other crises in the region to deflect the organization’s 
efforts from that central goal”.13 Internationally – in spite of the perpetual US 
policy of classifying Hizbullah, since its inception, as a terrorist organization 
– Hizbullah, Ayatullah Fadlallah, and Iran, all condemned 9/11 as suicidal-
terrorist attacks targeting innocent civilians. On these grounds, I take issue 
with Saad-Ghorayeb’s conclusion that Hizbullah’s “continued subordination 
of its domestic political role to its geostrategic concerns”,14 arguing that Hiz-
bullah’s integration in the Lebanese public sphere is, in general, in accordance 
with its political program, while the party’s regional militancy is in agreement 
with its political ideology.15
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3.2 Working definition of terrorism
In 1974, Sartre stated, “Terrorism is the atomic bomb of the poor”. Sartre made 
this remark in reference to the 5-6 September 1972 PLO attack on Israeli ath-
letes participating in the Olympic Games in Munich that claimed the lives of 
11 Israelis. He labelled this attack as a liberation act conducted by “freedom 
fighters”, not terrorists. Sartre was an advocate of social violence in order to 
counter the violence of the state. Compared to Hizbullah’s position, Sartre is 
extremely radical because Hizbullah refuses to use violence against occupying 
forces outside the occupied lands.
 Norton defines terrorism as “the intentional killing of innocent people 
for political aims”. Based on this definition, he argues, “that is why terrorism 
earns such widespread opprobrium; it is a gross assault on people who are by 
definition innocent. But what of an attack on soldiers of an occupation force, 
or soldiers in battle… There is not much difficulty winning widespread if not 
unanimous support against terrorism of the first sort, but agreement breaks 
down very quickly when the victims are uniformed soldiers and the context 
is war or occupation… In the case of Lebanon and Israel, Israel occupied 
southern Lebanon for more than twenty years and left only after relentless 
and effective attacks on Israeli occupation forces. Was this resistance to occu-
pation terrorism? In the hands of propagandists, terrorism is a useful rhe-
torical bludgeon, but America is compelled to recognize that for many of its 
Arab friends in the Middle East, Hizbullah’s resistance was legitimate. In 1993 
and 1996, Israel accepted ‘ground rules’ that expressly permitted the Lebanese 
to resist occupation”.16 In line with Norton, Goldstein defines terrorism as 
“political violence that targets civilians deliberately and indiscriminately”.17 
Goldstein argues, “beyond this basic definition other criteria can be applied, 
but the definitions become politically modified: one person’s freedom fighter 
is another’s terrorist. More than guerrilla warfare, terrorism is a shadowy 
world of faceless and irregular tactics marked by extreme brutality”.18 In this 
chapter, I adopt Norton’s and Goldstein’s definition of terrorism as a working 
definition because it seems to entail the essential part of the standard defini-
tions19 and it seems to be an acceptable definition to the international com-
munity.
 Thus, even though the West and most Islamic movements consider 9/ 11 as 
terrorist attacks20, the point of departure is the distinction between what the 
West classifies as suicide operations and terrorism, and Islamic movements 
and Hizbullah deem legitimate acts of resistance. And so, when it comes to 
the definitions of terrorism, it seems both parties are caught in a prisoner’s 
dilemma21 since neither side is willing to compromise. Knowing that conflict 
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within discourse disrupts the tendency to reach a wide audience, each party 
insists on employing an implicit discourse that claims the absolute truth, leav-
ing little or no room for dialogue and understanding. As such, truth is defined 
by the dominant discourse, rather than the demotic (alternative) discourse.22 
It seems that the Western discourse has the upper hand due to its media hege-
mony.23
3.3 The terrorism charge
Keeping in mind Moussalli’s argument that jihad “is neither suicide nor a 
campaign of atrocities”24 and bearing in mind Masri’s argument that nation-
al resistance is legitimized under international law in the case of resistance 
to occupation, Hizbullah’s jihad materialized through its legitimate acts of 
resistance25 and martyrdom operations against the Israeli occupying forces in 
southern Lebanon and the Biqa‘. Byman rightly argues, “in Hezbollah’s strug-
gle to expel Israel from Lebanon in the 1990s, much of its activity vis-à-vis 
Israel was best characterized as guerrilla warfare rather than terrorism. The 
vast majority of Hezbollah’s actions were focused on Israeli military person-
nel on Lebanese soil and intended to drive Israel out of the country”.26 And so, 
Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance inflicted heavy casualties on the Israeli side and 
was instrumental in driving the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)27 out of Lebanon 
by 25 May 2000 after 22 years of occupation.28 Hinnebusch acknowledges 
“all the Arabs shared Lebanon’s euphoria at Israel’s evacuation of southern 
Lebanon under Hizbollah’s pressure in June 2000”.29 Byman adds, “Faced 
with ferocious Hezbollah resistance, Israel withdrew to a ‘security zone’ in 
southern Lebanon and, 15 years later, left Lebanon altogether”.30 Also, Israeli 
based sources seem to acknowledge this as a fact. As Levitt puts it, “Follow-
ing the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from south Lebanon in May 2000 (for 
which it rightly claimed credit), Hezbollah was obliged to scale back its guer-
rilla warfare against Israeli forces…”31 (Italics added for emphasis). Indeed, 
with the Israeli withdrawal, the resistance was concentrated in the Lebanese 
Shib‘a farms32, which are still occupied by the Israeli forces.
 Thus, the claim that Hizbullah is a “terrorist organization”33, as most West-
ern media and some governments label it34, fails to comply with Lebanese 
reality. In this connection, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-
general, argues that the US brands Hizbullah with terrorism35 exoterically or 
on the table, while esoterically or under the table, it is doing its utmost best 
to establish contact with it. However, according to Nasrallah, Hizbullah is 
refusing contact from the perspective of its ideological stance, power poli-
tics, and the interest of the stronger party. He added that the stick and car-
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   65 26-4-2011   13:42:19
663 Political Violence: Terrorism and 9/11
rot as well as rationalization policies employed by the US administration to 
contain and curtail Hizbullah’s activities are of no avail.36 Knowing that Hiz-
bullah has legitimate and recognized parliamentary representation37, I sug-
gest that labelling Hizbullah as a ‘terrorist organization’, implicates Hizbul-
lah’s parliamentary bloc entitled ‘Loyalty to the Resistance’ (which includes 
Christians38) with terrorism. Byman acknowledges that “at home, Hezbollah 
is as much a social and political organization as it is a terrorist or guerrilla 
movement; abroad… It is embedded in Lebanese politics and society, unlike 
al Qaeda, is a stakeholder in the existing regional order, not a force bent on 
destroying it. This position has made Hezbollah stronger but has also forced 
it to become more cautious, cunning, and subtle.”39 It is not surprising then 
that some Western scholars have changed their views and no longer regard 
Hizbullah as a terrorist party. This attitude lends more weight to Hizbullah’s 
integration in the Lebanese public sphere.
 At the beginning of his writings, Martin Kramer branded Hizbullah with 
‘systematic terrorism’ as conveyed in his ‘Calculus of Jihad’40 theory. Kramer 
altered his stance when he conceded that Hizbullah, unlike the PLO and oth-
ers, did not engage in worldwide terrorist attacks against Israeli and Ameri-
can targets, rather it confined its struggle to the ‘legitimate’ act of resistance 
and liberation in southern Lebanon.41 In this connection, Sayyid Ibrahim al-
Musawi42 argues that Israel is a ‘terrorist state’43, not the Lebanese resistance. 
He contends that from 1948 till the founding of the PLO there was not a single 
attack carried out against Israel from the Lebanese borders, yet Israel killed 
more than 100 civilians and wounded many others. Al-Musawi adds, in 1968, 
Israeli commandos blew up 13 Middle East Airlines (MEA) airplanes at the 
Beirut International Airport as a reprisal for an attack in Athens, by what 
they claimed to be “Lebanese-trained Palestinian” freedom fighters. Norton 
argues that “since the late 1960s, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have 
been repeatedly displaced from their homes in the South, more often than not 
as a result of Israeli military action”.44 He adds, “since 1992, 14 Israeli civilians 
have died as a direct or indirect result of Hizbullah’s attacks, while over 500 
Lebanese and Palestinian civilians have died”.45 Furthermore, Norton con-
tinues, “in April 1996 alone, hundreds of thousands of civilians were driven 
north by IDF bombing… Israeli strikes on Lebanese power plants darkened 
much of Lebanon in 1996, 1999, and twice in 2000, causing damages esti-
mated at $ 300 million”.46 As Norton puts it, in the beginning, the classical 
image of Hizbullah as depicted by Western media was the following: middle-
aged men, with long beards and machete knives, thirsty for murder and ter-
rorism. This hyperreality was overridden by another one, namely, “a handful 
of fanatics and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up, drinking, 
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gambling, and entertainment sports…”47 Ranstorp writes, “contrary to the 
image of a group of fanatics [the Islamic Resistance is portrayed as] fighting 
for the liberation of Lebanon against a vastly superior army”.48 Husem adds 
that the Islamic “resistance became increasingly viewed as a legitimate move-
ment internationally”, especially after the de facto recognition it acquired 
from Israel and the US in 1993 and 1996 in the wake of ‘Operation Account-
ability’ and ‘The Grapes of Wrath’.49 Norton has already endeavored to shatter 
this hyperreality on various occasions. He writes, “the long-standing view the 
U.S. and Israel have of Hizbullah as an irrevocably hostile terrorist organiza-
tion has changed. The party’s gradual entry into the political arena in 1992 
and its subsequent attraction to middle class members of the Shiite commu-
nity has led Hizbullah’s members to become ‘Lebanese nationalists par excel-
lence’”.50 In this connection, Viotti and Kauppi write, “despite couching their 
agenda in Islamic terms, organizations such as Hizballah (Party of God) in 
Lebanon, Hamas in the West Bank of Israel… are also fuelled by nationalist 
sentiment”.51 More emphatically, Hinnebusch argues that “… radical Islamic 
movements such as Hamas and Hizbollah are primarily manifestations of 
Arab national resistance to Israel rather than promoters of religious agenda”.52 
According to Husem, “the [Islamic] Resistance was increasingly recognized 
as a national resistance. The increasing positive exposure for the Resistance 
and the Hizbullah in Western academia and media contributed too to their 
growing international legitimisation”.53
 Norton added that “Hizballah forces displayed impressive discipline” 
when they took over Lebanese territories evacuated by the IDF during the 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon.54 In fact, in a gesture aimed at easing 
any possible tensions in the south after the Israeli withdrawal, Nasrallah said 
that unsatisfied, aggrieved people with the South Lebanon Army (SLA)55 tri-
als have individually prepared their cases and are ready to file independent 
lawsuits in order to appropriate their rights. Thus, Hizbullah resorts to due 
process, rather than vendettas and revenge. Hasan Fadlallah argues that Hiz-
bullah is doing its best to make sure that the perpetrators of war crimes face 
the Lebanese state’s legal criminal justice and punishment.56 In fact, Hizbul-
lah honors and upholds promulgated standing laws. Bashar al-Asad, the Syr-
ian president, argues “when the causes that led to the resistance are gone, I 
believe its members will go back to normal life and will choose other ways 
to serve their country after achieving the long-cherished victory”.57 Norton 
argues that “Hizbullah fighters are totally integrated into Lebanese society… 
They have family ties, jobs if not professionals, homes, networks of social sup-
port, and hopes and aspirations for Lebanon”.58 William Burns, the deputy 
US foreign secretary for the Near East, during his meeting with the Lebanese 
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president, thanked the Lebanese government for its cooperation in the “war 
on terror”. He conceded, “Hizbullah is a political party with a strong social 
and political base, but we [the Americans] are worried about its ‘terrorist’ 
activities, which require a deep, calm dialogue”.59
 In spite of Hizbullah’s apparent integration into the Lebanese political and 
social life, on 21 May 2002, the US State Department released its annual report 
entitled “Patterns of Global Terrorism”60 that argued that Hizbullah “furthers 
terrorism to achieve its ends” and claimed that Iran is the most salient in but-
tressing terrorism since it supplies militant Palestinian groups and Hizbullah 
with money, arms, and logistics.61 Although the next day Hizbullah released 
a political declaration in reply to the accusations, it took Nasrallah only two 
days to vehemently respond in his speech commemorating the “Second 
Anniversary of the Israeli Withdrawal” in the presence of Imam Khumayni’s 
daughter. In answering the American contentions about meetings among al-
Qa‘ida, on the one hand, and Hamas, and Hizbullah, on the other, Nasrallah 
affirmed that these meetings never took place, and there is no need to deny 
these accusations because they are naïve and unfounded.62 According to Nas-
rallah, other US accusations claimed that Hizbullah posits a stronger threat 
to the US’s national security than al-Qa‘ida.63 Nasrallah ridiculed this claim 
forecasting that the Americans might later on accuse Hizbullah of having 
weapons of mass destruction. He added that the American Administration 
is not leaving any opportunity to tarnish Hizbullah’s image and integrity by 
incriminating the party with drug trafficking, money laundering, and other 
“nonsensical charges”; while everyone knows that Hizbullah is “cleaner” and 
“purer” than such accusations. According to Nasrallah, the truth of the mat-
ter is that the Americans are distorting the image [the truth] in order to tar-
get resistance movements in the region and serve Israeli security interests. 
Byman seems to second Nasrallah when he argues, “in contrast [to al-Qa‘ida] 
Hezbollah is widely viewed as a legitimate, and even admirable, resistance 
movement fighting an oppressive regional hegemon [Israel]”.64 Nasrallah 
adds,
If inflicting defeat on the enemy [Israel] in Lebanon is a crime, and siding with the 
Palestinians is an offence punishable by the New World Order, then we [Hizbul-
lah] are proud to be indicted with such a crime and ready to pay the price. We 
cannot be conquered, we will not yield; since the beginning we were dreaming [to 
become martyrs] of Karbala’, but we attained victory [against the Israelis].
Nasrallah affirms,
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What is the most that the Americans can do to us? Kill us? Dignity is the oppo-
site of humiliation, and death to humiliation65. If in order to stay alive, they want 
us to prostrate to Condoleezza Rice66, [Donald] Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney,67 and 
that crazy-idiot George Bush,68 then, for sure, we prefer death, one thousand times 
than to live such a life [of humiliation]... But who said that death is waiting for us, 
maybe victory is, while fatality is waiting for them because we are in our land, and 
we know how we fight and whom we fight… I do not promise you martyrdom 
in battle with the enemy; however, with full confidence, I pledge you triumph in 
every battle, with any enemy, and we are ready for this victory…69 (Italics added 
for emphasis)
From the aforementioned, one could infer Hizbullah’s response to these 
charges through its counter hegemonic discourse and deeds: more confron-
tation with the ‘Great Satan’ (the US), and its ‘representative’ in the region, 
namely, the ‘Little Satan’ (Israel).
3.4 The regional confrontation: Supporting the 
Palestinians
With the inauguration of the Aqsa Intifada on 28 September 2001, Hizbul-
lah turned its resource mobilization to the West Bank and Gaza. I argue that 
in regional affairs, especially the issue of buttressing the Intifada, Hizbullah 
became more and more radical, using hard-line pre-Ta’if70 discourse that 
labels the US as “Great Satan” and the “Mother of all Corruption”(Um al-
Fasad).71 I contend that Hizbullah’s stance towards Israel remained ideologi-
cally the same, but it was coined in very strong terms. In conformity to Khu-
mayni’s discourse Israel remained the “Rapist Entity” (al-Kiyan al-Ghasib), 
the “Zionist Entity” (al-Kiyan al-Sahyuni) that is a cancerous gland (al-Gudda 
al-Sarataniyya)72 in the region and should be uprooted at all costs because 
it is the “Absolute Evil” (Sharrun Mutlaq).73 In theory, Hizbullah’s political 
ideology distinguishes between a Jew,74 and a Zionist.75 For instance, Finkel-
stein,76 an American anti-Zionist Jew77 visited Lebanon in December 2001. 
In spite of the Lebanese government’s policy of boycotting Jews and Jewish 
goods, he was given a visa to enter Lebanon. Also, contrary to Hizbullah’s 
standard policy of not sitting with an American or a Jew at the same table, 
the party’s low-rank cadres were present at both lectures, maybe to affirm that 
they are not against ‘Jews who tell the truth’; on the contrary, they exercise 
not only tolerance, but also appreciation towards such Jews.78 This attitude 
is warranted by Hizbullah’s ideological concession that “a ‘small number’ of 
Jews are not Zionists” and the distinction between “Zionist Jews and ‘ordinary 
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Jews’, who are actually assimilated into their respective societies and whose 
affiliation to Judaism is devoid of any political or nationalist implications”.79 
Hizbullah’s cadres – a great majority of whom are the product of the European 
system of education, rather than Islamic schools and universities – contend 
that Finkelstein and Maxime Rodinson80 could be considered such Jews. On 
these grounds, I do not agree with Saad-Ghorayeb’s contention that Hizbul-
lah’s distinction between Judaism and Zionism is “purely academic”81; rather, 
I contend that it has practical implications as the former exposition endeav-
ored to demonstrate. However, according to Hizbullah, in the state of ‘Israel’ 
the distinction between a Jew and a Zionist does not hold because all the citi-
zens are considered Zionists. According to Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah’s deputy 
secretary-general, “Israeli society is a military society”.82 Nasrallah affirms 
that in Israel Hizbullah does not distinguish between a civilian and a military, 
a woman, a child, and an elderly.83 Nasrallah argues with a strong qualifi-
cation,84 “in Israel there are no civilians: they are all conquerors, occupiers, 
rapists of the land; they are all taking part in the crime and the massacre… 
they are all Zionists and must be killed”.85 In this connection Saad-Ghorayed 
correctly argues that Nasrallah’s previous statement clearly runs against “the 
Islamic and humanitarian principle which dictates that civilians should be 
neutral… Hizbu’llah rationalizes that it is not killing innocent Israeli civil-
ians, but hostile militant Zionists”.86 Nasrallah adds that “killing them is a reli-
gious obligation, and the persons who do it are regarded as martyrs”.87 In spite 
of this vehement rhetoric, Hizbullah itself does not engage in such attacks; 
rather, as Saad-Ghorayeb remarks, “it would justify [martyrdom operations] 
if they were staged by Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
and Al-Aqsa Martyrs.” Thus, Hizbullah “clearly advocates the resort to ter-
rorism by armed Palestinian groups”.88 As Nasrallah puts it, “the Palestinians 
do not need anyone to fight on their behalf. They are capable of fighting on 
their own using their rifles, bombs, and the bodies of their martyrs in order 
to rapture the Zionist disgrace and humiliation89 and defeat the Zionist enti-
ty”.90 And so, Hizbullah’s war-by-proxy strategy allowed it to indirectly wage 
a war of attrition against Israel in the Occupied Territories. Nasrallah affirms, 
“those who killed Za’ifi [the Israel Minister of Tourism] are the most noble 
people of the Umma… The war against the Zionists in Lebanon and Palestine 
is the embodiment of the consensus of the Umma”.91 I would like to end by 
stressing that – contrary to the Palestinians who have blown themselves up 
with Israeli civilians – Hizbullah has never done so. Hizbullah did not engage 
in any suicide operation against Israeli civilians in its eighteen-year struggle 
with the Israeli forces occupying south Lebanon. Rather, all its field and mar-
tyrdom operations targeted Israeli and military personnel. So far, Hizbullah 
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has not conducted any suicide operation in Israel. As Levitt concedes, “over 
the last three years, Hezbollah has steadily intensified its involvement in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, gravitating from the provision of material support 
and training for Palestinian terrorist groups to the direct recruitment of Pal-
estinian operatives under its own command and control”.92 (Italics added for 
emphasis). In a similar vain, Byman argues, “Hezbollah has provided guerril-
la training, bomb-building expertise, propaganda, and tactical tips to Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other anti-Israeli groups”.93
 When Muhammad Rida Khatami, the Iranian deputy speaker, was asked 
to comment on the Palestinian authority’s decision to consider any operation 
carried out by the Palestinian resistance as terrorism, he said that: “In general, 
we do not support acts of violence, especially those targeting civilians. How-
ever, when we examine the situation, we see that one of the parties [Sharon] 
still carries out his criminal attacks towards the other party [Palestinians]. 
Thus, we cannot call on the latter party to waiver its inalienable right of self-
defence”.94 I suggest the same rationale applies to the Lebanese Resistance. 
Husem affirms, “the [Islamic] Resistance was determined to extract the high-
est price possible for the [Israeli] occupation and imbue any form of Israeli 
withdrawal with the image of a military debacle routing one of the world’s 
strongest armies would have great political gains for the Hizbullah on the 
domestic [and international] arena”.95 I think the analogy with the Palestinian 
resistance is not that far-fetched. Husem argues that the Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon under Hizbullah’s attacks “would probably signal to 
the Palestinians that Israel could be ‘defeated’ by force”96, which is a precedent 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Byman puts it, Hizbullah is known “… for its 
successful resistance against the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon (the 
only time that Arab arms have forced Israel to surrender territory)…”.97 Con-
cerning the spillover of the Lebanese victory of May 2000 on the Palestinian 
Intifada or what came to be known as the “Lebanese Model98 [namudhaj] 
of Resistance”, Hizbullah uses the following major premise: “We [Hizbullah 
and the Lebanese] liberated our land after 22 years of occupation, you [the 
Palestinians] can do it after 33 years; it is not an impossibility”.99 Thus, it is no 
wonder “Palestinians regularly cite Hezbollah’s combination of skilled opera-
tions, willing sacrifice, and emphasis on long-term struggle as a guide to their 
own efforts”.100
 I would like to end this exposition by stressing that the formula of equat-
ing civilians to the military applies only to Israel, not outside its borders, or 
“is the particular case of the Zionist entity” as Muhammad Ra‘d affirms.101 
That is why, as will be demonstrated later, Hizbullah, Fadlallah, and Iran con-
demned the 11 September 2001 attacks as suicide-terrorist attacks that have 
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nothing to do with martyrdom operations that are carried out by resistance 
movements for the sake of liberating occupied land. In the wake of Nasral-
lah’s fiery, uncompromising discourse, The ‘Saudi Initiative’ was propagated 
to cool down the situation and extend a hand to Israel in an attempt to end the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.
3.5 The Arab summit and its repercussions
In response to a question on the Arab Summit to be held, back then, in Bei-
rut on 27-28 March 2002, Nasrallah said that he does not expect much102, 
maybe because “Israel’s conception of itself as a besieged refuge for world 
Jewry afflicts it with both insecurity and an irredentist need for territorial 
expansion”.103 As it turned out, the Arabs offered a lot of ideological conces-
sions, while “one should not expect much from Sharon”, as Nasrallah stated. 
The Arabs officially endorsed and adopted the ‘Saudi Initiative’ that called for 
the full recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it, if it with-
draws to the 4 June 1967 borders.104 The Arabs105 did not ask for the return 
of all the four million Palestinian diaspora or so106; rather, they demanded a 
“just solution” to the refugee crisis107 based on UN Resolution 194.108 For the 
sake of argument, I strongly believe that if Sharon would have said “yes” to the 
Arab Summit’s proposals, then the so called militant groups – such as Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs, and Hizbullah – could not have done much 
to curtail the process since they would be working single-handedly losing 
most, if not all of their support from Arab states and Iran. Blanford concedes, 
“[Bashar] Asad said that Hizbullah and the Palestinian groups would ‘by 
definition fade away’ once a regional peace settlement had been reached”.109 
Moreover, from a theoretical perspective,
while a complete and lasting peace and resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict is hardly a forgone conclusion, such a situation would drastically alter the 
dynamics of identification in most Middle Eastern countries. In part, a perma-
nent resolution would alter the ability of transnational identities [Hizbullah as an 
‘Islamic jihadi (struggle) movement’] to influence the internal dynamics of states. 
Specifically, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism have been important to identity dis-
putes of the region.110
Although Hizbullah exploits both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism in order to 
buttress the Intifada and support the “oppressed”, I think that in the event of 
a permanent peace settlement, Hizbullah’s transnational influence will wane 
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or gradually wither away since the party will, most likely, content itself with 
Lebanese domestic affairs.111
 Since this utopian scenario did not materialize, explaining Hizbullah’s 
doctrinal stance sheds some light on its behavior on the ground. Knowing 
that Hizbullah is totally against the Oslo Agreement and any peace negotia-
tions112 with Israel, it is no wonder that Hizbullah rejected the ‘Saudi Initia-
tive’ because it gives back only 22 percent of the historic Palestine – the 4 June 
1967 borders – while Hizbullah demands the return of all of Palestine, namely, 
1948 Palestine, from the Jordan river till the Mediterranean Sea, and the repa-
triation of all the Jews who came after the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that 
divided the Middle East among the British and French after the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire, putting Palestine under British Mandate.113
 In turn, Sharon’s114 response to the Arab Summit initiative was his “oblit-
erating incursion” into the West Bank in order to uproot “terrorism”115 and 
“isolate” Arafat. In the wake of these events, eighteen months after the start 
of the Intifada, Nasrallah threatened Sharon116 to open a new front on Israel’s 
northern boarder if the events of 1948 would be repeated and Sharon would 
fulfil his irredentist ambitions or what is known as the ‘transfer policy’117 of 
banishing the Palestinians from the occupied territories to Jordan and per-
manently annexing the land. In that case, Hizbullah’s retaliation would not 
be confined to Shib‘a; rather, Hizbullah would cross the redline and enflame 
the whole line of control along Israel, Syria and Lebanon.118 Nasrallah added 
that not only Hizbullah, but also all the Arabs would stand firm and support 
the Palestinians if Israel would “massacre” them and wage a massive evacu-
ation war against them.119 Hizbullah blatantly admitted that it would keep 
on supporting the Intifada with all possible means, come what may, includ-
ing smuggling guns and rockets through Jordan120, as Hizbullah is a local 
Lebanese political party that has no branches in Palestine.121 A few days later, 
Nasrallah’s intimidation was substantiated by Fadlallah who argued that any 
Israeli attack on Lebanon would be met by massive retaliation from Hizbullah 
reaching “at least as far as Haifa”.122 In this situation, calls for restraint came 
not only from the US and the EU, but also from Iran.
 During Sharon’s massive incursion into the West Bank, specifically from 
30 March till 12 April, Hizbullah kept on attacking the Shib‘a farms123 in spite 
of the Iranian call for restraint through the Iranian foreign minister, Kamal 
Kharazi, who visited Beirut 11-13 April. Hizbullah did not respond and kept 
its war of attrition against the Israeli forces still occupying Lebanese land.124 
Hizbullah’s media and other affiliated or sympathetic media institutions criti-
cized Kharazi’s remarks, which came in the wake of Colin Powell’s mission in 
the Middle East. A day later, Kharazi replied, arguing that “wisdom and vigi-
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lance dictates self-restraint against the Israeli provocations… the Lebanese 
resistance has the legitimate right to liberate occupied land.”125 As if this was 
not enough, the Iranian embassy in Beirut issued a memo affirming Kharazi’s 
latter interpretation.126 Thus, Hizbullah does not always respond to Iranian 
calls; rather, it follows the course of action that benefits its policies domes-
tically and regionally. Hizbullah stopped attacking the Shib‘a farms as of 13 
April 2002, when Sharon’s incursion waned. In the wake of the Shib‘a attacks, 
Hizbullah sent its political council member and head of Hizbullah’s Chris-
tian-Muslim dialogue, Ghalib Abu Zaynab, to tour Christian religious and 
political leaders explaining the situation and asking for their support, which 
he unconditionally got, including the backing of the Maronite cardinal who 
argued that what is happening to the Palestinians is “abhorrent”, and that the 
Resistance (Hizbullah) has the right to liberate Lebanese occupied land. He 
added that he had great confidence in the Resistance and its rationalization 
in managing the conflict.127 In addition, John Kelly, the ex-US ambassador to 
Lebanon, stressed “both Syria and Lebanon has affirmed that Shib‘a farms are 
Lebanese and send a written memo in this regard to the UN. That is why Shib‘a 
farms are Lebanese.”128 In turn, Asher Kaufman, an Israeli academic, demon-
strated that Shib‘a farms are Lebanese.129 Also, a survey conducted by “Delta 
Centre” conveyed that 75 percent supported the opening of all Arab fronts 
with Israel; 63 percent supported the Lebanese Resistance; 74 percent but-
tressed the continuation of the Intifada; 63 percent refused peace with Israel; 
and 84 percent espoused the existence of an Arab Union, along the lines of the 
EU.130 Even the Christian extreme rightist banned ‘Lebanese Forces’ issued a 
declaration supporting the Intifada and the Lebanese resistance.131
 In spite of all of Hizbullah’s efforts to buttress the Intifada, a Palestinian stu-
dent wrote an article attacking Nasrallah arguing that he betrayed his word of 
“you [the Palestinians] can count on us [Hizbullah] when the time comes”.132 
The student claimed that the “propaganda” attacks against Shib‘a did not help 
the Palestinians in Jenin; rather, they were for public consumption. He felt 
that the Palestinians were left alone to be “massacred”.133 The student con-
tinued slamming Nasrallah, arguing that instead of supporting Palestinian 
freedom fighters who fired Katyusha rockets [into the occupied Syrian Golan 
Heights far away from Shib‘a], Hizbullah curbed their activities by helping the 
Lebanese government to catch them. The student added, concerning Hizbul-
lah’s buttressing of the Intifada, that there was a gap between the “motto” and 
“reality”. He concluded that the Intifada was helping Hizbullah and the Arabs, 
not the reverse.134 This incident is an indication of Hizbullah’s infitah policy 
and, more or less, of the existence of an “open public sphere”135 in Lebanon. 
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In this milieu, the Lebanese responses were communicated with regard to 9/11 
and the US stance towards Lebanon.
3.6 Resetting the clock
The international confrontation and the domestic response: The US stance 
towards Lebanon after 9/11 and the Lebanese response
Since only in the state of Israel, Hizbullah does not distinguish between civil-
ians and military personnel, Hizbullah, Fadlallah, and Iran all condemned 
9/11 as suicidal, terrorist attacks targeting innocent civilians. The ideological 
explanation behind this is that Hizbullah “‘does not pursue martyrdom as 
an end in itself ’, but as a means of achieving victory… without the impera-
tive need for a defensive jihad, martyrdom becomes suicide, which is clearly 
proscribed in Islam and thereby not rewarded with an everlasting life in para-
dise, as is true martyrdom… [Nasrallah argues] ‘Maybe some people think we 
crave martyrdom because we like to die in any way. No, we like to die if our 
blood is valued and has a great impact [on Israel]’”.136
Fadlallah’s and Hizbullah’s response
Ayatullah Fadlallah denounced the 9/11 operations as criminal, suicidal acts 
that constitute an ugly human genocide in all respects. These, according to 
him, are not martyrdom acts. He added that neither offensive nor defensive 
jihad justifies such acts that are denounced religiously (shar‘an). These are 
vicious acts that are not sanctioned by any religion, civilization, or human 
logic. It is not right to use innocent, peaceful civilians as bargaining chips and 
means of leverage to change a certain [US] policy. Islamically speaking, it is 
wrong to engage oneself in such acts because there is no shar‘i justification 
for such acts. 9/11 is a horrendous act that is not authorized by any religion 
or approved by any “heavenly message”. Thus, Fadlallah is adamantly against 
targeting civilian means of transportation because their safety and security is 
a worldly humane concern from a shari‘ perspective.137
 In conformity to the Iranian stance138 and that of the leading Lebanese 
Marj‘a Fadlallah, Hizbullah, after five days of silence, condemned the 9/11, 
2001 attacks against the US. Bearing in mind that Hizbullah’s animosity is 
towards the US administration, not the US people, Hizbullah issued a politi-
cal declaration entitled, “Hizbullah regrets lives lost and warns the US not to 
resort to unjust policies”, which runs as follows:
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After many Muslim clergy men stated their position toward the bloody attacks 
which recently occurred in New York and Washington, we call for caution and not 
falling prey to a state of fear and panic that was intended to be spread throughout 
the world to give the US administration free rein to practice all types of aggression 
and terrorism under the pretext of fighting aggressions and terrorism, Now the big 
question is whether what the American administration is planning really has to 
do with responding to the perpetrators of the latest attacks, or whether it wants to 
exploit those tragic events to exercise more hegemony over the world and practice 
more unjust policies which have led to this level of hate against the US by many 
peoples and governments in the world. The world, which is now waiting for the US 
response, must not forget that there are massacres carried out against the Pales-
tinian people by the Israeli occupation, which feels proud, that the world is silent 
towards its crimes. We are sorry for any innocent people who are killed anywhere 
in the world. The Lebanese, who have suffered repeated Zionist massacres in Qana 
and elsewhere, massacres that the US administration refused to condemn at the UN 
Security council, are familiar with the pain and suffering of those who lost their 
loved ones in bitter events.139
It is worth mentioning that Hizbullah140 complains of the US’s unconditional 
support of Israel, including the showering of Israel with financial and military 
aid that are used to ‘massacre’ the Palestinians; the US’s continual veto in the 
security council that encourages Israel’s perpetual breaching of UN resolutions 
and international agreements. This attitude allows Israel to act with immunity 
above international law; on these grounds, Hizbullah accuses the US of prac-
ticing a double-standard141 policy and of being a biased, unreliable modera-
tor.142 In this connection, Hinnebusch writes about “Washington’s continued 
pro-Israeli bias… [and] Washington’s tacit support for Israeli violations of UN 
resolutions in Lebanon and the occupied territories and its punitive measures 
against Iraq for similar violations”.143 Blum mentions, “… the habitual support 
of Israeli belligerence and torture, and condemnation of Arab resistance to it; 
the double standard applied to Israeli terrorism, such as the wilful massacre 
of 106 Lebanese at the UN base at Qana in 1996…”144 In this connection, Hun-
tington acknowledges the “West’s failure… to impose sanctions on Israel for 
violating UN resolutions. The West… was using a double standard. A world of 
clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: peo-
ple apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to oth-
ers.”145 Hizbullah adds that in June 2002 the US lobbied for the international 
community to grant its personnel serving in peacekeeping operations immu-
nity from prosecution by the newly established International Criminal Court 
(ICC), thus acting with immunity and impunity above international law. After 
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the US threatened to use its veto power to curb all peacekeeping operations, 
the international community granted US personnel one-year immunity. Thus, 
for the second consecutive year, on 12 June 2003, and after a row with the EU, 
the US managed to get the international community to renew the immunity 
for one more year. Twelve members of the security council voted for Resolu-
tion 1487, while France, Germany, and Syria abstained. Arguing that all coun-
tries should be judged with the same law, Hizbullah questions why the US 
should be immune from war crime lawsuits when it is so much concerned 
with human right breaches and systematic abuses. As Hizbullah argues, it 
seems that the US advocates the application of justice, but does not want to 
apply it to its own citizens.146
The US stance towards Lebanon
What do these Lebanese think? Do they think that the US would have cared for 
their problems if they were secluded from the problems of the Middle East and 
did not affect the region in one way or another? If we [the US] could totally isolate 
Lebanon and its problems from the Middle East, then we would not move our little 
finger even if the Lebanese slaughtered one another with old shaving razors.147
I claim that nothing has changed in the US position concerning Lebanon 
and Hizbullah before and after 9/11. As Byman puts it, “for most of the past 
two decades, Hezbollah has claimed pride of place as the top concern of US 
counter-terrorism officials.”148 Thus, ever since Hizbullah’s inauguration, the 
US administration has considered the party as a “terrorist organization”. Just 
before 9/11, in April 2001 the US listed Hizbullah on its terrorism list. Hizbul-
lah released its own response entitled, “Hizbollah statement in response to the 
annual report of the US state department”, which runs as follow:
1) The American administration, which considers the Lebanese resistance (terror-
ism), unveils once again its true face, which sees only from the Israeli eye. Now 
the whole world can easily differentiate between the terrorist who practices the 
most violent methods against civilians and the resistant who uses his legitimate 
right to liberate his land whether it is in Palestine or in Lebanon. 2) Adopting the 
Israeli perspective and considering the Palestinians who defend themselves as ter-
rorists demonstrates the unfairness of the American administration, which keeps 
silent towards the Israeli massacres of our people in Palestine. 3) Distorting the 
hizbollah pure image and trying to pin the name (terrorism) on it, clearly shows 
the American and Israeli fear of the great example that the resistance provided 
specifically in terms of fighting the occupation. 4) The American administration 
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is trying to ignore the fact that there are Lebanese hostages in Israeli prisons who 
were kidnapped from Lebanese occupied land. It [is] also trying to ignore the fact 
that the three Israeli soldiers who were captured from Lebanese occupied land are 
aggressors not hostages. It is only honorable that we use them as a means to release 
our brothers in Israeli prisons. 5) We regard the hostile of the American admin-
istration as proof that we are following the right path. We are certain that the US 
government will consider whoever keeps the dignity of his people an enemy.149
After 9/11, the UN security council, under pressure from US lobbying, issued 
UN Resolution 1373 asking governments to file written reports within 90 days 
indicating the steps taken by them to curb terrorism and terrorist activities 
on their territories.150 In turn, the US issued four terrorism lists after 9/11; two 
are binding issued through the UN, and two non-binding presidential decrees. 
These either included Hizbullah’s members or asked the Lebanese govern-
ment to freeze Hizbullah’s assets.151
The Lebanese response
It is worth mentioning that Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister, was among 
the first Arab prime ministers, if not the first, to overtly condemn the 9/11 
attacks by arguing that the Lebanese people sympathize with their fellow 
Americans because “they have suffered from terrorism for years”.152 The 
Lebanese official position concerning the US listing of Hizbullah as a ‘Ter-
rorist Organization’ whose assets should be frozen was conveyed by the presi-
dent Emile Lahud who told the four delegates of the US congress who visited 
Beirut that, “Hizbullah is a local Lebanese organization that has no foreign 
branches or ties with any terrorist organization operating outside Lebanon 
[no global reach].”153 The Norwegian, Spanish, and Italian ambassadors in 
Lebanon remarked that Hizbullah is a resistance movement, not a terrorist 
one. The latter ridiculed the US and Israeli claims of the presence of terrorist 
camps in the Biqa‘.154 Chirac, the French president, told Hariri during his offi-
cial visit to France that the US’s fourth terrorism list, the third one after 9/11, 
which asks the Lebanese government to freeze Hizbullah’s assets, is not bind-
ing to Lebanon because it was issued as a presidential decree, not as a UN or 
security council resolution.155 In this regard, Salamé156 argued that Lebanon 
has its own fiscal and monetary legislations that prohibit and control money 
laundering as well as the flow of ‘terrorist’ money. He added that Lebanon has 
a special understanding with the US ambassador in Beirut concerning that 
matter.157 In turn, N‘im said that the US list is a breach of the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as well as the US’s Fifth Amendment, namely, 
“Rights of those accused of crime; any deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
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requires due process of the law”. He added that Hizbullah and the Resistance 
are a “continuation” of the Lebanese State, and only the Lebanese judicial sys-
tem has the right to deal with Hizbullah’s assets;158 any other call to do so 
by another party is denied.159At that time, there seemed to be some kind of 
a consensus among many Lebanese political (including the Christian right-
wing Phalangists), religious (including the Maronite cardinal), and social 
leaders that Hizbullah is a resistance movement, not a terrorist one. Thus, the 
Lebanese mosaic myriad conveys not only a consensus on this issue, but it 
also turns out to be a fundamental ‘pillar’ of national unity and solidarity, as 
such a ‘shared public sphere’.
 On 13 December 2001 both Lebanon and Syria individually sent a written 
response to the UNSC resolution 1373, dated 28 September 2001, which gave 
90 days for countries to take constructive measures to curb terrorist activities 
on their territories, thus meeting the dealine of 27 December 2001.160 Know-
ing that Article 40 calls for the formation of an international army to take 
military action and curtail terrorism, I think that considering Lebanon as a 
possible target of the US’s war on terror is far-fetched. Lebanon has signed 
ten out of the twelve treaties and international agreements to curb terrorism, 
and is preparing to ratify the other two.161 Also, Lebanon has already signed 
the Arab Agreement of Combating Terrorism. Faruq al-Shari‘, the Syrian For-
eign Minister at the time, remarked – on the doorsteps of the Lebanese presi-
dential palace, during his visit to Lebanon on 26 November 2001 – that the 
common ground with Syria is the joint definition of terrorism, which clearly 
distinguishes between terrorism and resistance giving legitimization to the 
latter.162 Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who openly condemned the terrorist 
9/11 attacks against the US, said that: “If jihad for the liberation of occupied 
nations is considered ‘terrorism’, then God raise me as a terrorist, and mar-
tyr me as a terrorist” (Idha kana al-jihad fi sabili tahrir al-awtani irhaban, 
Allahuma ahyini irhabiyyan wa amitni irhabiyyan). He added that martyr-
dom operations are the mostly extolled form of Jihad in the name of God, 
and that ‘legitimate terrorism’ is sanctioned in the Qur’an: “And make ready 
for them whatever you can of fighting men and horses, to terrify thereby the 
enemies of Allah and your enemy” (8: 60). Thus, in this context, “terrorism” 
is welcomed.163 In point seven of its final declaration, ‘The Council of Muslim 
Ulama’ totally rejected the American lists of terrorism and their corollaries 
arguing that they are lies and allegations tarnishing the honesty and integrity 
of resistance movements in Lebanon and Palestine [Occupied Territories164]. 
They affirmed that “the resistance is the holiest and the noblest phenomenon 
in our modern history, and it is the lively embodiment of the will of the umma 
in defending its sanctified causes and rights against the Zionist entity.” The 
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ulama added that resistance movements symbolize by their jihad the honesty, 
dignity, and nobleness of the Muslims, and are an expression of the humani-
tarian aspirations of the mustad‘afin (oppressed) everywhere in the world.165
 In light of Hizbullah’s 29 August 2002 attack on the Shib‘a Farms that led to 
the death of one Israeli soldier and wounded two others, Richard Armitage166, 
the US deputy secretary of state, on 5 September 2002, labeled Hizbullah as 
the “A-Team of terrorism” arguing that the time to deal with it had come. Vin-
cent Battle, the ex-US ambassador to Lebanon, reiterated Artimage’s stance 
affirming, “Hizbullah remains a terrorist organization.” In turn, Hizbullah 
issued a political declaration attacking the US administration and its “fabri-
cated and baseless political accusations [that are] no more than a stack of lies 
designated to mislead and divert the public opinion, in an attempt to justify 
the US Administration’s hostile actions.” Further, Hizbullah threatened the US 
by claiming: “We clearly announce to the Muslim Ummah that the American 
Administration will be held accountable for any offensive against Lebanon 
and we emphasize that we are in full readiness to confront any eventuality and 
defend our people.”167 This time, the new Italian ambassador, Franco Mis-
tretti, came to Hizbullah’s rescue: “The EU does not think that Hizbullah is a 
terrorist group168… there is no evidence that backs arguments that Hizbullah 
is engaged in terrorism.”169 On 11 December 2002, Canada placed Hizbullah 
on its terrorism list; Australia followed suit on 5 June 2003. A few days before 
the second anniversary of 9/11, the EU blacklisted Hamas’ political wing.170
The Canadian and Australian ban: The interplay among the domestic, regional, 
and international dimensions
From the early 1980s through 9/11, 2001, and until the present, the Lebanese 
Hizbullah has been classified by the US State Department as a ‘terrorist orga-
nization’. Since the inauguration of the party, the Israeli stance on Hizbullah 
coincided with that of the US. In 2002, Canada and Australia banned Hizbul-
lah and added the party to their terrorism lists.
 Canada placed Hizbullah on its terrorism list171 because, in the event of 
commemorating ‘Jerusalem Day’ on 29 November 2002, Nasrallah called on 
the Palestinians to continue their “martyrdom” operations.172 According to 
Nasrallah, the Canadian government’s contention of Hizbullah’s ‘global reach’ 
is based on an article in the 4 December 2002 issue of the Washington Times 
which claimed that Hizbullah’s leader exhorted the Palestinians to pursue 
jihad against Israeli interests outside Israel, implying that Nasrallah called for 
a global campaign of suicide bombings.173 Keeping in mind the fact that the 
speech was delivered in Nabatiyyé, not B‘albak, as the Washington Times con-
tended, Nasrallah argued this allegation is neither borne out by facts (since it 
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is not present in the speech) nor warranted by discourse analysis. Moreover, 
the Canadian stance seems to be at odds with the earlier Canadian position, 
when Jean Chrétien, the Canadian prime minister, attended the Francophone 
Summit held in Beirut – from 18-20 October 2002 –although Nasrallah was 
present as an honorary guest.174 At that time, only Hizbullah’s military wing 
was banned in Canada, but not the party’s civil and social institutions. Blan-
ford contends that the move came “amid intensive lobbying and a threatened 
lawsuit by pro-Israeli groups.”175 In reference to the Francophone Summit, 
Byman argues, “In October 2002, Hezbollah operatives participated in the 
Francophone summit in Beirut with implicit French endorsement.”176
 In spite of the Canadian ban on Hizbullah and the prohibition of any offi-
cial to establish contact with Hizbullah, on 26 June 2003, Tony Valeri, a Cana-
dian MP, came to Lebanon to investigate the ‘real reasons’ (unearth the truth) 
behind the ban, which was considered, the least to say, as a breach to the ban. 
After a persistent request from Valeri to meet Hizbullah officials and listen to 
their viewpoints, Valeri met with the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, 
Muhammad Ra‘d. Ra‘d affirmed that Hizbullah was very much in favor of 
the continuation of normal and friendly relations between the Lebanese and 
Canadian people. He added that since the Canadian ban was not based on 
realistic data and that it was the result of great US pressure, Hizbullah could 
not find a justification for this decision. Ra‘d stressed that Hizbullah is not 
a ‘terrorist organization’ with an alleged ‘global reach’ as the US labels it; on 
the contrary, Hizbullah does not have an ‘outside branch’ or activities outside 
Lebanon, neither in the form of security arrangements nor in the form of 
military and political presence. Rather, Hizbullah is a legitimate resistance 
movement operating within the UN principles and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Moreover, according to Ra‘d, Hizbullah is a legitimate Leb-
anese political party with NGOs and civil institutions, which are functioning 
according to the stipulations of Lebanese law. Ra‘d added that the aid Hizbul-
lah receives is invested in performing socio-economic services for the needy, 
rather than sponsoring ‘violent acts’. Ra‘d argued that these ‘facts’ could be 
easily investigated; the burden of proof befalls those who filed those allega-
tions. Based on my fieldwork and interviews I learned that in 2005 there were 
serious discussions between Hizbullah’s NGOs (Social Service Institutions) 
and the Swiss government and NGOs to grant the party’s NGOs Swiss licences 
so that they would be recognized by the international community as welfare 
NGOs and not ‘terrorist organizations’. Before a deal was struck, the July 2006 
war started. After the war, Hizbullah changed its priorities and had to channel 
all it resources to solve the refugee crisis and rebuild what had been destroyed. 
So what Hizbullah termed from the beginning as a matter of beating a dead 
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horse, proved so, not because they gave up; rather because Realpolitik dic-
tated another course of action. Valeri conceded the existence of US pressure; 
however, he argued for the necessity of finding a continuous mechanism to 
convey the aforementioned information about Hizbullah to the Canadian 
public, insinuating a role for the ‘Lebanese-Canadian Parliamentary Friend-
ship Committee’ in this respect.177
 In line with the Canadian position, on 16 June 2003, Daryl Williams, the 
Australian attorney general, announced that Australia decided to ban “Hiz-
bullah’s external military wing”.178 The draft legislation adopted by the Aus-
tralian parliament was imposed retroactively as of 5 June 2003 in spite of the 
fact that the UN did not officially label Hizbullah as a terrorist organization. 
It is worth mentioning that according to Australian law in order to consider 
an organization as a terrorist one and to place it on a terrorist list, it must be 
deemed so by the UN; it seems that this law was not honored. Reuters con-
veyed the opinion of some analysts who argued Australia’s ban on Hizbullah 
appears to have been as a result of the party’s connection with international 
policies, rather than its link to terrorism. The analysts acknowledged that Hiz-
bullah does not pose a threat to Australia. In turn, Cliff Williams, the director 
of ‘Terrorism Studies’ at the Australian National University, told the reporters 
that the ban on Hizbullah was most likely the result of pressure by the US on 
the Australian government because Hizbullah poses a potential threat to Isra-
el.179 On 17 June 2003, the Australian government announced that it placed 
Hizbullah on its terrorism list. In response, Hizbullah issued a political dec-
laration addressed to the Australian prime minister and parliament, arguing 
that the decision lacks credibility because it is ‘isolated’ from any substantial 
evidence. Hizbullah affirmed that political pressure would not dissuade the 
party from giving any concessions with regard to its legitimate right of resist-
ing the Israeli occupation to Lebanon.180 Both in Canada as in Australia, the 
Lebanese immigrant community is of a considerable size. It was assumed that 
Hizbullah has a significant following among these communities – a conclu-
sion, which is very doubtful and highly improbable. Political analysts argued 
the Australian move was based on the following three considerations: 1) The 
Australian government’s acquiescence to the US’s pressure after the war on 
Iraq; 2) The war on Iraq had its toll on Australian election interests, which 
resulted in the Australian Conservative Party having the upper hand and gave 
way to the pro-Israeli Australian lobby to express its will in the parliament; 3) 
The game of state’s interests, especially economic, financial interests among 
Australian and US companies in terms of investments in the Middle East and 
Iraq, led the Australian governing party to reap rewards by officially branding 
Hizbullah with terrorism.
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3.7 Hizbullah’s dialogue with the US, EU, and non-
state actors
Almost two months after PM Rafiq Hariri’s assassination, on 19 April 2005, a 
fourteen-member technocrat cabinet headed by PM Najib Miqati was sworn 
in. Hizbullah not only gave a parliamentary vote of confidence to the new 
cabinet, which received 109 votes out of 128 MPs, but also fielded Trad Hama-
dé, a Hizbullah affiliated sympathizer, for the first time in its history. Hamadé 
was accorded the Ministry of Labor and Agriculture, an appointment that was 
supposed to serve as a litmus test to Hizbullah’s future ministerial work in the 
cabinet. Keeping in mind that the US administration brands Hizbullah as a 
‘terrorist organization’, it neither voiced its opposition to such an appointment 
nor threatened boycotting him. On the contrary, in June 2005 Hamadé met, 
with Hizbullah’s blessings, senior members of the US administration, includ-
ing Elizabeth Dibble, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern 
affairs, in his capacity as a minister representing Hizbullah in the cabinet.
 That was not the only contact between Hizbullah and the US administra-
tion over the past few years. In an attempt to discuss the problematic that 
was impeding Muslim-European-US dialogue, a lot of unofficial meetings 
took place between the two parties in Beirut, Amsterdam, Rabat, Geneva, 
and Oman. Graham Fuller, a former intelligence officer at the CIA, conducted 
dialogue sessions with Hizbullah officials, most notably in March 2005 with 
the current MP and back then Hizbullah’s foreign relations officer Nawwaf al-
Musawi.181
 Actually, in 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbullah’s 
leader Hasan Nasrallah met with Kofi Annan, the ex-secretary-general of 
the UN. Since then Nasrallah has also repeatedly met with Jewish intellec-
tuals such as Norman Finkelstein, Noam Chomsky, US journalist Seymour 
Hersh, and British MP George Galloway. Not surprisingly, there has also been 
a European rush towards Hizbullah, especially after the June 2009 legislature 
elections, most notably by the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, French 
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, British lawmakers, and other low-level 
contacts such as the British, Norwegian, and Danish ambassadors to Lebanon 
and other EU and US delegations.
 Already before the elections, Britain re-established contact with Hizbul-
lah’s ‘political wing’ and met with MP ‘Ali ‘Ammar in March 2009 after it 
ceased contact with Hizbullah members in 2005, and listed Hizbullah’s ‘mili-
tary wing’ as a proscribed terrorist organization in 2008. In 2005 the Euro-
pean Parliament had already ruled Hizbullah as a terrorist organization. The 
resolution passed 473-33 in the EU parliament, but is not binding for EU poli-
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cymakers. Senior US officials have mocked and publicly rejected the British 
decision. In May 2009 Jeffrey Feltman, the US deputy assistant secretary of 
state for Near East affairs and former ambassador to Lebanon affirmed: “Our 
position on Hizbullah remains unchanged… We see no distinction between 
the leadership and funding of the group’s terrorist, military, political and 
social wings.”
 In line with the US stance, the Netherlands regards Hizbullah as a terror-
ist organization. Also, the resumption of talks with Hizbullah’s political wing 
caused a row in the British parliament, with Labor MP Andrew Gwynne ques-
tioning the foreign minister on the wisdom of such a move, which, according 
to him, not only affects domestic Lebanese dynamics but also has a bearing 
on the peace process since the “British policy could undermine Arab moder-
ates in the region who strive for peace through non-violent means.” David 
Miliband, the UK foreign minister, begs to differ with Gwynne arguing that 
“Britain is willing to step-up contact with Hizbullah as they begin to play a 
bigger role in Lebanon’s government.” Miliband thinks that “carefully consid-
ered contact with Hizbullah’s politicians, including its MPs, will best advance 
our objective of the group rejecting violence to play a constructive role in 
Lebanese politics… The UK strongly supports a comprehensive peace settle-
ment to the Arab/Israeli conflict and this will need to include an agreement 
between Israel and Lebanon.”182 Hizbullah’s unofficial mouthpiece, the daily 
newspaper al-Akhbar, boasted that secret meetings between senior Hizbul-
lah cadres and the US administration are occurring all the time through the 
mediation of a third party, the hot item on the agenda being the naturaliza-
tion of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, an eventuality that Hizbullah is 
adamantly against183, as clearly stated in its 2009 Manifesto, the Lebanese 
constitution, and the latest Lebanese government’s policy statement. In that 
very Manifesto, Hizbullah called on the EU to distinguish between ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘resistance’ and to dissociate itself from the ‘unjust’ US policies:
Since some European people have a history in resisting the occupier, Europe’s ethi-
cal and humanitarian duty – in addition to its political duty – is to acknowledge 
the right of the people to resisting the occupier, on the basis of distinguishing 
between resistance and terrorism.184
The Bush Administration decided to establish a correlation between ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘national resistance’ in order to disarm the resistance of its humanitarian legit-
imacy and its righteousness of cause, and to justify the waging of all forms of wars 
against it… ‘Terrorism’ was transformed into an American alibi for hegemony.185
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We think that the stability and cooperation in European-Arab relations require a 
European approach that is more independent, just, and objective (than that of the 
US).186
Not surprisingly, the US position remained the same regarding avoiding con-
tact with the two Hizbullah ministers, while at the same time recognizing the 
Lebanese cabinet that was formed on 9 November 2009.
3.8 Conclusion
I suggest that after 9/11, the US policy towards Hizbullah has not changed. 
From the early 1980s up till April 2001, Hizbullah has been classified by the US 
State Department as a ‘terrorist organization’. The same happened on 21 May 
2002. After 9/11, the US issued three additional lists, which either included 
Hizbullah’s members or asked the Lebanese government to freeze Hizbul-
lah’s assets. I further purport that in the Lebanese public sphere there has 
been no substantial alteration in Hizbullah’s doctrines after 9/11, rather a re-
evaluation of some priorities. Nasrallah argued, “In the light of the terrorist 
milieu propagated by the US on all the world after Sept. 11, I reiterated in more 
than one occasion, Hizbullah is as it is before and after Sept. 11; nothing has 
changed”.187
 Lynch notes, “… often public discourse reinforces the existing consensus 
rather than producing a new one”.188 From this stance, one can argue that 
there is a shared belief among most of the Lebanese that Hizbullah does not 
have branches in any part of the world, is not a political party in the tradi-
tional sense; rather is a local resistance movement that is “the embodiment of 
the people’s will and sovereignty”.189 Thus, the response to the US terrorist lists 
was the consolidation of the earlier view that is shared among almost all Leba-
nese confessions, namely, a national consensus that Hizbullah is the Lebanese 
resistance, not a terrorist organization. And so, Hizbullah upheld its political 
legitimacy and capital, which springs from the support of the Lebanese gov-
ernment and people.
 I dispute Saad-Ghorayeb’s claim that Hizbullah’s domestic agenda is sub-
servient to its regional plan and that the party tends to stress the former at 
the expense of the latter.190 It seems to me Hizbullah does not simply have to 
choose between either or emphasize one more at the expense of the other, as 
she contends, because the party can play its cards neatly or strike a balance 
between the two, at least sometimes. Further, I maintain that in the domes-
tic sphere, almost nothing changed in Hizbullah’s political program, which 
increasingly is targeting integration in the Lebanese public sphere through 
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dovish policies aimed at pluralism and respect for sectarian differences in the 
Lebanese mosaic. However, in the regional sphere, especially after the ‘April 
2002 West Bank counterterrorism offensive’ and the 2009-2010 ‘Operation 
Cast Lead’ in Gaza”,191 Hizbullah became hawkish and more belligerent in its 
support of the Palestinian Intifada, to the extent that one can argue, “Hizbul-
lah is more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves”192; this made the 
party “a difficult number in the regional equation”, as some political analysts 
remarked.
 I contend that after 9/11, Hizbullah’s support for the Palestinian Intifada 
became more confrontational both in discourse and deeds. This is due, in 
part, to the US administration’s targeting of Islamic and resistance move-
ments193 labeling them as terrorist organizations, specifically the US’s hostile 
attitude that accused Hizbullah of global terrorism194, in spite of all of Hizbul-
lah’s integration policies. However, the catalyst that warrants such an attitude 
is Israel’s ‘aggressive’ policies and its continual and devastating incursions into 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories that put Hizbullah’s credibility and repu-
tation at stake. This explains the resurfacing of the ‘Great Satan’ label of the US 
and the ‘Absolute Evil’ tag of Israel, both being used and exploited by Hizbul-
lah in abundance for mobilization purposes. By this, Hizbullah is practicing 
its double-edged-sword theory, namely, domestic integration, and regional 
militancy: the former in conformity to its political program, and the latter 
in accordance with its political ideology. This leads us to discuss Hizbullah’s 
views on suicide bombing or ‘martyrdom’, as they call it.
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4 Political Violence: Suicide 
Operations1
Abstract
After the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, Hiz-
bullah had not committed a single martyrdom operation although it engaged, 
on many occasions, the Israeli soldiers in Shib‘a and kidnapped three sol-
diers on 7 October 2000 and two on 12 July 2006. Contrary to what has been 
rumored, the party did not conduct martyrdom operations in the ‘Second 
Lebanon War’ or the July 2006 War since Hizbullah had the required arsenal 
to face the invading IDF and was able to inflict heavy casualties, killing more 
than 100 soldiers. In fact, Hizbullah’s last martyrdom operation was conduct-
ed in 1999.
 The basic question of this chapter is to study how religious, political, and 
national discourse is used to justify martyrdom for Islamic movements, in 
particular the Lebanese Hizbullah. (In other words, this chapter is about how 
nationalist and political discourses intermingle with a religious discourse on 
martyrdom, and how Hizbullah, an organization perceived as religious/fun-
damentalist, is relying, in addition to religious discourse, on nationalist and 
political discourses in its representation of martyrdom). My main concern 
is to analyze how the religious authorities of Hizbullah deal with this ques-
tion, and how this discourse changes overtime. Thus, I endeavor to expose 
Hizbullah’s religious-political discourse and analyze fatwas (religious edits) 
and speeches dealing with the issue of martyrdom. I contest the commonly 
held view that regards martyrdom as a specifically Shi‘ite phenomenon, argu-
ing that, in addition to Sunni Palestinians, Lebanese nationalists, from all 
religious denominations, have also carried out such operations. I would like 
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to debunk a few myths too, for instance the one regarding the social back-
ground of suicide bombers. I endeavor to rupture stereotypes and challenge 
the master narrative on the Islamic movements’ constituency being “made 
up of poor desperate people who commit suicide so that they can enjoy the 
virgins in Paradise.” The problematic is that although martyrdom has become 
the trademark of radical Islamic groups, it was not solely carried out by them. 
I purport that the icon that both parties, secularists and Islamists, embraced 
is that martyrdom operations were conducted in order to uphold the honor, 
pride, and dignity of the ‘nation’ (‘izzat wa karamat al-umma). Thus, I argue 
that martyrdom operations – whether carried out by Islamic movements or 
resistance movements – are altruistic, self-sacrificial operations conveyed in 
the form of symbolic capital (honor and dignity).
4.1 Introduction
In conformity to its resistance identity as an Islamic jihadi movement, Hiz-
bullah sanctioned martyrdom operations as a specific resistance strategy. 
Hizbullah clearly states in its “Identity and Goals”2 that it “… also used one 
of its own special types of resistance against the Zionist enemy [Israel] that is 
the suicide attacks. These attacks dealt great losses to the enemy on all think-
able levels such as militarily and mentally. The attacks also raised the morale 
across the whole Islamic nation.” Are suicide operations a legitimate tactic in 
a war for national independence? Does Hizbullah’s quest for national freedom 
justify its resort to martyrdom operations? Is martyrdom incumbent upon 
men only, or is it the duty of women too? Is there an evolving understanding 
of the role of martyrs?
Background of the study
A survey conducted by Reuters on the Palestinian reaction towards suicide 
operations conveyed that 75 percent of the Palestinians supported the 4 Octo-
ber 2003 suicide operation, the sixth operation conducted by a Palestinian 
woman since the beginning of the Intifada. The operation was performed by 
lawyer Hanadi Jaradat3 who blew herself up killing twenty Israeli civilians in 
the wake of the celebration of Yum Kippur (Day of Forgiveness) in Haifa, a city 
that is supposed to portray Israeli-Palestinian peaceful coexistence. The sam-
ple included 1,318 Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, out of whom 17 
percent were against the operation, and 4.4 percent vehemently condemned 
it.4 The late Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, founder of Hamas, argued, “I’m saying that 
in this phase (of the uprising [Intifada]), the participation of women is not 
needed, like men. We can’t meet the growing demands of young men who 
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wish to carry out martyr operations”.5 On 14 January 2004, at the Erez cross-
ing in Gaza, Reem Saleh Al-Riyashi, the seventh woman suicide bomber and 
the first Palestinian mother6, blew herself up amongst Israeli soldiers, killing 
four and wounding seven.7 In laying Reem to rest, Mahmud Al-Zahhar, a 
Hamas political leader, declared, “The martyr Reem is a heroine since she 
gave up everything. This was a young married woman who left behind a hus-
band and children to go to paradise... She won’t be our last.”8 (Italics added 
for emphasis). Although Shaykh Yasin earlier argued that it is not essential for 
women to participate in martyrdom operations, in spite of the growing num-
ber of male contenders, it seems he revoked his decision later on due to altera-
tions dictated on the battlefield. In commenting on Al-Riyashi’s operation, he 
said, “The operation is a watershed operation on two counts: first, because a 
woman executed it [first woman from Hamas to conduct such an operation]; 
second because it resulted from a joint endeavor between Kata’ib Shuhada’ al-
Aqsa [The secularist Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is an offshoot of Arafat’s 
Fatah], and Kata’ib Izzeddine Al-Qassam [the military wing of Hamas].” Yasin 
added that Hamas refuses any cease-fire with the ‘Zionists’ [Israel] because 
this is tantamount to capitulation. Yasin affirmed, “Hence, everyone knows 
that there is no road and no other choice save the road of resistance”.9 In 
justifying women’s role in jihad and martyrdom, Yasin argued that when the 
enemy [Israel] occupied the land of the Muslims [Palestine], jihad became a 
religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims, men and women. He reiterated,
We used to say in the past that we leave women aside unless there is an urgent 
need for them to conduct martyrdom operations. Thus, when our brothers in the 
Kata’ib found the need to perform an operation by resorting to a woman, they did 
so because, in my opinion, it is a new beginning for the woman. However, con-
cerning jihad, it is not the beginning, rather the continuity of the road [manhaj] to 
martyrdom and struggle by recourse to both men and women.10
What has led to this apparent change in Yasin’s thinking and discourse?
 In the early morning of 22 March 2004, Israel silenced Shaykh Yasin (1937-
2004) for good in what it calls “targeted killings”. Yasin’s assassination earned 
him the title of “the leading martyr” and sparked a wave of rage amid calls 
for revenge based on the slogan “an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth”.11 
His death strengthened the resolve of the Palestinian resistance and the ‘rip-
ple effect’ of martyrdom operations was heavily felt, even in Israel proper. 
Likewise, Israel expected the assassination of Hizbullah’s second secretary-
general, Sayyid Abbas Al-Musawi, on 16 February 1992, would lead to the 
weakening of the party. However, the gap between Israel’s prognosis and 
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developments on the ground precluded this from materializing. On the con-
trary, it strengthened Hizbullah’s mobilization and its resolve to end the occu-
pation, after eight years, by driving the Israeli forces out of Lebanon through 
a relentless war of attrition. This analysis is substantiated by Nasrallah’s fare-
well address to Shaykh Yasin issued on the same day of the assassination: 
“The martyrdom of the leader of the resistance in Palestine, Shaykh Yasin, is 
a rebirth and resurrection of the resistance… The martyrdom of the leader of 
the resistance puts the resistance on the final road to victory.”12 In less than 
a month, on 17 April 2004, Israel assassinated Yasin’s successor ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 
al-Rantisi (1947-2004), the political leader and co-founder of Hamas. Hizbul-
lah declined to retaliate military; rather it confined its condemnation of the 
incident to issuing, two days later, a political declaration pinning the blame 
and responsibility for the assassination on the US administration.13 Interest-
ingly, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah issued a communiqué 
condemning the assassination:
This horrible crime is a result of the American free hand that was given to Sharon 
to eradicate the Palestinian people and end its cause, by killing its leaders and pro-
moting political projects that would virtually cancel all its political rights includ-
ing those that were articulated by the UN General Assembly. All these resolutions 
are meant to be sacrificed on the altar of the coming presidential elections…
Those who killed Dr Rantissi are: Firstly, President Bush and his administration. 
Secondly, Arab and Islamic complicity or silence. Thirdly, Sharon and his govern-
ment, having been given in his last visit to the US a green line and a readiness to 
provide a cover for any crime they might commit no matter how big it could be.
The American Administration rushed to declare that it supports this criminal act 
in defiance of the Arab and Islamic World as well as the international public opin-
ion and the stances taken by the European Union. It is suggesting to all of them 
that Sharon has the right to carry on in committing his crimes and massacres in 
Palestine in the same way American crimes are committed in Iraq, all in the name 
of ‘fighting terrorism’ and ‘self-defense’.
We say to the Palestinians that the American decision to commit massacres against 
them until the coming elections is final, and that the American-Israeli war against 
them is an open one. The only option they have is to endure, strengthen their unity 
and continue to hurt the enemy in a way that will make him cry first.
To the Arabs and Muslims we say: Isn’t that humiliation enough. Stop this fear that 
is about to kill what is left of the nation’s dignity. One of the original peoples of the 
nation is being eradicated while you are discussing when you will hold the summit 
which we believe that it will not be in the near future so that you will not have to 
issue a communiqué condemning the murder just as is the case of killing Sheik 
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Yassin… Meanwhile, Sharon would commit additional crimes with the joy of the 
arrogant and the boasting of the haughty.14
Based on our religious capacity, we urge the Arab and Muslim peoples to take to 
the streets to voice their opinion, and erase some of the disgrace [religious capital], 
before the darkness spread and injustice dominates.
On 17 August 2005 Israel relinquished the Gaza strip after 38 years of occupa-
tion and started evacuating its settlers. Nasrallah termed this eventuality as 
the second victory for the model of resistance in five years: “The choice of 
resistance liberates Gaza.” He added that this constitutes further proof for the 
utility of holding on to the weapons of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance. On 12 
September 2005 Israel officially ended its occupation of Gaza after the com-
plete withdrawal of its military.
 In four days – from 10 to 14 June 2007 – Hamas took control of the entire 
Gaza strip and established its Islamic Emirate after a bloody military coup 
that ousted Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the Gaza strip and 
established its Islamic Emirate.
 From 27 December 2008 to 20 January 2009 Israel conducted its military 
campaign ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in the Gaza strip aimed at stopping Hamas 
rockets from targeting southern Israel after a six months truce between the 
two parties expired on 19 December 2007. After almost five years of Yasin’s 
and Rantisi’s assassinations, on 1 January 2009, on the sixth day of ‘Opera-
tion Cast Lead’, Israeli war planes assassinated Nizar Rayyan (1960-2009). 
Rayyan, one of the top five decision makers in Gaza and the liaison between 
Hamas’ leadership and the group’s military wing, had threatened the resump-
tion of suicide operations against Israel. Rayyan, a lecturer in Islamic Law and 
a preacher, dispatched one of his sons on a ‘martyrdom’ operation that killed 
two settlers and wounded fifteen in October 2001 in Gush Katif Gaza settle-
ment Elei Sinai. Moreover, Rayyan planned and financed the 2004 operation 
at the Ashdod port, which led to the death of ten Israelis. The fourth major 
targeted killing claimed the life of Hamas’s interior minister, Said Siam, who 
was killed with his brother Ayyad and another senior Hamas member in an 
Israeli airstrike on his house in the Jabalya district in Gaza City. These major 
targeted killings took place eight months after Hamas’s Gaza coup of June 
2007. According to Israeli sources, ‘Operation Cast Lead’ resulted in 1,166 Pal-
estinian deaths and 11 Israeli deaths.15 According to Palestinian sources 1,505 
Palestinians died.16
 Concomitant with the assassination of two other Hamas cadres, Rayyan’s 
omen became a reality when, on 5 January 2008, a Hamas suicide bomber 
detonated himself in an Israeli tank wounding one soldier.
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 The problematic is that some social scientists have argued that the Shi‘ites 
have cultivated a sense of martyrology. For instance, Cole and Keddie con-
tend that Shi‘ism constitutes a culture of martyrdom or is characterized by 
a “martyr complex”17, while Fouad Ajami labels the Shi‘ites as being “sui-
cidal”18. Thus even though some authors regard martyrdom as a specifically 
Shi‘ite phenomenon, nevertheless Sunni Palestinians and Lebanese national-
ists, from all religious denominations, have also carried out such operations. 
If it is claimed that the Shi‘ite discourse on martyrdom was adopted by the 
Sunnis, then in addition to the religious discourse, what other kind of dis-
course do the secularists embrace? If Hizbullah and the Palestinian resistance 
relied on their religious capital to sanction martyrdom operations, then how 
could one explain other secular political party’s martyrdom operations, which 
were conducted by men and women of different religious denominations? 
Although martyrdom has become the trademark of radical Islamic groups, 
it was not solely carried out by them. For instance, secular Lebanese politi-
cal parties have conducted martyrdom operations targeting Israeli occupa-
tion forces. The ‘Lebanese Communist Party’ (LCP) conducted a martyrdom 
operation carried out by a Christian female, while the ‘Syrian Social National-
ist Party’ (SSNP) has conducted twelve martyrdom operations evenly divided 
between six women and six men belonging to different confessions and reli-
gious denominations.
An anecdote: “Prologue in heaven”, the martyr’s mother19
(Martyrdom 1)20: On the sunny Sunday of 9 May 1999, Nynne Bjerre, Vibeke 
Toft, and the author went to interview the mother of a Hizbullah martyr21 
in the southern suburb of Beirut in a very humble, barely standing home. 
The two Danish journalism students experienced a ‘cultural shock’ when they 
learned that they had to congratulate the mother instead of offering her their 
condolences. As a Lebanese, I was not surprised myself, but the Danes were 
perplexed. They questioned how could a person congratulate a mother on the 
loss of her own son. How could a caring, loving mother give her own son will-
ingly to death? The visible astonishment of the Danes, however, was a serious 
challenge for the illiterate martyr’s mother. She said, “My daughters, if you are 
bitten by a snake and the poison is flowing in your blood stream, will you let 
it go all the way to your heart and kill you, or will you simply suck it out?” She 
gave another analogy; she said that if a person discovered a cancerous gland 
in his body would not he remove it from the root so as not to kill him? She 
showed us some pictures of her son without shedding a single tear; rather, 
she was cool in a heeding-up manner. In particular, she argued, “Dignity is 
the opposite of humiliation, and death [is preferable] to humiliation”.22 She 
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added that the martyr (her son) “acted as an anti-Destin, a bronze hawk, a 
hard-core altruist whose greatest duty and source of pride [honor and dig-
nity] is to sacrifice himself for the well-being of his country by killing as many 
as possible of his enemies.”23 She stressed, “This is the greatest pride that can 
befall a mother.”
 (Martyrdom 2): In connection to this, even Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hiz-
bullah’s secretary-general, felt ‘embittered’ when he was shaking the hand of 
a martyr’s father – not because he felt ashamed, but because he nor his family 
were honored by any martyr. This is not the case anymore since he ‘sacrificed’ 
his own 19-year old son, Hadi, so that by his martyrdom, and that of many 
others, the cause will not die, Lebanon will survive, and Hizbullah will pre-
vail: “Lo! The Party of God Is Victorious.” (5: 56)24
4.2 Jihad and martyrdom
The classical distinction between offensive and defensive jihad is well-known 
in the literature. It is adequately discussed in the ‘manual’ of jihad and mar-
tyrdom.25 In a similar fashion, Khosrokhavar distinguishes between what 
he calls the “two forms of martyrdom”, namely, “offensive martyrdom” and 
“defensive martyrdom”, which respectively correspond to offensive and defen-
sive jihad.26 Moussalli illustrates the holy matrimony that exists between jihad 
and martyrdom. According to him,
“Hizbullah adheres to the doctrines of al-jihad al-akbar (greater struggle) and al-
jihad al-asghar (smaller struggle). Whereas the smaller jihad denotes the combat-
ing of activities against the enemies of Islam, the greater jihad was defined by the 
Prophet as that which encompasses the individual’s service to the cause of religion. 
Hizbullah broadens the notion of greater jihad to include all efforts that an indi-
vidual exerts to complete his duty as a believer… Jihad has basic characteristics 
like realism… Although struggle (jihad) aims at transforming any institution that 
opposes and does not allow Islam to be freely practiced, it is neither suicide nor a 
campaign of atrocities”.27 (Italics added for emphasis)
Nasrallah affirms, “Not all fighting is jihad”. According to him, the Islamic-
Qur’anic terminology (mustalah) or definition of jihad, is that jihad is the 
specificity of fighting in the name of God: “Oh believers, if you journey 
[fight with the sword] in the way of Allah be discerning… And he who kills 
a believer intentionally will, as punishment, be thrown into Hell, dwelling in 
it forever; and Allah will be angry with him, curse him and prepare for him a 
dreadful punishment.” (4:94-93) According to Nasrallah, this is par excellence 
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the toughest punishment in the Qur’an inflicted upon a person who inten-
tionally kills a believer, for this a kabira (the worst sin). Nasrallah adds that 
jihad has its own religious injunctions and jurisprudence; there is halal (reli-
giously sanctioned) and haram (religiously prohibited) in jihad. That is why 
he stressed the need to ask the jurisprudents about the jurisprudential details 
dealing with the jihadi work, or else this work will not be done for God, rath-
er for some other end. Thus, jihad in the name of God should be governed 
by the God’s Shari‘a, God’s legitimacy, and the total subjugation and obedi-
ence to God’s volition. From here comes the devotion to martyrdom and the 
love of meeting God.28 From this perspective, Nasrallah offered an outright 
condemnation of the 11 March 2004 train terrorist bombings in Madrid that 
claimed the lives of 191 innocent civilians and wounded around 1,400 others. 
Nasrallah said, “What has happened in Madrid is condemned by all stan-
dards and criteria… We in Hizbullah denounce it as a horrible crime and a 
blatant attack against innocent civilians and people. Every attack that targets 
innocent civilians to whichever country or religion or nation they belong to 
is a cowardly act that is vehemently censured from an Islamic, Qur’anic, and 
Muhammadi perspective”.29
 Although many scholars acknowledge that terrorism is the weapon of the 
weak30, it seems that they do not adequately stress that ‘relative deprivation’, 
which is usually coupled with a loss of dignity and identity, is one of the main 
causes of what the West calls ‘terrorism’, and Islamic movements label as ‘self-
sacrifice’ or ‘martyrdom’. From the perspective of relative deprivation theo-
ries, “a group member engages in collective action any time that she or he 
is acting as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at 
improving the conditions of the group as a whole.” Collective action seems 
to justify “why a person might forgo his or her personal interests and choose 
instead to take actions designed to the ingroup as a whole.”31 Thus, martyr-
dom could be classified as an altruistic act aimed at furthering collective 
action. The ‘domino effect’ of martyrdom operations in the West Bank, Gaza, 
and Israel seem to substantiate this conclusion. Sayyid Ibrahim al-Musawi32 
offers a religious-ideological explanation arguing,
[A] combination of frustration, anger, oppression, despair, a strong faith33 and an 
unquestionable dedication all culminate to make the Palestinians what they are 
now: human bombs... the Lebanese victory against the Israeli Army provides the 
best example of how to liberate a people’s land. The Lebanese have had experience 
of self-sacrifice operations, although they were not the first to carry them out… 
resistance fighters in southern Lebanon and occupied Palestine have marched 
relentlessly as human bombs toward their targets. Members of the Islamic groups 
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in southern Lebanon and Palestine carry out their self-sacrifice operations on 
a basis of religious belief and courage in taking the ultimate test of faith. They 
believe this sacrifice will be compensated by God’s ultimate reward: Heaven. Reli-
gion, however, forbids such acts in the presence of alternative actions that could 
attain the same results. In the face of a superior Israeli army and its great arsenal, 
and in the absence of any effective external support, Palestinians find themselves 
with little choice but to resort to such methods to fight against Israeli terror and 
subjugation. As such these actions become accepted by religion. Jihad in Islam is 
not assigned to women as a duty, yet Ayatullah Fadlallah has authorized women 
to carry out such operations under the current conditions in Palestine. Israelis 
have violated Palestinian rights and dignity. Recently, Bush issued a new ‘fatwa’ 
proclaiming that a suicide bomber is a murderer and not a martyr. This is contrary 
to the Qur’an and to the Prophet’s teachings… The answer is that the queue of 
self-sacrifice bombers [domino effect] is growing longer, as the rest of the world 
waits.34
Al-Musawi’s explanation entails value-laden terminology reflecting, not only 
Hizbullah’s understanding of concepts such as ‘self-sacrifice’, ‘martyrdom’, 
‘suicide’, etc., but also the Islamic movements’ perception of these concepts. 
In order to come to grips with Hizbullah’s and the Islamic movements’ insight 
into these concepts, I start by defining what martyrdom is. Then, I distinguish 
among the four senses of martyrdom; afterwards, I discuss the origin and 
causes of martyrdom, fatwas and opinions on martyrdom, and I end up by 
differentiating between martyrdom and suicide. Since some authors use jihad 
and martyrdom interchangeably, thus blurring the distinction between the 
two terms, I start by offering, in the next section, the working definition of 
martyrdom that this chapter adopts.
4.3 Martyrdom
Definition of martyrdom
As a working definition of martyrdom, I adopt Momen’s and Moussalli’s defi-
nitions fusing them into one definition. According to Momen, “the ultimate 
in [self]-sacrifice [altruism] is martyrdom, in which a person sacrifices his or 
her own life itself for religion.”35 Thus in Islam, martyrdom is the highest and 
most extolled form of jihad.36 According to Moussalli,
The martyr has a special place in Islam, because he is not punished on the day of 
judgment and is promised Paradise. Although historically and theoretically Mus-
lims have practiced martyrdom in defending their existence and land, it is not nor-
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mally considered something that was acquired through fighting fellow Muslims. 
The fundamentalists believe that Islam has commended martyrdom as a way of 
uplifting the community and defending the weak [oppressed] and the community. 
For them, it is considered to be a sign of ultimate belief in God. Today, it is mostly 
practiced by fundamentalists, especially radicals, who use it as a distinguishing 
mark of their activism (harakiyya).37 (Italics added for emphasis.)
Based on empirical38 and theoretical research considerations, I suggest that 
the common definition of martyrdom among Muslims and non-Muslims, 
devout and secular, is that it seems to be regarded as a form of altruistic 
behavior. I propose that, for Muslims, it is based mainly on the Qur’anic inter-
pretation of symbolic capital; for non-Muslims, the nationalistic dimension of 
symbolic capital seems to be the most salient.
 Inspired by the martyr’s mother39, theorizing the debate, I argue that jihad 
and martyrdom, as carried out by Islamic movements resisting occupation, 
are forms of altruistic or self-sacrificial behavior, which is conveyed in the 
form of symbolic capital. (Altruism is a supererogatory act, i.e. an act done 
beyond the call of moral duty or obligation). Bourdieu defined symbolic capi-
tal as the “degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration or honour 
[dignity, possessed by someone and] founded on the dialectic of knowledge 
and recognition.”40 (Italics added for emphasis) Since Hizbullah labels itself 
as an ‘Islamic jihadi movement’41, symbolic capital acquires vital importance. 
“Symbolic capital refers here to the status of a fighter for the cause of ‘true 
Islam’ whatever that means.42 The Koranic verse [4:95]…, which states that 
‘God hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their 
goods and persons’ conveys this idea of symbolic capital. The more one 
fights with one’s ‘goods’ or ‘one’s’ ‘person’, the more one accumulates sym-
bolic capital”.43 However, symbolic capital is not only confined to those who 
fight under the banner of Islam; it is also employed by nationalist and other 
resistance movements. For instance, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party leader 
said in justifying resistance and martyrdom: “Life is only a stance embodied 
in pride and dignity44 (Ina al-hayat waqfatu ‘izzin faqat)”.45 Building on the 
aforementioned, in the next section, I differentiate among the four senses of 
martyrdom, mainly among Islamic movements, but that could also be applied 
to non-Islamic ones. Thus, the next sections might answer the question why 
people martyr themselves. Does everyone will martyrdom, or is it sometimes 
‘accidental’?
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Four senses of martyrdom46
The Messenger of God [Prophet Muhammad] said: “Nobody who dies and 
has something good for him with Allah will (ever like to) return to this world 
even though he were offered the whole world and all that is in it (as an induce-
ment), except the martyr who desires to return and be killed in the world for 
the (great) merit of martyrdom that he has seen.”47
 According to Wensinck, “the essence of the later Muslim doctrine of the 
martyrs is already found in the Kor‘an [9:20; cf. 47:4; 61:11]… The admiration 
of the martyrs expressed in Allah’s book [Qur’an], is developed into a doctrine 
by tradition and dogmatics, a doctrine the centre of which is the close rela-
tion between martyrdom and paradise… Moreover the martyrs are elevated 
in rank above the other inhabitants of paradise.”48 Keeping in mind that the 
martyrs are absolved from the Day of Judgement and that “their sins have 
been cancelled by their meritorious life and death”49, I distinguish among the 
following four categories of martyrdom basing myself on primary sources:50
 Martyrdom 1): al-istishhadi al-mujahid (hard-core altruist, a supereroga-
tory act): The word al-mujahid is implied, but not directly stated. ‘The mar-
tyred fighter’ corresponds to a Muslim person who – in performing jihad, or 
holy war – intentionally and willingly blows himself up in the battlefield or 
keeps on fighting in the battlefield till he dies (never surrenders) in order to 
inflict the highest amount of damage and fatalities on the enemy. According 
to Prophet Muhammad, this person is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial 
shroud (la yughsl wa la yukaffan)51, although it is generally stipulated as a reli-
gious obligation to do so. As is acknowledged in the hadith, the “angels wash 
him”. As interpreted by Qasim, this special treatment is done in recognition 
of his special status, or performed as a token of gratitude and a sign of special 
commemoration (takrim) for his great deeds. This corresponds, for instance, 
to the twelve Hizbullah fighters who blew themselves up targeting Israeli mili-
tary and intelligence personnel during the occupation of Lebanon.52
 Martyrdom 2): al-shahid al-mujahid (altruist, a supererogatory act): ‘The 
martyr fighter’ corresponds to a Muslim person who, in performing jihad, 
falls in the battlefield while facing the enemy. For instance, this is the case 
of Hadi Nasrallah and other Hizbullah fighters who confronted the IDF in 
conventional warfare without blowing themselves up. Like category one, the 
martyred fighter, the martyr fighter is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial 
shroud. The angels wash him. This corresponds, for instance, to the 1,281 Hiz-
bullah fighters who had died in confronting Israel from 1982 till 2000.
 Martyrdom 3): al-shahid (victim, not supererogatory act): ‘The martyr’ 
corresponds to an innocent civilian Muslim person who died without tak-
ing part in the fighting. He/she is washed and wrapped in a burial shroud 
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because he/she died outside of the battlefield. However, the final evaluation is 
for God (al-taqyyim ‘inda Allah). As Ayatullah Khamina‘i puts it, “for every 
person martyrdom is a special prerogative. If God responded to his/her call 
(du‘a’) and considered his death as martyrdom, then God has bestowed upon 
him/her the highest dignity and prerogative in return for his/her essence that 
has gone to heaven”.53 As Wensinck puts it, “whosoever demands martyrdom 
from Allah in uprightness obtains the place of a martyr, even if he should die 
in his bed.”54
 Martyrdom 4): shahid al-watan or shahid al-qadiyya (altruist, a supererog-
atory55 act): ‘The martyr of the nation-state’ or ‘the martyr of a cause’ corre-
sponds to a non-Muslim who died in the battlefield fighting for his country 
or the cause he believes in. God is the only one who evaluates whether he/she 
could take the remuneration (ajr) of a Muslim martyr and be elevated to the 
level of martyr fighter in the full Islamic jurisprudential sense of the word. 
This corresponds, for instance, to the non-Muslim Lebanese Army soldiers 
who died in the confrontation with Israel, the same day Hadi Nasrallah and 
his two companions died. Also, non-Muslim fighters of the September 1997 
Hizbullah formed ‘Lebanese Multi-Confessional Brigades’ (Al-Saraya Al-
Lubnaniyya Limuqawamat Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli) fall in this category. They are 
buried according to the specific rites of their respective religions.
 This classification leads us to inquire about the origin and causes of mar-
tyrdom. Is a sense of hopelessness the motivation behind martyrdom? Or is 
sexuality the motive behind such operations, I mean what some media por-
tray as the alleged 70 or 72 virgin brides waiting for the martyr in heaven? 
If this is the case, then if the martyr is a woman, what does she obtain as a 
reward or receive in return?
Origin of martyrdom: Causes and motivation
Shedding light on the first martyrdom operation by a Palestinian mother, an 
editorial in Al-Sharq Newspaper entitled, “Martyrdom Resistance is the Cul-
ture of Downtrodden People” questioned the reasons for martyrdom opera-
tions in the Occupied Territories arguing that Israel and the US brand such 
operations with terrorism as a pretext to continue occupation and their ‘iron-
fist’ policy. According to the editorial, these retaliating measures are incapable 
of eliminating terrorism; rather they are conducive to enflaming the so-called 
terrorists to sacrifice themselves. Al-Sharq stressed the need for a profound 
vision and thorough scientific study in order to find out the real causes that 
drive this growing number of educated youth to voluntarily enlist to conduct 
martyrdom operations, irrespective of the ideological, doctrinal, religious, or 
secular beliefs that they adhere to. The editorial concluded that popular resis-
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tance or martyrdom is the only available and viable weapon that is capable of 
confronting “the arrogance that is fortified by shear power [Israel].” In other 
words, liberating occupied lands can be achieved by relying on the experi-
ences of the Lebanese resistance [Hizbullah’s model] and the victory that was 
achieved by forcing the ‘Zionist occupation’ [Israel] to withdraw from south-
ern Lebanon. In short, the Israeli withdrawal encouraged the Intifada to adopt 
the martyrdom model in its resistance to the ‘Zionist occupation’.56
 Richard Antoun contends: “Passages from the Quran suggest that mar-
tyrs sit next to God with other righteous men, and they enjoy multiple virgin 
brides.”57 (Italics added for emphasis.) I argue that the first part of the sen-
tence is corroborated by the traditions attributed to the Prophet, but the sec-
ond part is an unsubstantiated fiction that is neither warranted in the Qur’an 
nor in the hadith. Instead of validating his claim with the alleged Qur’anic 
verses, Antoun quotes Joel Greensberg’s article in the New York Times issue of 
25 January 1995. As far as I know, there are neither Qur’anic verses nor hadiths 
referring to ‘multiple virgin brides’ being offered as a reward for a martyr. On 
these grounds, I argue that Antoun’s claim is an unsubstantiated myth that 
has no foundation in official religion whatsoever.
 Condoleeza Rice, the US national security advisor at the time, tried to 
explain suicide operations arguing, “[A] sense of hopelessness provides a fer-
tile ground for ideologies of hatred that persuade people to forsake univer-
sity educations, careers and families and aspire instead to blow themselves 
up – taking as many innocent lives with them as possible.”58 (Italics added for 
emphasis.) Barbara Victor59 subscribes to a similar view. In her study on Pal-
estinian women suicide bombers, she contends that the main motive for this 
‘fatal cocktail’ is that a ‘culture of death’ entered into the psyche of the Pales-
tinian people as a result of hopelessness, social stress, and depression, which 
these relatively destitute women suffered from. Such a theory seems unten-
able, especially after a pregnant woman, a well-to-do lawyer, and a mother of 
two blew themselves up. Contrary to Rice and Victor, Harik rightly argues 
that “the fundamentalist rationale behind this tactic [martyrdom operations] 
stands at odds with the common belief that terrorists are raving lunatics who 
strike out blindly at those they hate.”60 In this respect Momen states,
The theme of sacrifice and martyrdom stands uncomfortably in today’s secular, 
hedonistic world. Most of the mainstream orthodoxies, in the Christian world at 
least, appear embarrassed by it and do their best to minimize its place in religion… 
In some new religious movements… there is a strong emphasis on self-sacrifice 
and arduous work to advance the cause. Perhaps its appeal to youth lies in the 
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commitment, intensity and idealism that it demands, which contrasts with their 
bland, cocooned existence”.61
Keeping in mind Moussalli’s argument that jihad “is neither suicide nor a 
campaign of atrocities”, contrary to Rice, Ayatullah Fadlallah argued, “self-
martyrdom is not the result of brainwashing, nor is it irrational or immoral. 
Those who interpret martyrdom in such a way are guided by the premises of 
psychology.”62 In refuting the psychological approach63 to the study of mar-
tyrdom, Fadlallah argues,
The problem with the discipline of psychology is that it attempts to study the 
phenomenon of martyrdom from the perspective of a pragmatic vocabulary and 
laboratory results. They [psychologists] refuse to admit that certain things can be 
understood only through labor and pain. You can never be capable of appreciat-
ing freedom if you do not come to grips with enslavement. You can appreciate the 
crises of the starved only when you come to grips with the pangs of starvation.”64
In spite of Fadlallah’s criticisms of psychological approaches to martyrdom, 
Antoun stresses that “the significant reward for martyrs are psychological or 
soteriological (gaining salvation), depending on one’s worldview. The suicide 
bomber’s death is described by militants as ‘the martyr’s wedding’ (i.e., an 
occasion of joy and celebration). The martyr is said to become a saint and sit 
next to God in heaven. His family takes pride in his supreme achievement 
and receives the esteem of the community” [symbolic capital].65 In a similar 
vein, Khosrokhavar postulates “three themes of the martyrs’ predilection: (1) 
The mutation between sadness and joy; (2) The motivation to struggle against 
the oppressor; and (3) The identification of the martyr’s death with marriage, 
which justifies the festivities, the refusal of sadness, and the necessity of a col-
lective joy.” According to Khosrokhavar, the martyrs do not die, but remain 
living and present in the midst of the people. As such, sacred death is not a 
duty, rather a realization of the most ardent desire. Also, Khosrokhavar adds 
that the theme of the martyr’s blood is of vital importance; by being spilled on 
earth, blood enforces and revitalizes the sacred cause of combating the forces 
of evil. According to him, this miraculous, soteriological virtue originates 
from the sudden emissions of the (martyr’s) body, emissions that liberate the 
combatant’s body energy and causes the future victory against the oppressors. 
Khosrokhavar concludes that the martyr invokes the family, in particular the 
mother, in order to earn her consent and blessings for promoting the holy 
ideas in the service of those for whom the martyr has sacrificed herself/him-
self.66 (My translation).
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 Whatever the case, psychological or not, according to Fadlallah,
What gives the martyr the right to die is not merely a cause in a theoretical sense, 
but the practical conditions that gave rise to that cause. In a sense, Fadlallah seems 
to be saying that the ‘ulama’ must sanction martyrdom only when the situation 
requires self-martyring acts… But the ‘ulama’, in Fadlallah’s view… are the con-
science of the suffering community. Suffering is mainly caused at the hands of the 
Israelis, and the only answer to this suffering is martyrdom.67
Concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict in particular, the Muslim ‘ulama issued many fatwas sanctioning 
martyrdom operations.
Fatwas and opinions on martyrdom
It is worth mentioning that Imam Khumayni was the fist to sanction martyr-
dom operations arguing that they constitute the highest level of self-sacrifice 
for the sake of religion.68 Khumayni added, “[A]s Shi‘ites we welcome any 
opportunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks forward to an oppor-
tunity for self-sacrifice and martyrdom”69; as such, “red death is much better 
than black life”.70 Khumayni added, “our leader is that kid who blew himself 
up in front of enemy tanks.”71 In turn, the Iranian ‘ulama in Qum issued a 
fatwa sanctioning martyrdom operations.72
 Ayatullah Fadlallah argued that martyrdom operations are legitimate 
because they are conducted under the banner of jihad in order to drive out the 
Israeli occupation forces, which conducted a dynamic ‘extermination’ of the 
Palestinian population that has no recourse except to deter the occupier by 
shattering his security in any plausible way.73 Fadlallah adds, “a person must 
face power with equal or superior power. If it is legitimate to protect one’s 
life, land, and destiny, then all means of self-defence become legitimate.”74 
In explaining the basis of martyrdom operations, Fadlallah seems to offer 
psychological and rational-political justifications in spite of the fact that he 
openly blasted psychological interpretations of martyrdom. According to him 
the psychological component of martyrdom is “spiritual happiness”. In elab-
orating that, Fadlallah argues, to the mind of Muslim practicing resistance 
against occupation, “the choice of martyrdom and death is in agreement with 
the spiritual and doctrinal foundations of the believer. Death becomes a self-
willed process instigated by internal factors. Also, ‘death is a step that leads 
to reaching the martyr’s goal. That is why the believer, when he achieves self-
martyrdom, lives through spiritual happiness’”.75 In explaining the rational-
political component of martyrdom, which is “legitimate resistance”, Fadlallah 
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adds, “Suicide attacks in occupied Palestine [Israel] are not the craven acts of 
the morally depraved as they are portrayed by Western Media, but a form of 
legitimate resistance amid escalating dangers.”76 According to Fadlallah, many 
Qur’anic verses support the view that killing oneself is similar to homicide, in 
the sense that both need God’s permission. Fadlallah argues,
‘Basically, it is haram (prohibited by religion) to kill oneself or others; but during 
jihad (holy war or struggle for the sake of Islam), which is defensive or preventive 
war according to Islam, it is accepted and allowed, as jihad is considered an excep-
tional case’.77 In analysing the theological arguments legitimising suicide attacks, 
Fadlallah said that Allah did not identify a certain procedure to fight the enemy 
and defend the rights of the nation [‘umma]. ‘If achieving victory means that we 
have to go through a minefield, which necessarily and definitely means that many 
are going to be killed, then we would go,’ he said. Fadlallah said that the Palestinian 
perpetrators of ‘martyrdom operations’ do not target civilians, but rather aim to 
defend their people by inflicting damage and losses on the Israeli side to maintain 
a kind of equilibrium with the high-tech arsenal used by the Israeli Army.”78
In addition, Fadlallah issued a fatwa sanctioning the martyrdom (‘self-sacri-
fice’) operations of Palestinian women79, which is revolutionary because in 
Islam jihad is not incumbent upon women.80 As al-Musawi puts it,
Fadlallah also contradicted views widely held by Islamic scholars on the role of 
women in jihad, saying women are allowed to participate and carry out ‘self-sacri-
fice’ operations. ‘Nothing in Islam prevents women from embracing struggle and 
fighting for the sake of Allah. Women initially are not required to fight, for this 
is men’s duty, but under certain circumstances [in the ‘Occupied Territories’] it 
might be a women’s duty as well’.81
Both Imam Khumayni and Sayyid ‘Ali Khamina’i consider martyrdom as the 
highest level of self-sacrifice for the sake of religion, arguing that there is no 
difference between a man and a woman from a shar‘i (religious) perspective.82
 ‘The Council of Muslim Ulama’ argued that self-sacrifice operations con-
ducted against Israeli occupying forces [of Arab lands] are legitimate and they 
constitute the highest degree of martyrdom. They added that since martyr-
dom is conducted consciously, freely, and willingly, and since it is done out of 
a doctrinal belief in God, then it is one of the most important strategic weap-
ons available to the resistance in order to enforce its will and try to counter 
the superior power of the Israeli forces.83 The radical Shaykh Hamid al-‘Ali 
argued that martyrdom operations are intended to kill the occupying ‘infi-
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dels’ in order to spread terror in their hearts, thus forcing them to relinquish 
occupation of Muslim land. If this process results in the inevitable death of 
some women and children, as a consequence, and not on purpose, then this is 
religiously (shar‘an) sanctioned.84
 It is interesting to note that these views on martyrdom are not only 
confined to Muslim discourse; rather, there seems to be a correspondence 
between Muslim discourse and Christian discourse, rendering the issue a 
nationalistic one. I take the late Edmond N‘im, the Lebanese Maronite judi-
cial, constitutional, and international law expert, as a case in point.85 N‘im 
gave a ‘fatwa’86 contending “the martyrdom operations in occupied Palestine 
[Israel] are certainly legitimate.” He argued public international law sanctions 
the Palestinian people to face the Israeli superior military might by all avail-
able means in order to reach a balance with the means used by the Israelis. If 
the Palestinian people cannot find effective ways [to alter the Israeli military 
might], they have the right to blow themselves up in Israeli territories proper, 
in response to the Israeli destructive, sabotage, and killing operations perpe-
trated in Palestinian land. That is why, martyrdom operations are legitimate 
because they are the only means that the Palestinians can resort to in order 
to stand against the advanced weapons used against them by the Israelis. He 
conceded that targeting civilians in all violent confrontations is prohibited. 
However, this injunction holds only when there is, more or less, a balance of 
power among the warring nations. This is certainly not the case in Palestine. 
Therefore, when it comes to determining the aggressor; there is no difference 
among the military and the people of the aggressing nation. Since the military 
aggressing forces cannot be stopped by any weapon that the aggressed upon 
have, then the resistance has the right to resort to [Palestinian] human bombs 
against [Israeli] civilians. And so, there is no distinction between a settler, a 
civilian, and Israeli military. In short, N‘im affirms that from the perspective 
of international law, “overwhelming power needs overwhelming resistance”.87 
Thus, N‘im mirrors Nasrallah’s discourse offering, as he claims, an Interna-
tional law88 justification in addition to the ideological one.
 Acknowledging the problematic, Bin Eli‘azar, the ex-Israeli Minister of 
Defense, conceded that there could not be any victory against Palestinian sui-
cide bombers.89 In a similar vein, Davis argues, “Lebanon’s suicide bombers 
have been effective against Israel, according to Boaz Ganor, an Israeli ter-
rorism expert and executive director of the International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism. In an article published by Ganor’s institute on April 25, 
1998, he said that suicide attacks during the 1980s led to the Israeli withdrawal 
from southern Lebanon and had even broader consequences:
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This served as a proof for the Palestinian-Islamic organizations that a readiness 
for self-sacrifice, determination, and long-term vision, together with the correct 
use of terrorist strategies (and with the reliance on the influence of mass media 
on western opinion), can lead to far reaching military and political achievements. 
Activists in the Islamic organizations quickly learned that suicide missions are 
extremely effective. (A relatively small number of high-impact suicide missions 
succeeded in ousting from Lebanon the French, the Americans and eventually 
the Israelis.) The Palestinian-Islamic organizations, relying on a fundamentalist 
ideology similar to that of Hezbollah, started to learn and imitate the new ter-
rorist methods, and preached daring and self-sacrifice in preparation for suicide 
missions ”.90
Bearing the aforementioned discussions in mind, the time has come to 
address the difference between suicide operations and martyrdom ones.
Suicide and martyrdom91
From the perspective of theoretical and practical ethics, the foundation rests 
on the distinction between what psychological egoism calls suicide: “All vol-
untary human actions are selfishly motivated”, and what normative ethical 
theories label as altruism. Suicide is the opposite of altruistic or self-sacrificial 
behavior. As mentioned earlier, altruism is a supererogatory act, i.e. an act 
done beyond the call of moral duty or obligation.92
 According to Kohlberg, Muslim authors “while unequivocally condemn-
ing suicide, … attempted to define as precisely as possible the borderline 
between dangerous but praiseworthy behaviour [martyrdom] and foolhardy 
rush to perdition [suicide].”93 Kohlberg tries to answer the question, “is it 
permissible for an individual warrior to attack a large enemy force?”94 He 
comes to the conclusion that there seems to be a consensus among medieval 
Muslim jurists, belonging to different schools of law, that it is indeed the case: 
“jurists by and large upheld the principle of the quest of martyrdom placing 
only minimal restrictions on its realization.”95 Keeping in mind Kohlberg’s 
argument that “modern ideas about martyrdom cannot be understood in iso-
lation; they draw their inspiration from the past”96, the analogy with contem-
porary suicide bombers is not that far-fetched. Kohlberg writes:
In defending the actions of the suicide bomber, for example, some present-day 
writers compare him [her] to the individual soldier of medieval times who faced 
a large army: since the bomber’s aim is martyrdom, and since he [she] is likely to 
cause damage to the enemy, his [her] action is not only licit, but conforms to God’s 
will; it is not self-killing [suicide] but self-sacrifice [martyrdom]. These writers 
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maintain that if Muslims of the Prophet’s days had been in possession of modern 
explosives, they would have used them in the same manner as today’s fighters.97
From this perspective, Fadlallah, Qasim, and Nasrallah endeavored to set a 
line of demarcation between suicide and martyrdom for Islamic movements.
 As mentioned in chapter 3, Ayatullah Fadlallah denounced the 9/11 opera-
tions as criminal-suicidal acts that constitute an ugly human genocide in all 
respects. These, according to him, are not martyrdom acts. He added that 
neither offensive nor defensive jihad justifies such acts that are denounced 
religiously (shar‘an). These are vicious acts that are not sanctioned by any 
religion, civilization, or human logic. It is not right to use innocent, peaceful 
civilians as bargaining chips and means of leverage to change a certain [US] 
policy. Islamically speaking, it is wrong to engage oneself in such acts because 
there is no shar‘i justification for them. 9/11 is a horrendous act that is not 
authorized by any religion or approved by any “heavenly message”. Thus, Fad-
lallah is adamantly against targeting civilian means of transportation because 
their safety and security is a worldly humane concern from a shari‘ perspec-
tive.98
 Why was Fadlallah so vehement is his condemnation of suicide attacks, 
while he blatantly supports martyrdom operations carried out by men and 
women? Fadlallah stressed a “linguistic distinction between ‘suicide’ and ‘self-
sacrifice’99 operations. ‘Suicide is considered a crime from the religious point 
of view.100 One does not own his life to end it when he likes. Allah owns 
everyone’s life and it is a great transgression to inflict harm as it is to others’. If 
one kills oneself or others without a religious permission, he will be punished 
in the hereafter by being immortalized in hell.”101 As I see it, there seems to be 
a concordance between Fadlallah’s and Qasim’s views.
 Na‘im Qasim distinguishes between suicide operations and martyrdom 
operations. In explaining the latter, Qasim exhorts parents to raise their chil-
dren on the notions of jihad and martyrdom102 or death in the name of God. 
According to him, the logic behind martyrdom is based on a religious under-
standing and belief in the hereafter where people live happily and realize all 
their dreams in addition to the fruits that behold the umma as a result of mar-
tyrdom. Qasim affirms that martyrdom, as the duty of defending and liberat-
ing occupied land, is an embodiment of the concept of obedience (al-ta‘a)103 
to God and it is a “legitimate and religious responsibility” (al-mas’uliyya al-
shar‘iyya wa al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi) that leads to eternal life. Qasim stresses 
that martyrdom is a voluntary, willed act that is based on the intellectual and 
theoretical foundations of a religious, psychological, and cultural upbring-
ing embedded in the Qur’anic concept of ithar104 or ‘preference’, preference 
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of life in the hereafter, rather than the here and now, and preference of the 
umma over the individual. He concludes that martyrdom has specific reli-
gious safeguards (dawabit shar‘iyya), meaning that, if inflicting injury, heavy 
casualties, or victory on the enemy cannot be done except by resorting to 
martyrdom, then it is welcomed as a religiously legitimate act. Contrary to 
Rice who does not distinguish between suicide and martyrdom, Qasim con-
tends that suicide, not martyrdom, is an expression of hopelessness, frustra-
tion, and despair of life that usually occurs in the case of non-believers who 
are facing, for instance, economic, social, or political hardships. (Italics added 
for emphasis). Qasim is confident that while a believer surrenders to the will 
of God and knows that his/her patience will lead to rewards, a person who 
commits suicide will go to hell because he/she is not free to dispose his/her 
life as he/she deems fit. That is why understanding martyrdom and agreeing 
to it is not subordinate to international conventions or the enemy’s and the 
‘oppressors’ (mustakbirin) policies. Qasim continues to argue that it is quite 
natural that those wage an organized campaign against martyrdom in order 
to distort it and label it with demeaning connotations because it is a weapon 
that is tenable and cannot be under their control. That is why the West resorts 
to threats and intimidations that are of no avail to the martyrs, since “they 
live in this world, but are not part of it.”105 Qasim adds that martyrdom has 
given Hizbullah a special and extraordinary power that made the party’s will 
to attain victory stronger, especially when power shifted in the direction of 
the ‘enemies’.106
 In this respect, Nasrallah has reiterated, on various occasions, that “vic-
tory is always the result of martyrdom.” He also referred to the enormous 
pride and dignity in the hearts of the martyrs: “Our people in Palestine [West 
Bank and Gaza], as in Lebanon, possess a substantial power; they are lovers of 
martyrdom, lovers of meeting God, lovers of departing to the vicinity of God 
and the eternal gardens [garden of Eden].”107 Harik notes that “this means 
that some [martyrdom] attacks will always succeed despite the most rigorous 
precautions taken to prevent them.”108 Nasrallah argues that martyrdom is as 
dangerous as non-conventional weapons because the target can never prepare 
a defense mechanism to deal with it, unlike the defenses that have been cre-
ated to deal with almost any weapon. That is why martyrdom as a weapon is 
tenable and can never be controlled or contained by the ‘enemy’.109 As Saad-
Ghorayed rightly remarks, Hizbullah
‘does not pursue martyrdom as an end in itself ’, but as a means of achieving vic-
tory… without the imperative need for a defensive jihad, martyrdom becomes sui-
cide, which is clearly proscribed in Islam and thereby not rewarded with an ever-
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lasting life in paradise, as is true martyrdom… [Nasrallah argued] ‘Maybe some 
people think we crave martyrdom because we like to die in any way. No, we like to 
die if our blood is valued and has a great impact [on Israel]’.110
Thus building on what has been argued so far, one can claim that martyr-
dom is the most efficient means available for the resistance to fight an out-
numbered and outgunned occupation force. As Harik puts it, “martyrdom 
attacks are the means they have at hand to effectively confront the Israelis… if 
they had alternative weapons like the American-made Apache helicopter gun 
ships and the F 16 fighter planes used by the Israeli military establishment, 
they would use them instead.”111
 I would like to end by stressing that – contrary to the Palestinians who 
have blown themselves up into Israeli civilians – Hizbullah has never done so. 
Hizbullah has not engaged in any suicide operation against Israeli civilians in 
its eighteen-year struggle with the Israeli forces occupying south Lebanon. 
Rather, all its field and martyrdom operations targeted Israeli military and 
intelligence personnel. As Harik puts it,
During the course of Hezbollah’s seventeen-year struggle with Israel along the 
Lebanese/Israeli frontier in southern Lebanon, it has never been established by any 
party directly involved (including the United Nations contingent on the ground) 
that the Party of God has perpetuated a single terrorist attack against Israeli civil-
ians… Hezbollah made an early strategic decision to exclude terrorist tactics from 
its jihad against Israeli occupation and stuck to it.112
Furthermore, Hizbullah has never conducted any suicide operation in Israel; 
rather, it has left it to the discretion of the Palestinians to do so. Nasrallah 
rationalizes this stance by arguing that “the Palestinians do not need anyone 
to fight on their behalf. They are capable of fighting on their own using their 
rifles, bombs, and the bodies of their martyrs in order to rapture the Zionist 
disgrace and humiliation113 and defeat the Zionist entity.”114
4.4 Do only Islamic movements engage in martyrdom?
It might be argued that the process of thought illustrated by the foregoing 
exposition on martyrdom, is that martyrdom operations are exploited by 
Islamic movements’ leaders to grant religious capital to members and sup-
porters who get killed in a political or military battle. Martyrdom, which is 
extolled as a religious (shar‘i) injunction, is used by them as an instrument of 
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mobilization, especially when these people are promised the ticket to heav-
en115 if they conduct martyrdom operations. This might explain why Islamic 
movements and Hizbullah consider martyrdom as the ticket to heaven, while 
the West regards it as terrorist-suicide attacks.
 It is worth mentioning that ‘self-sacrifice’, ‘martyrdom’, or suicide opera-
tions are not confined to Islam; there are ‘nationalistic’ types of martyrdom 
that have little or even nothing to do with religion, but with the struggle for 
national independence. For example, the Chinese communists during the 
insurrection in Shanghai in 1927; the Japanese kamikaze in WWII; the Lib-
eration Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and India; the Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey; Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) of India; 
and many others resorted to suicide operations.116 As far as I know, the Chi-
nese communists are Buddhists or Confucianists; the Japanese kamikazes are 
Shinto and Buddhists; the LTTE is mainly composed of Hindus and a few 
Christians117; and the BKI are Sikh. Gunaratna writes: “The LTTE has con-
ducted one suicide operation in India. It is the only group to have killed two 
world leaders – the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi118, and the 
president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa – using male and female sui-
cide bombers.”119 Qunaratna adds that between 1980 and 2000, for instance, 
the LTTE conducted 168 suicide operations, while the PKK conducted 22120, 
which, I reckon, outweighed by far all suicide operations conducted in Israel 
and Lebanon during the same period.
 In the Middle East, the Lebanese case exemplifies both trends: ‘Islamic’ 
and ‘nationalistic martyrdom’. Compared to the Iranian and Palestinian case, 
Khosrokhavar classifies the Lebanese case as “ambivalent” wavering between 
‘martyrdom’ and ‘absurd death’ because of the multiconfessional, sectarian 
nature of the Lebanese myriad. According to him, this along with the Israeli 
invasions created a “prosperous ground for martyrdom.”121 I turn attention to 
the fact that in the Lebanese case, Hizbullah was not the only political par-
ty that conducted martyrdom 1 operations against Israeli forces occupying 
Lebanon. Rather, Hizbullah had fierce competition from secular multiconfes-
sional Lebanese political parties such as the rightist SSNP, the leftist LCP, the 
Ba‘th Party, and the Naserite Social Party, especially in the years from 1985 till 
1990.122 While Hizbullah conducted 12123 martyrdom 1 operations by Shi‘ite 
males124, SSNP and LCP performed martyrdom operations by both males and 
females of different religious denominations.
 To begin with, I take the SSNP’s martyrdom operations as a case in point. 
Although Khosrokhavar explains the ‘religious motivation’ behind Hizbul-
lah’s martyrdom operations, and the ‘nationalistic’ or ‘political motivation’ 
behind secular political parties’ motivation125, in the SSNP case, he seems to 
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imply that, Sana Muhaydli126, the seventeen-year-old Shi‘ite SSNP girl, was 
the only SSNP martyr.127 I argue that like Hizbullah, SSNP conducted 12 mar-
tyrdom 1 operations in total, which included, in addition to Sana, five other 
women. Thus, it seems that Khosrokhavar stresses religious capital128, but is 
misinformed about or sidelines the eleven other SSNP martyrdom operations, 
which in addition to Shi‘ites, were carried out by Sunnis, Druz, and even 
Christians.129 I would like to stress the nationalistic aspect and the multicon-
fessional nature of nationalistic identity, rather than limiting it to one sect. 
My hypothesis is to try proving that, for instance SSNP and LCP, non-Shi‘ite 
martyrs sacrificed their lives, not as ‘absurd deaths’, but as symbolic capital in 
order to uphold the honor and dignity of their nation and liberate their land, 
as was the case with Hizbullah martyrs, for example. Another contention and 
overgeneralization made by Khosrokhavar, concerning Muslim and secular 
martyrs, is that he argues that most of the martyrs come from poor, deprived 
classes (grassroots) of south Lebanon.130 Based on fieldwork research, I found 
out that most of the martyrs were middle class; some even had university edu-
cation.131 Also, I have discovered that the martyrs came from different geo-
graphical locations in Lebanon, and not predominantly from south Lebanon 
as Khosrokhavar asserts. In the SSNP case, I was told that at least four martyrs 
had a university education and that they came from the middle class; one 
of them was even an aristocrat Christian.132 As mentioned earlier, the SSNP 
martyrdom operations are based on its political ideology as stipulated by 
S‘adé.133 That is why, the SSNP martyrs were not only Lebanese, but included 
also Syrians and Palestinians. (This explains, why SSNP, unlike Hizbullah, sent 
martyrs to conduct martyrdom operations in Israel). The SSNP Sana Muhay-
dli134, ‘the bride of the south’, is one of the most celebrated woman martyrs; 
she was only 17 when she blew herself up in 1985 in an Israeli patrol.135 When I 
interviewed her father Yusuf136, he argued that his daughter was a martyr and 
that she went to heaven even though she belonged to a secular political party. 
As he put it, “religion is for God, and the nation is for everyone (aldin lil Allah 
wa alwatan lil jami‘).”137 Sana’s father reiterated S‘adé’s ideology: “Our martyrs 
are the indication of our victory.”; “Our contact with the Jews is a contact of 
a foe to a foe.” According to him, “Sana martyred herself to rid Lebanon and 
Natural Syria from occupation, so that the Syrian nation can live with honor 
and dignity.” In highlighting the nationalistic will to power of the SSNP, Sana’s 
father quoted S‘adé, “In you is a power, which if actualized will change the 
course of history.” In showing solidarity with the predominately Muslim Arab 
world, he quoted the SSNP leader: “We are all Muslims, some are Muslims by 
the Qur’an, others by the Bible, and still others by wisdom. There is no enemy 
fighting us in our religion, rights, and nation except the Jews.”138 He ended 
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up by saying: “The blood that runs in our veins is not ours; rather it is the 
possession of our nation, when it requests it, it finds it.” As such, “blood is the 
most extolled witnessing to life. It is a will that asks for death, when death is 
a road to life, it is a will expressed by our eternal martyrs.” Thus building on 
S‘adé, Sana’s father links the concept martyrdom to the life and survival of the 
nation: “Our martyrs symbolize our great victories.”
 Another case in point is illustrated by the LCP upper middle-class Chris-
tian, Lola Abboud139, the flower of the Biqa‘, “a courageous woman who 
fought for her land and for her people, and went to her death willingly… 
Abboud’s avowedly devout Christian140 family had already produced a long 
line of warrior-martyrs.”141 Lola came from the Lebanese village of al-Qar‘un 
where Christians and Muslims live side by side in harmony and peace-
ful coexistence. According to Davis, Abboud became the “ideal martyr” for 
Palestinian women martyrs to emulate; “she had already paved that path in 
Lebanon.”142 According to her brother, Dr Fouad Elias Abboud, Lola was the 
“family’s last martyr” when she blew herself up amongst the Israeli soldiers 
attacking her village on 20 April 1985; she was only 19 then.143 According to 
him, the rationale for her martyrdom is that she was “fighting for the lib-
eration of her own homeland”, as a right and a duty and out of love for her 
country, in order to rupture the bitter humiliation and uphold the dignity and 
honor of her people. He argues that “a person is willing to die for his cause 
if it’s a question of his very existence… All cases of martyrdom are cases of 
fighting for your existence… Every martyr of ours was a martyr who died 
in self-defence144. We never went to Europe or killed Jews there. We were 
defending our own children… Americans don’t have that problem. They don’t 
have to fight for their existence, and maybe that’s why they don’t understand 
or don’t accept the concept of martyrdom”.145 Dr Abboud added: “The free-
dom fighter chooses death as a final choice. He doesn’t choose it from the 
beginning. It’s after he cannot fight anymore that he decides to kill himself… 
And she was fighting the Israelis within her own village. She was not fighting 
Israelis in Israel.”146 Davis alludes to the notion that martyrdom is an altru-
istic behavior of a supererogatory nature. Comparing Lola to “a modern-day 
Joan of Arc”, she writes “ it’s fair to say that Loula Abboud’s actions exceeded 
all expectations not only for women in war, but for men as well.”147 Since 
her martyrdom took place the day after Easter, it could be argued that her 
death served as a resurrection to her people. The Abboud’s family patriotism 
was further conveyed when Dr Abboud acknowledged that he identifies with 
Hizbullah and regards Nasrallah “as a national hero”. He added that Nasrallah 
“represents even me as a Christian. He represents my ideas, and I feel that he 
represents all Lebanese.” Dr Abboud continued, “I am somebody who has put 
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a lot of effort into liberating my country, and Hasan Nasrallah is somebody 
who was able to realize that dream for me. He was able to make it happen. 
He was responsible for the liberation of my country and I appreciate him for 
that.”148 Davis concludes that both Lola’s mother and her brother did not per-
ceive any antagonism between Lola’s “death and their strong Christian beliefs, 
even though Christianity, like Islam, forbids suicide.”149
 A similar justification for martyrdom is offered by Munif Muhammad 
Ashmar, a father of two Hizbullah martyrs: Ali who blew himself up in the 
Israeli forces occupying Lebanon (istishhadi), and Muhammad who died on 
the battlefield fighting them (shahid). Before he conducted the operation on 
20 March 1996, in his farewell address, Ali said, “… My body will become a 
fire that will burn the Zionist occupier, who everyday deliberately attempts 
to torture and humiliate you [the people]. However his [the occupier’s] end 
is near, God willing, at the hands of the Islamic Resistance”. The same ratio-
nale is offered by his father, Munif, who argues: “When duty calls and when 
there are dignities that are going to be downtrodden, when the pride and the 
honor of the umma is going to be downtrodden by the Jews, then we will not 
lay idle…”150 I suggest that this discourse bears a striking resemblance to the 
SSNP slogan of “Life is only a stance embodied in pride and dignity”, and that 
it is another indication of symbolic capital.151
 And so, Khosrokhavar argues that the thematic (themes) and discours-
es of Lebanese martyrs, both secular and Shi‘ite, are similar to the Iranian 
Shi‘ite martyrs and Sunni Palestinian martyrs’ discourses. The similarity is 
that all believe in the same values of combating the enemy through martyr-
dom, martyrdom that originates from a will to die and a desire of immortal-
ity. Khosrokhavar adds: “For the Shi‘ites it is God’s encounter that is realized 
by combating an infidel enemy. For the nationalists and the communists, 
immortality is achieved either by identification with the ‘collectivité natio-
nale’ or by identification with all the poor [deprived] in the world.”152 (My 
translation.)
4.5 Conclusion
It seems that I subscribe to Reuter’s153 view, who stresses the individually 
driven nature of suicide bombers arguing that they “can be educated and 
uneducated; religious and secular; comfortably off and destitute; their link 
is the decision they make to transform their powerlessness into extraordi-
nary power.”154 And so, in highlighting the long lineage between Islamic and 
national resistance (generalizing from my interviews with Sana’s father and 
the martyr’s mother of Hizbullah, as well as from the works of the aforemen-
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tioned authors on martyrdom) I argue that martyrdom operations – whether 
carried out by Islamic movements or resistance movements – are altruistic, 
self-sacrificial operations conveyed in the form of symbolic capital (honor 
and dignity). This generalization seems to be warranted by a correspon-
dence among the various discourses discussed above. Thus, I suggest that 
the common ground for both Islamic and nationalistic/secular movements 
is the agreement that living under occupation is tantamount to disgrace and 
humiliation. As such it is respectively a religious and nationalistic duty to end 
the occupation using all possible means, including martyrdom operations. In 
this chapter, I intended to express how both parties furnished a religious or 
secular political discourse to justify martyrdom, specifically to highlight how 
Hizbullah produced a religious discourse that became a model and a basis of 
justification for Islamic groups and movements, in particular the Palestinian 
ones. The icon that both parties, secularists and Islamists, embraced is that 
martyrdom operations were conducted in order to uphold ‘izzat wa karamat 
al-umma or the honor, pride, and dignity of the ‘nation’; this being the main 
cause or motivation behind martyrdom operations. This value-laden expres-
sion of symbolic capital connotes different meanings of the word ‘umma’ to 
the various adherents. Thus, for Hizbullah, the umma denotes the Islamic 
umma; for the SSNP the umma refers to the ‘Syrian Nation’; and for the LCP 
the umma pinpoints to “all the poor [deprived] in the world.” In its “Epilogue”, 
Hizbullah’s 2009 Manifesto accorded a high status to martyrdom and sacri-
fice:
… for we are believers in righteousness; we speak in its defense and sacrifice in 
its quest until martyrdom… our deeds were… meant for the revival of virtue, the 
abolition of falsehood, the defense of your oppressed followers, the upholding of 
justice on your land and an appeal to your (God’s) approval and nearness. For this 
our martyrs have died, and for this we continue to strive. You have promised us 
one of the two better goals/rewards (husnayayyn): either victory or the honor of 
encountering you through martyrdom.155 (p. 71)
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   112 26-4-2011   13:42:32
113
5 From Cooptation to 
Contestation to Political 
Power
Abstract
The remaining chapters shift the tenor of the book to more practical matters 
of Hizbullah’s political strategy in relation to its identity construction. Hizbul-
lah altered its identity and militant character of the 1980s – when it anathema-
tized the political system and regarded the Lebanese state as an apostate – to a 
gradual integration process in the political system, in particular, and the Leb-
anese public sphere, in general, since the end of the civil war in 1990 and the 
party’s acceptance of the Ta’if Agreement, which became Lebanon’s new con-
stitution. This chapter suggests that Hizbullah adhered to its policy of coopta-
tion and contestation from the early 1990s to 2005, the year PM Rafiq Hariri 
was assassinated and the Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon after a pres-
ence of almost three decades, thus altering the rules of the game and even the 
geostrategic equation. This chapter argues that a bona fide policy shift, aim-
ing at manipulation and obtaining more political power, picked momentum 
in the beginning of 2005, ensued with more vigour after the July 2006 War, 
and continues to be the norm till this day, through piecemeal socio-political 
engineering and identity reconstruction that allows Hizbullah to read and 
interpret events and react to these dynamic changes accordingly, dwelling on 
the complexity, flexibility, and pragmatism of Shi‘ite jurisprudence, and thus 
rendering legitimacy to the party’s behavior.
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5.1 Cooptation to contestation
Hizbullah as an open national actor: The party’s infitah policy
Since the public sphere “enables participation in collective choice, whether 
about specific policy issues or basic institutions… [and since] the public 
sphere is itself a medium of social integration, a form of social solidarity, as 
well as an arena of debating others”1, Hizbullah shed its irredentist ideology 
and deemed it an absolute necessity to integrate into the Lebanese public 
sphere, rather than to shun it by employing the policy of infitah (opening-up). 
As mentioned earlier, in general, Hizbullah employs the term infitah or ‘Leba-
nonization’ to denote its political discourse, deeds, and policies in the era of 
the political program2, or to signify its enrolment in Lebanese domestic polit-
ical life.3 Thus, Hizbullah’s infitah aims at inculcating an open dialogue policy 
in a pluralistic setting through interaction and cooperation with all Lebanese 
sects and communities that comprise the Lebanese myriad4, in order to rid 
Lebanon of its political and social problems, foster national unity, and build a 
stronger, united Lebanon on shared common grounds.
Debates on the elections: An open public sphere?
Some changes that took place in the Lebanese politics illustrate the growing 
importance of Hizbullah in the Lebanese public sphere. Although Hizbullah 
initially regarded the political system, which does not take demographics into 
perspective, as unfair and unjust, the party’s integration into the Lebanese 
system through electoral politics sheltered it with additional political legiti-
macy and a wider following. Hizbullah seems to have realized from the Ira-
nian experience, as well as from the internal dynamics of the Lebanese public 
sphere, that electoral politics (parliamentary and municipal elections5) is the 
cornerstone of democratic practice. Hizbullah’s participation in the elections 
could be considered as a pivotal event in shaping its current identity.
 As mentioned in chapter two, after much heated debate and a lot of delib-
erations, Hizbullah took a favorable decision to participate in the 1992 elec-
tions, arguing that the interests outweigh the vices by far. Hizbullah presented 
its findings to Imam Khamina’i and requested from him a formal legal opin-
ion (istifta’) on the legitimacy of participating in the elections. As soon as 
Khamina’i authorized and supported (ajaza wa ’ayyada) participation, Hiz-
bullah embarked on drafting its election program and officially announced 
its participation in the elections.6 Thus, it seems that Hizbullah was forced by 
the political circumstances, the Ta‘if Agreement, and the end of the civil war, 
to move to a new phase in its history by propagating a matter-of-fact political 
program and by co-opting with the Lebanese system. Hizbullah shifted its 
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political strategy by accepting and engaging in the democratic process under 
a sectarian-confessional political and administrative system. Although Hiz-
bullah is still primarily an Islamic movement, which changes its policies as 
circumstances change, it increasingly displays the characteristics of a nation-
alist-patriotic political party.
Hizbullah’s advocacy of electoral politics
Hizbullah’s election strategy is circumstantial and contextual, based upon and 
legitimized by the Shi‘ite jurisprudential concept of public interest (masla-
ha): “For interests to be anything other than completely ephemeral prefer-
ences, they must be analyzable in terms of the identities of social actors.”7 
Thus, in addition to its strategic alliance with Amal, speaker Berri’s political 
party, Hizbullah reached out and allied itself with secular parties and former 
‘enemies’ on the Lebanese scene, like any political party that accommodated 
its protest by negotiations and bargaining with a wide spectrum of groups 
across the Lebanese myriad, making compromises on some doctrinal aspects. 
It included Christians and Sunnis in its parliamentary bloc and the municipal 
councils it controlled.
 All of Hizbullah’s political programs from 1992 to 2010 stressed supporting 
the Resistance, even after the liberation of Lebanon from the Israeli occu-
pation, which could be achieved through the enhancement of the Lebanese 
state’s foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, Hizbullah called for the estab-
lishment of civil peace; the founding of the state of law and institutions; the 
promotion of political participation; political, administrative, social, and 
economic reforms; upholding public freedoms; infitah and dialogue among 
all the Lebanese. Hizbullah also stressed the need to address pressing social 
and developmental issues that deal with health, education and culture, as 
well as the environment. The party emphasized the need to attain social jus-
tice through constructive mechanisms that address the serious and pressur-
ing socio-economic and financial crisis by finding a proper balance between 
material resources and human resources. This could be achieved, not only 
by defending and protecting the downtrodden and oppressed grassroots, but 
also by realizing socio-economic development, through projects targeting the 
deprived and dispossessed areas, aiming at a balanced development.8
 In 1992, Hizbullah participated in the first parliamentary elections, which 
were frozen for a period of twenty years due to the Lebanese civil war. The 
party won all of the twelve seats on its election list: eight were reserved for 
party members, and four for affiliated sympathizers: two for Sunnis and two 
for Christians (a Greek Catholic and a Maronite).9
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 In the 1996 parliamentary elections Hizbullah managed to keep ten seats: 
seven were occupied by party members; two by Sunnis and one by a Maronite 
Christian, non-party members. Only the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary 
bloc, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, was a clergyman.10
 Hizbullah won twelve seats in the parliamentary elections held in the sum-
mer of 2000. The party’s nine candidates, along with two Sunnis, and one 
Maronite Christian, received the highest number of votes in the country. All 
Hizbullah’s representatives in the parliament were civilian (no ‘ulama).11
Since its participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections, Hizbullah has 
played the role of a small but vocal opposition party in the legislature, which 
has grown increasingly powerful in recent years. Hizbullah participates in the 
legislature through the ‘Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc’, whose members have 
varied from ten to fourteen seats, and includes both party members as well 
as Sunni and Christian MPs not affiliated directly with Hizbullah, but sym-
pathetic to the party’s causes and issues. Between 1992 and 2009, prospective 
Lebanese cabinets received eleven votes of confidence from the legislature. 
Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc participated in all of these votes, exercising its 
voting behavior progressively according to the following pattern: from 1) vot-
ing against confidence between 1992 and 1996; to 2) abstaining between 1998 
and 2004; to 3) voting for confidence since 2005, the year the party fielded 
incumbents to the cabinet. To wit, they gave their approval only after they 
participated.
 By engaging in a pluralistic process, Hizbullah shifted its political strategy 
from cooptation to contestation, and finally to exercising empowerment. Hiz-
bullah’s participation in electoral politics could be regarded as cooptation. Its 
gradual integration into the Lebanese politics falls under contestation. Hiz-
bullah’s ascendancy in the political scene and becoming a nationalistic politi-
cal party could be viewed from the stance of human empowerment (tamkin). 
The shift to electoral politics helped to foment a national politics, instead of 
the fragmented politics or ‘states within the state’, which each political party 
or denominational group endeavored to establish in Lebanon during the civil 
war era. Thus, Hizbullah moved from being a closed sectarian social move-
ment to an open national actor employing the policy of infitah.
Hizbullah as a nationalist political actor
Lebanon is our homeland and the homeland of our fathers, ancestors. It is also 
the homeland of our children, grandchildren, and the future generations. It is the 
country to which we have given our most precious sacrifices for its independence 
and pride, dignity and freedom.
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We want a unified Lebanon for all Lebanese alike. We oppose any kind of partition 
or federalism, whether apparent or disguised. We want Lebanon to be sovereign, 
free, independent, strong and competent. We want it also to be powerful, active, 
and present in the geopolitics of the region. We want it also to be an influential 
provider in making the present and the future as it was always present in making 
the history.
One of the most important conditions for the establishment of a home of this type 
and its persistence is having a strong, capable and just state, in addition to a politi-
cal system which truly represents the will of the people and their aspirations for 
justice and freedom, security and stability, well-being and dignity. This is what all 
the Lebanese people seek and work to achieve and we are a part of them.12
Since national identity “is commonly understood as being immutable, but 
in fact its salience varies… and its character is neither fixed nor the same 
for all nationals,”13 Hizbullah expressed its Islamic legitimization in demo-
cratic form by portraying itself as a mainstream nationalist Lebanese political 
party while at the same time upholding its Islamic identity. Hizbullah’s infitah 
and Lebanonization endeavored to convey how it was able to strike a balance 
between its Islamic identity and program, on the one hand, and its Lebanese 
national loyalty, on the other, through ‘opening-up’ to the various constitu-
ents of the Lebanese myriad. Although Hizbullah denies it, it seems its suc-
cess in weighing between nationalist political commitments and its Islamic 
background was at the price of negotiations, bargaining, and compromises 
(even on some doctrinal issues), which characterize an open democratic sys-
tem, a public sphere. Through buttressing civil peace, public freedoms, and a 
functioning civil society, Hizbullah attempted to preserve its Islamic identity 
while working within the domain of the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, within a 
non-Islamic state and a multireligious, confessional-sectarian state.
 In the post-Ta’if era, Hizbullah faced the problem of reconciling its politi-
cal ideology with reality, so Hizbullah shifted from a jihadi perspective to a 
flexible shari‘a perspective. The party became satisfied with positive (man-
made) laws and legislations (al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya) and even contributed to 
their legislation through its MPs in the parliament. Hizbullah argued that the 
shari‘a, as a socially constructed phenomenon, is flexible and can account for 
all the complicities of modern life. And so, the party portrayed a distinguished 
flexibility in its political program in an attempt to reconcile, as much as pos-
sible, among its principles, aims, and political ideology, on the one hand, and 
the circumstances and its objective capabilities, on the other hand, by heavy 
reliance on the jurisprudential concepts of necessity, vices, and interests as 
a kind of Islamic prima facie duty. This is how Hizbullah’s pragmatism was 
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conducive in forging a marriage of convenience between political ideology 
and reality to the extent that Hizbullah was willing to place its political ide-
ology on the shelf and pursue a policy of infitah as sanctioned by its politi-
cal program. This dramatic change resulted in Hizbullah’s involvement in the 
Lebanese political system as it is. Hizbullah justifies and legitimizes its politi-
cal program and pragmatism by resorting to Qur‘anic and jurisprudential 
bases. In fact, Shi‘ite religio-political heritage conferred upon Hizbullah all 
the authenticity it needed in order to derive from it a political program based 
on flexibility and pragmatism.
 Hizbullah developed a special relationship with Emile Lahud, the ex-gen-
eral of the Lebanese army (1989-1998) and the then president of the Leba-
nese Republic (1998-2007). In 1993, when Lahud was general, he refused to 
obey the Lebanese cabinet and send the army to the south in order to uphold 
law and order and stop Hizbullah’s resistance. Syria and Hizbullah were very 
pleased with this behavior. The relationship between Lahud and Hizbullah 
was further consolidated when Lahud visited Nasrallah in 1997 and ‘congratu-
lated’ him on the ‘martyrdom’ of his son Hadi. In order to convey its nation-
alistic character, in November 1997 Hizbullah established the secular-patri-
otic Multiconfessional Lebanese Brigades to Fighting the Israeli Occupation 
(LMCB)14, a move encouraged by Lahud. During Lahud’s tenure as president, 
Hizbullah developed a strategic alliance with him as Syria’s man in Lebanon 
who would not allow the Resistance to be disarmed.
 Since the public sphere is defined by mutual participation15, Hizbullah 
tried to portray itself as a big Muslim-Christian coexistence promoter stress-
ing the importance of pluralism through multiconfessional representation. It 
incorporated Christians, including Maronites, in its parliamentary elections 
lists and granted them the right to speak in its name as long as they did not 
deflect from the party’s established doctrines. Also, it shared municipal coun-
cil seats with Christians. Thus, Hizbulah made it clear that the only condition 
for a sympathizer to speak in its name is to abide by its policy guidelines. 
Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Christians, as stipulated in its political program, 
garnered the party support in its resistance against Israel and infitah policies, 
especially among the Christians. By adopting what many observers would 
consider ‘Christian discourse’, namely, the abolition of political sectarianism 
in the mentality, before abolishing it in the texts, Hizbullah is portraying a 
progressive-liberal, and pragmatic view on the abolishment of political sec-
tarianism, which is in conformity with the stance of the Maronite church and 
the papal guidance. The Pope’s call for fraternity and the inculcation of dia-
logue and tolerance among the Lebanese had a responsive cord in Hizbullah’s 
circles since most of it was reminiscent of Imam Musa al-Sadr’s discourse on 
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Christian-Muslim understanding, mutual coexistence, and open and perma-
nent dialogue. Thus, in an endeavor of rapprochement towards the Lebanese 
Christians, Hizbullah based its political program of dialogue with them on 
the papal guidance.
 Thus, it is most likely that the Lebanese public sphere is dictating certain 
policies on Hizbullah, and the Lebanese political structure seems to be co-
opting Hizbullah to take decisions that may not be that popular to the rank, 
file, and leaders. On the whole, Hizbullah’s decisions are based on Realpoli-
tik, political expediency, benefit, and interest (maslaha). This calls into ques-
tion the extent to which Hizbullah is willing to be co-opted into the Lebanese 
political system and state institutions as well as its possible diffusion in the 
public sector. Undoubtedly, the death of Rafiq Hariri along with the Syrian 
withdrawal and its aftermath played a major role in accelerating the political 
changes within Hizbullah.
5.2 Attempts at manipulation and gaining political 
power
The strategy of manipulation after Hariri’s assassination and the Syrian with-
drawal
A major shift in the relations between Lebanon and Syria occurred after 
PM Rafiq Hariri’s assassination on 14 February 2005.16 This incident polar-
ized the country into two main political groups. The predominantly Shi‘ite 
March 8 Group comprising Hizbullah, Amal, and other pro-Syrian groups,17 
organized a demonstration in support of Syria. The other group known as 
the Cedar Revolution or the March 14 Trend18 responded with an estimated 
demonstration of one million people, spearheaded by the ‘Future Trend’, the 
majority of whom are Sunni, in downtown Beirut to demand the withdrawal 
of the Syrian troops and the truth about Hariri’s assassination. Under street 
pressure and UNSC Resolution 1559, Syria withdrew its military on 26 April 
2005 after a presence of 29 years.19 While March 14 hoped for the waning 
of Syrian influence in Lebanon, Hizbullah’s strategic-political relationship 
remained strong with the Syrian regime.20
 From 29 May to 19 June 2005, Hizbullah contested the first parliamentary 
elections after the Syrian withdrawal on the basis of a temporary four-par-
tite alliance between Sa‘d Hariri’s ‘Future Trend’, Amal, and the PSP. Hariri’s 
‘Future Trend’ and his allies won 72 seats out of the 128. Hizbullah won four-
teen seats21, adding two seats to its previous gains.22
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 Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres concede that the Syrian withdrawal has-
tened its joining the cabinet and proliferation in the Lebanese politics and 
state institutions. The party had resolved not to join the cabinet as long as 
the Syrians were present in Lebanon, since their presence accorded Hizbullah 
political patronage. After the Syrian withdrawal, however, Hizbullah felt that 
the Lebanese cabinet would be faced with decisions that might have grave con-
sequences for Lebanon’s future. Nasrallah has said that the 2005 parliament is 
the most important and most dangerous parliament since 1992, because it is 
obliged to decide the basic political and strategic choices for Lebanon in the 
decades to come.23 The party deemed it necessary to seek a representation in 
the cabinet so as to influence its policy statement and its implementation.24
 Nasrallah delivered a fiery speech in which he announced Hizbullah’s 
intention to play a leading political and developmental role by fully integrat-
ing in the Lebanese politics through a complete enrolment in Lebanese politi-
cal, economic, and administrative life, as well as the participation in all the 
Lebanese government’s institutions, including the cabinet.25 Capitalizing on 
the election results, Hizbullah participated in the cabinet with two ministers 
who were instrumental in drafting the section of the policy statement that 
grants Hizbullah the right to continue its resistance in the disputed Shib‘a 
Farms. Sanyura remarked that he is “very pleased and honored” with Hiz-
bullah’s presence in the cabinet. Thus, Hizbullah was able to influence to its 
own advantage the cabinet’s policy statement, as such manipulating the public 
sphere through the strong arm of the executive branch as represented by the 
council of ministers.26
 Although two ministers cannot veto the Cabinet’s decisions, it seems that 
Hizbullah gave up its older argument of refusing to be represented in the 
Cabinet because it rejected to hold responsibility for any dire decisions or 
unfavorable actions adopted by a 2/3-majority vote by the council of minis-
ters.27 Hizbullah thought that all decisions would take place according to the 
principle of ‘consensual democracy’, the principle of ‘consensual democracy’, 
whereby the unanimity of all the ministers would guarantee the passing of 
any legislation through Hizbullah’s prudent tactics and forceful manipulation. 
In this case, Hizbullah thought that there would be no need for the 2/3-major-
ity vote, which is only employed when there is a serious disagreement in the 
council of ministers. However, the precept of practice would prove Hizbullah 
wrong.
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The setback: Hizbullah suspends its participation in the Cabinet; no to foreign 
tutelage & Nabulsi’s religious edict (fatwa)
On 12 December 2005, the same day that al-Nahar anchor MP Gebran Tuéni 
was assassinated, the Lebanese cabinet met and referred this case, and other 
politically motivated assassinations, to the UN Commission investigating the 
Hariri murder, and asked for the formation of an International Tribunal (STL) 
to put to justice the perpetrators of these crimes. When the issue was put to 
the vote in the cabinet, as an apparent sign of disapproval, the five Shi‘ite min-
isters walked out, including the two from Hizbullah, thus eventually suspend-
ing their participation in the council of ministers for a period of seven weeks. 
It was Nabulsi, not Nasrallah, who issued a fatwa barring any other Shi‘ite 
from joining the cabinet in their absence.28 Only after PM Sanyura reiterated 
Hizbullah’s right to resist the Israeli occupation (in Shib‘a), as stated in the 
policy statement, the five ministers returned to assume their duties.
A major step towards hegemony: Alliance with ‘Aun
Saving Lebanon from civil war: Hizbullah’s Understanding with the Free Patri-
otic Movement (FPM)
On 5 February 2006, after one day of the mobs torching the Danish embassy 
in Damascus as a protest against the cartoons of the Prophet, mobs attempted 
to set the Danish embassy on fire in the Christian East Beirut neighborhood. 
Mayhem erupted, and many shops, cars, and churches were vandalized, and 
the population cursed. Lebanese security forces failed to bring the matter to 
order, and as a result the Minister of Interior resigned, and Lebanon offered 
Denmark a formal apology.
 In order to contain the negative repercussions of what happened and in 
order to prevent Christian-Muslim discord, not to say civil unrest or war, 
the next day, the leader of the FPM, general Michel ‘Aun, and Sayyid Hasan 
Nasrallah, met in a symbolic church across the old ‘green line’ and signed a 
historic ten-point Understanding addressing political, economic, administra-
tive, and security issues, as well as the relations with Syria. The Understand-
ing also addressed domestic concerns such as administrative reform, election 
law, fighting corruption, and the investigations into the Harriri murder.29 
Interestingly, Article 7 entitled, “Lebanese-Syrian Relations”, suggests four 
measures in order to ward off “foreign tutelage”, including demarcating the 
borders between Lebanon and Syria30; uncovering the fate of the Lebanese 
detainees in Syrian prisons; and establishing diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. It is worth mentioning that the forgoing points represented the 
demands of the Maronite church, as well as the defunct Christian opposition 
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group of ‘Qrnet Shahwan’. Currently, these demands inform the policies of the 
March 14 Trend31 in its entirety. Thus, Hizbullah succeeded in its manipula-
tion strategy of weakening, splitting, or sowing discord in the March 14 ranks 
through its alliance with the FPM.32
 Although the majority of the March 14 Trend are still Sunni and those of 
March 8 Group are still Shi‘ite, the situation now is completely different since 
the four-partite alliance ceased to be. Most importantly, after the Understand-
ing the FPM shifted its support to the March 8 Group. This escalated the ten-
sions and the confrontations between the March 14 and March 8 groups.
 
Hizbullah leader mocked on a Lebanese TV comedy show: 
Can Nasrallah control his followers and constituency?
In the evening of 1 June 2006, LBCI aired its weekly political satire show enti-
tled, Basmat Watan, which is a pun that could imply either ‘The Death of a 
Nation’ or ‘The Laughs of a Nation’. Anyway, one of the actors, dressed like 
Hizbullah’s leader in his black turban and religious attire, mocked Nasrallah 
as a political leader, and not as a religious leader. In spite of that, Hizbul-
lah’s constituency took to the streets chanting Imam Husayn’s call in Karbala’: 
“Death to humiliation” (hayhat minna al-dhilla), intending to go all the way 
to the Christian heartland to ‘burn down’ LBCI. On their way they wreaked 
havoc in Sunni and Christian areas, almost physically engaging the youth 
residents of these areas. After Hizbullah’s MPs and middle-rank cadres failed 
to contain their crowds, in an unprecedented call, Nasrallah in person, by way 
of Hizbullah’s media, called on the demonstrators to return to their homes. 
Although they immediately obeyed, the riots tainted Hizbullah’s image as an 
advocate of free speech and expression.
National dialogue ends in a fiasco
The 2006 national dialogue33 sessions among the fourteen leading politicians 
in Lebanon dealt with sensitive issues, including taboos such as Hizbullah’s 
weapons and its defense strategy. Nasrallah, in person, took care to convey 
Hizbullah’s position. The first session took place in March where a consensus 
was reached on two important issues: 1) the affirmation that Shib‘a farms34 are 
Lebanese, and thus Hizbullah has the right to continue its resistance against 
the occupying IDF; 2) the formation of an International Tribunal35 to put to 
justice the perpetrators of the Hariri murder. The last session was supposed to 
take place on 25 July, but due to the ‘Second Lebanon War’ it never took place. 
This led to an eventual halt to national dialogue.36
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   122 26-4-2011   13:42:34
1235.2 Attempts at manipulation and gaining political power
More manipulation after the ‘Second Lebanon War’ (12 
July-14 August 2006)37
The ‘Second Lebanon War’ or the July 2006 war between Israel and Hizbul-
lah was triggered when Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 
in a cross-border raid.38 Hizbullah’s strategic mistake might have been that it 
never anticipated such an action would spark a large-scale conflict that would 
ultimately lead to the destruction of almost all of Lebanon’s postwar achieve-
ments. Although some Lebanese question the wisdom of Hizbullah’s action 
that was used by Israel as a pretext to inflict so much damage on Lebanon, 
Hizbullah emerged from this crisis enjoying much more popularity than 
before, at least in its main constituencies.39
The media war: psychological warfare
Although the main role of Hizbullah’s media was to mobilize its constituency 
and raise its morale, al-Manar40 kept on portraying its regional and interna-
tional outreach to the Muslim umma and its members worldwide through 
its motto, ‘the channel of the Arabs and the Muslims’. During the ‘Second 
Lebanon War’, Hizbullah’s media displaced a remarkable will of survival. 
Even though Israel completely leveled the al-Manar building and that of al-
Nour sustained substantial damage, they were not out of the air for a single 
minute because Hizbullah had already prepared for contingency measures 
and alternative places to broadcast. Both continued to broadcast from undis-
closed underground locations.41 Likewise, al-Intiqad was regularly published 
on time every Friday, even appearing twice in the second week of the war42 in 
order to accompany Hizbullah’s ‘feats’ on the battlefield.
Destruction of cultural capital
In and around Hizbullah’s ‘Security Square’ (al-Muraba‘ al-Amni) fifty-one 
publishing houses were totally destroyed, most of which dealt with religio-
political issues. Indeed, where religion thrives, publications flourish. Many of 
these publishing houses did not keep their records on microfilm. Hizbullah’s 
think tank, the CCSD, was completely wiped out. Many Hizbullah-affiliated 
schools, universities, and institutions of higher learning were obliterated.
The Lebanese cabinet’s pragmatic moves: Hizbullah approves UNSC 1701
In an attempt to stop the war, on 5 August 2006 the Lebanese Cabinet unani-
mously endorsed PM Sanyura’s Seven Points43, although the fourth point 
stressed that the state has absolute monopoly over the use of force. After 
rejecting the UN draft resolution that fell short of demanding an Israeli with-
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drawal, and in an attempt to influence the wording of the new resolution 
to Lebanon’s advantage, in an unprecedented move44, the Lebanese cabinet 
unanimously approved deploying 15,000 Lebanese soldiers from the Litani 
river to the border with Israel. This seems to constitute a genuine policy shift 
rather than a rhetorical move, since Hizbullah’s earlier discourse vetoed send-
ing the army to the south “to protect Israel from the attacks of the Lebanese 
Resistance.” The cabinet also approved the 11 August 2006 UNSC Resolution 
1701, which calls, among other things, for the cessation of hostilities and 
Hizbullah’s disarmament – like the 2 September 2004 UNSC Resolution 1559 
called for. In these decisions, Hizbullah’s two ministers voted ‘yes’. Indeed, 
“choices are actions (individual and collective) that imply the availability of 
multiple possibilities.”45
 Hizbullah is fully conversant that the public sphere “opens the possibility 
that actors may redefine their interests in the course of public communication 
and shifting understanding of both collective good and individual and collec-
tive identity.”46 Employing this precept, and keeping in mind that as a survival 
strategy Hizbullah changes as circumstances change, Nasrallah asserted that 
accepting the deployment of the army to the south – which is a repetitive 
Israeli demand to the Lebanese government – and agreeing to the terms of 
UNSC Resolution 1701 “serve national interest since the strength of Lebanon 
is in its resistance and national unity.” Although this policy seems to be aimed 
at more integration and infitah, the real goal was to exercise more hegemony.
The devastation of the July 2006 War
Lebanon paid a heavy price: Israel imposed an air, land, and sea blockade 
almost completely severing the country from the outside world for approxi-
mately eight weeks – from 13 July to 8 September. In terms of material 
resources, Lebanon’s infrastructure and economy were destroyed, its indus-
tries and exports were curtailed, and foreign investments ceased to be. Isra-
el dismembered Lebanon through the systematic destruction of its roads, 
bridges, airports, harbors, telecommunication facilities, fuel supplies and 
reservoirs, electricity facilities, factories, etc. It was estimated that the tour-
ism sector alone would have provided a net income of $ 4.5 billion during 
the summer season. According to a UN report, Lebanon lost $ 15 billion in 
damages and revenues, and was losing $ 50 million a day on tariffs. An EU 
damage assessment revealed that, in the south, the IDF destroyed or damaged 
1,489 buildings; 21 out of 29 bridges over the Litani river; 535 sections of road 
and 545 cultivated fields. In the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s south Beirut stronghold, 
326 residential buildings sustained partial or complete damage, 269 of these 
were located in the Harit Hurayk district, which housed Hizbullah’s central 
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headquarters. All in all, 130,000 housing units sustained partial or complete 
damage. In addition, all the runways of the Beirut Rafiq Hariri International 
Airport as well as six strategic highway sections were damaged.
Reconstruction
While the late PM Rafiq Hariri has been regarded as the champion of recon-
struction, after the July war, Hizbullah is considered as the hero of recon-
struction, since the magnitude of the crisis and level of destruction was too 
heavy for the Lebanese state and its institutions to cope with. Out of the mil-
lion displaced by the war, almost half immediately returned to their destroyed 
villages and cities to find them littered with unexploded ordinances and clus-
ter bombs, most notably in the south.47 Hizbullah’s NGOs and civil institu-
tions spearheaded the relief efforts and started rebuilding partially destroyed 
homes. As soon as the cease-fire came into effect, Hizbullah dispatched spe-
cial assessment commissions that toured the devastated areas. While the Leb-
anese state and its institutions suffer from chronic corruption coupled with 
nepotism and favoritism, Hizbullah is renowned for its probity, integrity, and 
transparency in conducting public services and affairs. At a time when the 
country was facing severe shortages in foreign currencies, Hizbullah honored 
its words with deeds and delivered its promises of handing out cash dona-
tions ranging from $ 4,000 to $ 12,000 to all of the people whose houses or 
apartments were partially or completely destroyed. Whether the source of 
this money is Iranian petrodollars or not is irrelevant here.48 What is impor-
tant to note is that Hizbullah delivered its promise of fully compensating the 
owners of 15,000 completely destroyed households, not only by eventually 
rebuilding them, but also by handing every household enough money to rent 
and furnish an apartment till their original households were rebuilt again. If 
Hizbullah has not done so, then it would have lost much of its constituency. 
After all, people need a roof over their heads and a decent living; they cannot 
live on ideology alone. At a time when Hizbullah’s main reconstruction body, 
Jihad Al-Bina’, is classified as a ‘terrorist organization’ by the US Adminis-
tration, it accomplished a feat in urban planning when it founded the Wa‘d 
(Promise) reconstruction project, which is shouldering the gigantic burden of 
rebuilding the Dahiya almost one year after the war. All in all, Hizbullah allo-
cated an estimated budget of around $ 4 billion to reconstruction,49 and so 
far spent around $ 400,000 million.50 The $ 4 billion were allocated not only 
for reconstruction as such, but also for buying land north of the Litani river, 
mainly from Christians and Druz, even sometimes at ten times its original 
price, in order to link the party’s constituencies in the south and the Biqa‘. In 
some instances, Hizbullah succeeded in buying entire villages, making these 
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restricted military areas. Although Wa‘id’s ambitious plan faces a lot of chal-
lenges, Iranian generous funding – which, in the first place, allowed such a 
project to materialize – will in the end realize Wa‘d’s motto: ‘We’ll rebuild it 
more beautiful than what it was.’ Engineer Hasan Jishi, the CEO of Hizbul-
lah’s Wa‘d project, held a press conference where he announced that Wa‘d is 
rebuilding 244 of the 281 living complexes destroyed by the July war.51
New rules of the game: Alteration in Hizbullah’s military 
strategy
Hizbullah’s military strategy is characterized by asymmetrical warfare in 
which the two belligerents are so mismatched in their military capabilities or 
accustomed methods of engagement that the military disadvantaged power 
(Hizbullah) must press its special advantages or effectively exploit its enemy’s 
(Israel’s) particular weaknesses if they are to have any hope of prevailing. This 
was the situation before the Israeli withdrawal of May 2000, and continued to 
be the case from May 2000 to July 2006; and from July 2006 onward.
Hizbullah’s military strategy during the Israeli occupation (1982-2000)
Hizbullah’s intelligence is of a high degree of efficiency; its military structure is 
characterized by a high and sophisticated degree of discipline. Its clandestine 
tactics render it very difficult to identify members of the Islamic Resistance, 
especially when some fight in civilian clothes, while others wear the same uni-
form as the IDF, and even speak Hebrew. Hizbullah’s revolutionary Resistance 
employs guerrilla warfare, hit-and-run as well as blitz tactics, which do not 
immediately aim at occupying land; rather endeavor to drive out the enemy 
by continuously launching a war of attrition in order to inflict the highest 
number of casualties on the IDF. The Islamic Resistance’s tactics resemble 
the Vietcong strategies that were effective in defeating the Americans in the 
Vietnam War. Actually, Israeli higher military command has compared the 
plight of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon with the US involvement in the 
Vietnamese quicksand.
Hizbullah’s military strategy after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal
Hizbullah’s deterrent military strategy, which was employed from 2000 to 
2006, was put to the test in the July 2006 war. In fact, Hizbullah dwelled too 
much on its stock of 20,000 rockets, thinking that these would prevent Israel 
from attacking Lebanon again. During the six years that followed the Israeli 
withdrawal, Hizbullah transformed southern Lebanon into a hi-tech bunker 
of sophisticated anti-tank rockets, as well as near-, middle-, and long-range 
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rockets. Hizbullah built elaborate fortifications and oversaturated these with 
armaments. The July war will prove that Hizbullah dwelled too much on its 
presumed balance of power with Israel, or what it calls ‘balance of terror’, 
invoking the Qur’an (17: 8): “If you come back, we will come back, and we will 
make Hell the resting place of the infidels.” Thus, Hizbullah overestimated its 
deterrent strategy since it had no contingency measures to fend off a massive 
Israeli attack, except its heavy reliance on its cache of missiles.
The July 2006 war: Miscalculation on both sides
The July 2006 or the ‘Second Lebanon War’ was the most destructive war 
Israel launched against Lebanon. Israel kept heavily bombarding Hizbul-
lah’s constituencies in the south, Biqa‘, and the Dahiya systematically, in an 
attempt to sow discord among the residents and diminish Hizbullah’s fol-
lowing. Although Hizbullah’s 4,000 rockets had limited destructive capac-
ity on the material level, on the psychological level these rockets ‘terrorized’ 
the Israeli population and forced more than two million Israelis either to live 
underground in bunkers or to leave the targeted areas to safer places. A BBC 
documentary52 claimed that Israel sustained the heaviest aerial bombard-
ment since its creation in 1948.
 Though Israel initially aimed at eliminating Hizbullah and releasing its two 
kidnapped soldiers, it gradually watered down its expectations to destroy-
ing Hizbullah’s infrastructure and curtailing its capability of firing rockets on 
Israel, an eventuality that did not materialize either. Tzipi Livni, the Israeli 
Foreign Minister, conceded that the strongest army in the world could not 
disarm Hizbullah.53
 By the concession of its leadership, Hizbullah was taken by surprise and 
miscalculated the Israeli reaction to the abduction of its two soldiers. Hizbul-
lah’s strategic mistake might have been that it never anticipated such an action 
would spark a large-scale conflict that would ultimately lead to the destruc-
tion of almost all of Lebanon’s postwar achievements. On 27 August 2006, 
Nasrallah acknowledged that Hizbullah would not have kidnapped the two 
soldiers if it had known the devastating outcome: “We simply would not have 
done it.”54
 Thus, it seems that the July war resulted in a zero sum game since both 
Israel and Hizbullah claimed victory. Nasrallah dubbed it as “the most fierce 
battle in Lebanese history”, hailing it as “a strategic, historical, and divine vic-
tory for Lebanon and the umma.” Olmert stressed that in addition to its mili-
tary victory, Israel won a great diplomatic victory by UNSC Resolution 1701. 
He purported that Israel was able to change the rules of the game that resulted 
from the 1996 ‘April Understanding’. Although Hizbullah kept on firing rock-
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ets into Israel till the last day, even in areas that were occupied by the IDF, the 
war proved that both Hizbullah’s defense strategy and that of Israel need seri-
ous revisions.
 Although the party was not well prepared for it, the July war did not pose 
an existential threat to Hizbullah’s survival. After one year of the war, through 
the concession made by Ehud Barak, the Israeli Minister of Defense, Hizbul-
lah has not only rebuilt its arsenal, but has also acquired more capabilities 
and power than ever before. Hizbullah constructed elaborate fortifications 
for its newly acquired long-range missiles above the Litani river so as not to 
conflict with the international community for breaching the 1701. The party is 
successfully linking its main constituencies in the south and the Biqa‘ by buy-
ing land and entire villages, making these restricted military areas. However, 
from the Litani river to the Israeli border, Hizbullah’s fighters would remain 
invisible and their weapons would be out of sight, but not out of reach. Nas-
rallah warned Israel that if it considered attacking Lebanon again, Hizbullah 
would not hesitate to use unconventional weapons that could target any loca-
tion. The 24 August 2007, UNSC Resolution 1773 – which extended UNIFIL’s 
mandate till 31 August 2008 – reiterated what was achieved a year earlier by 
the 1701: no cease-fire, rather a ‘cessation of hostilities’. Likewise on 27 August 
2009, the UNSC renewed, to Israel’s dismay and Hizbullah’s relief, 1701 for one 
year under the same rules of engagement. And so, the cessation of hostilities 
was not coupled with a comprehensive political solution or settlement of the 
conflict, rendering the situation immensely fragile, like a volcano that can 
erupt at any time.
Hizbullah’s military strategy after the July 2006 war
The major change after the July 2006 war is that Hizbullah shifted from a 
defensive to an offensive military strategy that aims at occupying all the North-
ern Israeli settlements, thus moving the war to Israeli soil if Israel attacked 
Lebanon. This new Hizbullah strategy was put to the test in November 2007 
when, apparently in preparation for its upcoming third war on Lebanon, 
Israel conducted a military drill, which involved 50,000 military personnel, 
across its northern border with Lebanon. Hizbullah immediately responded 
with a three-day military drill, which involved the mobilization of 120,000 
of its elite fighting force, dressed in civilian clothes, south of the Litani river, 
where around 12,500 UNIFIL and 15,000 Lebanese army soldiers were sta-
tioned. This unprecedented move aimed at sending a three-fold strong mes-
sage to: 1) Israel in case it entertained the idea of attacking Lebanon again; 
2) the international community, namely that Syria and Iran would use the 
Hizbullah card as a stick and a bargaining chip; 3) local Lebanese politics if 
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Hizbullah’s demands were not met, as Nasrallah affirmed in his 11 Novem-
ber 2007 fiery speech. In that same speech Nasrallah defiantly challenged the 
implementation of the UNSC 1959 Resolution, affirming that all the armies in 
the world cannot disarm Hizbullah. In 2008-2009 Nasrallah reiterated that 
all of Israel is within Hizbullah’s missiles reach. On 14 September 2009, com-
memorating the third anniversary of Hizbulllah’s ‘Divine Victory’, Nasrallah 
boasted that the party’s military capabilities were three times stronger than 
those in 2006. He introduced a new ‘balance of terror [power]’ formula aimed 
at deterrence, namely if Israel would bomb Beirut or the Dahiya, Hizbullah 
would then strike Tel Aviv, thus setting the new rules of the game.
Hizbullah’s 22 September ‘divine victory’ parade55
Nasrallah’s speech was attended by Lebanese MPs, cabinet members, politi-
cians, clergy, many Arab dignitaries, and an audience of around 800,000, who 
guaranteed a perfect human shield, and barred Israel from executing its threat 
of killing Nasrallah as soon as the opportunity loomed.56 Nasrallah stressed 
that Hizbullah would surrender its arms if Israel relinquishes the Shib‘a farms, 
releases the Lebanese prisoners of war, and submits the landmines maps: “We 
will not keep our weapons forever.” Nasrallah affirmed that Hizbullah’s rock-
ets increased from 20,000 before the war to 33,000.57 Many March 14 cadres 
criticized Nasrallah58, arguing that there is nothing in the military dictionary 
called a ‘divine victory’.
 In turn, Israel mocked Hizbullah’s “divine, historic, and strategic victory”, 
arguing that Hizbullah was only showing off while Nasrallah had been in 
hiding since 12 July, and he would return to his dungeons after finishing his 
speech. According to Israel, this claim was made by a person who conced-
ed three weeks earlier that if he had known Israel’s devastating response, he 
would not have kidnapped the two soldiers. Israel accused Hizbullah of being 
a Syrian-Iranian agent executing their policies in the Middle East.
Turning the tide: The political price of the victory
Keeping in mind that choices “are shaped by social imaginaries – that is, more 
or less coherent socio-cultural processes that shape actors’ understanding of 
what is possible, what is real, and how to understand each other”59, as a polit-
ical price of the victory, Hizbullah demanded getting hold of the required 
one third veto power in the council of ministers, after wielding power over 
the legislature and the presidency, at the time.60 This could be accomplished 
through an alliance with the FPM, which received the highest number of votes 
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in the 2005 legislative elections.61 For this to take place, Hizbullah demanded 
the formation of a representative national unity government and the holding 
of earlier legislative elections based upon a more representative election law 
that all the Lebanese would agree upon, preferably one based upon propor-
tional representation and small electoral districts, as Hajj Mahmud Qmati 
later clarified.62 Indeed, “participation in public life can accordingly be itself 
a form of social integration or solidarity.” Broadening the mandate of Haber-
mas’s notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’, Calhoun emphasizes “the impor-
tance not only of loyalty to created institutions but in participation in the 
process of creation and recreation… [because] democratic choice is inherent 
in the public sphere”.63
 This calls for some explanation. The Ta’if Agreement divided political 
power, according to the quota system, evenly among the Muslims64 and the 
Christians, both in the cabinet and the parliament. Thus, the 128 seats in the 
legislature were split 50-50 between the Muslims and the Christians, so were 
the 24 seats of the current Sanyura cabinet. As such, all the Shi‘ites are entitled 
to five ministers out of the 24; even if they all resign, the cabinet can still 
meet and take decisions by a 2/3-majority vote. This definitely does not reflect 
Hizbullah’s demographic strength nor its big political force. Since Hizbullah 
decided to participate in the political system as it is, it can only exercise hege-
mony over it and the public sphere through alliances based on negotiations, 
bargaining, and even compromises.
 In the legislature, at the time, Hizbullah65 and its allies had 57 MPs66 out of 
a total of 128, or 44 percent control of the parliament, which implies that the 
Hizbullah-led opposition was entitled to more than thirteen ministers out of 
the 30 of the future national unity cabinet. Aiming at obtaining veto power, 
the Hizbullah-led opposition asked for eleven ministers. Thus, there has been 
a visible change in the balance of power to Hizbullah’s advantage after its alli-
ance with the FPM.67 This strategy of attempting to manipulate and exercise 
hegemony over the public sphere through its integration into the political sys-
tem is conducive to Hizbullah’s bottom-up Islamization project. Already the 
president and the speaker were on their side (not to say that the Hizbullah-led 
opposition virtually controls the institution of the presidency and that of the 
parliament). Thus, all they need to control the Lebanese political system is 
to have the veto power in the council of ministers, which, if granted, were a 
precedent since the founding of the Lebanese Republic in 1920, and its first 
constitution in 1926.
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Nasrallah’s ultimatum: 31 October 2006 interview with 
al-Manar TV
Since in the public sphere “culture – and identities – will be made and remade 
in public life… [and since] citizens need to be motivated by solidarity, not 
merely included by law”68, Nasrallah gave the cabinet a one-week ultimatum, 
starting from Monday 6 November, for the formation of a national unity 
government where Hizbullah and its allies would wield the one-third veto 
power, or else, the Hizbullah-led opposition would take to the streets until the 
cabinet yielded to their demands. It is interesting to note that an editorial in 
al-Safir criticized Nasrallah for not mentioning Israel once in his three-hour 
interview. The Mufti of Mount Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Ali Al-Jusu, 
accused Nasrallah of nurturing Sunni-Shi‘ite discord and of unfounded accu-
sations towards the PM to the extent of indirectly branding him with treason. 
In turn, on 4 November, MP Pierre Gemayyel said in reference to Hizbullah’s 
one-week ultimatum: “We will not allow those who determine war and peace 
to have the final say in state building.”69
Attempts to revive the dialogue end in a deadlock
The sessions of the ‘National Consultations Conference’ ended with the res-
ignation of the five Shi‘ite ministers from the cabinet, on the symbolic day of 
11 November, which marks Hizbullah’s ‘Martyrs’ Day’. After a few days, an ally 
of president Lahud, Jacob Sarraf, the Greek Orthodox Minister of the Envi-
ronment, followed suit.70 The resignation of the six ministers did not lead to 
the collapse of the Sanyura cabinet since eight should resign for this to take 
place. In the wake of these tensions, the assassination of Pierre Gemayyel took 
place on 21 November 2006. This implies that the resignation or assassination 
of one minister could deal a fatal blow to the Sanyura cabinet. Since then, 
tensions rose to a new high and a political deadlock got hold of the Lebanese 
public sphere.
The role of media71 in the public sphere
Quoting John Stewart Mill’s concept of the ‘tyranny of the majority’, al-Intiqad 
labelled Sanyura’s government as tyrannical, claiming that it only has an ‘arti-
ficial’ majority. In turn, Sanyura replied that granting the Hizbullah-led oppo-
sition veto power in the cabinet amounts to the ‘tyranny of the minority’.72 It 
is worth noting that the political deadlock between the two parties lasted for 
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18 months since the launching of the protests on 1 December 2006; as Qmati 
clarified, “the sit-in is a symbol of political opposition.”73
 Al-Intiqad had a face-lift in order to accommodate Hizbullah’s new image 
as the leader of the Lebanese opposition. Starting issue 1192, exactly one week 
after Hizbullah took to the streets, the left banner read: “Lebanon 1: The Popu-
lar Movement for National Unity”. Al-Nour dubbed itself “the voice of nation-
al unity”, followed by the national anthem, then songs by Marcel Khalifé, a 
popular Christian Lebanese nationalist singer.
Hizbullah’s socio-religious compromises
In addition to its earlier doctrinal compromises74, Hizbullah socio-religious 
beliefs apparently gained some flexibility. Hizbullah was accused of mixing 
and sleeping in tents in order to achieve narrow political gains. Hizbullah’s 
cadres took care to refute these claims by contending that it upheld its ethical 
and Islamic values and norms, and that other members of the Lebanese oppo-
sition might be committing such acts, but definitely not Hizbullah’s mem-
bers. In spite of their attempts to ward off such accusations, Hizbullah’s cadres 
sounded speechless when asked to comment on pictures showing Hizbullahis 
hugging members of the FPM who were sipping champagne on New Year’s 
Eve. This came at a time when the Maronite patriarch admonished against the 
mixing of the two genders in tents. And, most importantly, the caricature of 
Future TV, Hariri’s media outlet, on Christmas Eve: “Merry Christmas (milad 
majid, which also means happy birth), but in which tent?” The implication is 
that the youth were sleeping around in tents.
 
Hizbullah’s popularity
On 6 January 2007, a survey conducted by the Saudi funded al-‘Arabiyya 
cable TV tested Hizbullah’s popularity. The results revealed that the party’s 
popularity plummeted from 74 percent to 54 percent75; 53 percent pinned the 
blame of the war on Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria; and 51 percent considered 
the demonstrations of the Hizbullah-led opposition conducive to increasing 
the sectarian tension (Sunni-Shi‘ite discord). Although this survey should be 
taken with a grain of salt, it sheds some light on the situation. For instance, 
in Egypt, during the war and its aftermath, Hizbullah flags and Nasrallah’s 
posters where visible everywhere, but after Hizbullah’s attempts to topple the 
Sanyura cabinet, these signs of support dwindled, not to say ceased to be. This 
might suggest that when it comes to Sunni-Shi‘ite discord, the parties forget 
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about their commitments to nationalism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Arabism, 
and seek narrow confessional interests.
Hizbullah takes to the streets
In spite of dangerous precedents76, which suggested that no one can guaran-
tee the security of the street, on 1 December 2006, Hizbullah, the FPM, and 
other members of the Lebanese opposition took to the streets in downtown 
Beirut – filling completely Martyr’s Square and the Riyad al-Solh Square – 
demanding the formation of a national unity cabinet, where the Lebanese 
opposition wields the one-third veto power. PM Sanyura admonished Nasral-
lah by saying: “Do not waste your military accomplishments and victories on 
Israel in Beirut’s alleys.” Hizbullah failed to deliver its promise of a fast col-
lapse of the government.77 Addressing the demonstrators over a big screen, 
Nasrallah delivered his second promise: “We will defeat (topple) the Lebanese 
government, like we defeated Israel in the 34-days war”.78 In the early days of 
the sit-in, Hizbullah frontline jihadis besieged the council of ministers’ head-
quarters in downtown Beirut. However, behind the scenes contacts resulted 
in ending this blockade. The tug of war between the Hizbullah-led opposition 
(March 8 Group), on the one hand, and the Lebanese cabinet and its sup-
porters (March 14 Trend), on the other, led to a bitter polarization that put 
Lebanon in a stalemate and political deadlock for over a year.
Slipping towards civil war: 23 and 25 January 2007 civil 
unrest: Nasrallah’s fatwa
This tension resulted in serious civil unrest. On 23 January, after 53 days of 
sit-ins and protests in downtown Beirut, the Hizbullah-led opposition crip-
pled the country through a general strike, coupled with the blocking of main 
roads, burning wheels, etc. Three people died and 150 were wounded. This 
was not the end of it. Two days later, during the proceedings of the Paris 
III Conference79, a Sunni-Shi‘ite confrontation erupted in a populous Sun-
ni neighborhood of Beirut. This resulted in four deaths and 300 wounded, 
including thirteen Lebanese army soldiers, and 216 arrests. Dangerous scenes 
reminiscent of the civil war erupted: sniping, automatic weapons, gunfire, 
mayhem, burning cars, destruction of property, etc.; it was a real battle zone. 
In an unprecedented move, Nasrallah issued a fatwa calling on his supporters 
– and by extension all the Lebanese – to immediately vacate the streets: “From 
the stance of a national, patriotic, ethical, religious, and shar‘i duty…, I call on 
you to fully cooperate with all the measures that the Lebanese army is taking 
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in order to ensure and uphold peace and stability… this fatwa is in the inter-
est (maslaha) of our country, its civil peace, and peaceful coexistence… we 
insist on using civil, democratic, and political means in expressing our politi-
cal differences, and any recourse to arms, from whichever party, is considered 
treason.”80 Similar calls were made by speaker Berri and Sa‘d Hariri, the par-
liamentary majority leader.81 Nasrallah added: “Even if 1,000 Hizbullahis die 
we will not be led to fitna (discord) or take recourse to our weapons in the 
domestic infighting.”82 After these bloody confrontations, Hizbullah labeled 
the Sanyura cabinet as “the government of the armed militias”.83
 Most likely, if civil war erupts, then it would lead to the total destruction of 
Lebanon since – unlike the 1975-1990 civil war, where mainly Muslims fought 
Christians and vice versa – the whole country is polarized in such a way, that 
both camps (the March 8 and March 14) include parties from all religious 
denominations and sectarian affiliations.
Shi‘ite opposition allied with the March 14 Trend: 
Indicators of an open public sphere or a free public 
sphere?
It seems that Hizbullah does not completely hegemonize or monopolize the 
Shi‘ite public sphere since it does not muffle or put the lid on dissident voices 
such as Sayyid Hani Fahs84 (a Shi‘ite intellectual); Sayyid ‘Ali Al-Amin, the 
ex-Mufti of Tyre and Jabal ‘Amil85; Shaykh Muhammad Al-Hajj Hasan86, the 
leader of the Free Shi‘ite Movement (Al-Tayyar ‘Al-Shi‘i Al-Hurr); Shaykh 
Yusuf Kanj; and Shaykh Subhi Al-Tufayli. How much power do they wield on 
the ground, and do they have a substantial following?
 Sayyid ‘Ali Al-Amin87 – a graduate of the Najaf seminary who descends 
from an influential family88 of religious scholars (‘ulama) – was one of the 
main wielders of authority in Jabal ‘Amil89, the historical den of Shi‘ism in 
Lebanon. Most importantly, when Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine, 
the head of the Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council90, died, al-Amin was a serious 
contender to succeed him. However, Hizbullah placed a veto on al-Amin, 
accusing him, as it has done with Berri, of deflecting from Imam Musa al-
Sadr’s path. This incident poisoned the relationship between Hizbullah and 
al-Amin. Although Fadlallah still maintained his contacts with Hizbullah 
and occasionally met Nasrallah, it seems that al-Amin and Fadlallah are on 
the same wavelength, but since they are both Sayyids and wield substantial 
authority and following, they do not put their hands together. So, it boils 
down to a matter of contestation of authority. Who wields more power and 
following? To whom shall the khums go?91
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 Sayyid Hani Fahs is a member of the Shi‘ite establishment, the pyramid 
structure that holds the bulk of the Shi‘ite community, which is mainly com-
posed of Hizbullah’s constituency, and, to a lesser extent, Amal’s constituency. 
Although he is vocal against Hizbullah’s taklif al-Shar‘i, he neither sides with 
the March 14 Trend, nor appears in anti-Hizbullah public events.
 Unsubstantiated reports claim that Shaykh Yusuf Kanj92 studied in the reli-
gious seminary of Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, but he parted company with him 
and established his own seminary. When Nabulsi told him that you need a 
certificate of ijtihad (ijazat ijtihad), Kanj replied: “I’m the one who should 
give you an ijaza.”
 The renegade Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli contends that Hizbullah is protect-
ing the Israeli border by preventing jihadi groups from attacking Israel, and 
he accuses Iran of serving the interest of the US. In an interview on Future 
TV on 27 January 2007, Tufayli vehemently censored Hizbullah’s leadership, 
accusing Nasrallah of executing Khaminai’s policies in Lebanon.93 It is worth 
mentioning that al-Tufayli is the only one among the above who has armed 
followers and controls several villages in the Biqa‘, which are off-limits to the 
Lebanese state’s security apparatuses. Thus, Hizbullah managed to exercise 
hegemony over the Shi‘ite representation in Lebanon.94
 
Nasrallah’s Easter Speech95: 8 April 2007
Addressing 1,734 Hizbullah university and school graduates, Nasrallah 
stressed that Hizbullah is a viable and vital political movement in its early 
youth: “We were never defeated, and we will never be defeated… we are a 
viable party… we survived more than a quarter of a century and we’re there to 
stay; the future is ours.”96 Not mentioning Israel in his discourse and speeches 
became folklore; instead, he concentrated his attack on the Sanyura cabinet97, 
“Feltman’s98 government”, as he repeatedly labeled it, admonishing against 
“foreign tutelage”.99 Nasrallah communicated Hizbullah’s official position on 
the International Tribunal, namely, that the party is going to hand in its res-
ervations, but only to a national unity cabinet, and not to the UN or any other 
mediator. This seems to stand in sharp contrast to the consensus of all the 
parties, including Hizbullah, on the Tribunal during the first dialogue session 
in March 2006. It seems Hizbullah retracted its earlier position.
Lebanon on the verge of Sunni-Shi‘ite discord
On 23 April 2007 two Sunni members of the PSP – Ziad Ghandur (12 years 
old) and Ziad Qabalan (22 years old) – were kidnapped from Shiyyah, in 
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Dadiya, Hizbullah’s stronghold in southern Beirut. On 26 April, Lebanese 
security forces found the two bodies of the victims, who were shot at close 
range, in Jadra, a Christian village of Iqlim al-Kharrub. Iqlim al-Kharrub, a 
predominantly Sunni area situated in the heartland of the Druz mountains, 
votes for the PSP and Jumblatt. It seems quite obvious that the abhorrent 
crime meant to sow discord among the Druz, Sunnis, and the Shi‘ites, since 
the assailants were the brothers of Yehya Shamas, one of the Shi‘ite victims 
belonging to Amal who fell in the Thursday, 25 January 2007 civil unrest in 
the predominantly Sunni area of Tariq al-Jadidé. In order to ward off discord, 
Jumblatt took the initiative to calm down the situation arguing that the crime 
was a vendetta crime, and not a politically motivated one. Jumblatt’s call for 
national unity was well received by the March 8 group, including Hizbullah, 
who on 2 May met with the March 14 trend while the parties were paying their 
respects to the families of the victims in their birthplace of watah al-Msaytbé, 
a predominantly Sunni area, as well as in Dar Al-Fawa, the residence of the 
Sunni Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. Even during the funeral procession on 
27 April, members of the March 8 group were present, including, members of 
Berri’s parliamentary bloc. These initiatives helped to break the ice between 
the parties, paving the way for Nasrallah’s new initiative.
 
Sanyura’s initiative
Reaching out to the Hizbullah-led opposition, Sanyura came up with a pro-
posal aimed at ending the deadlock. He conceded to the opposition’s demand 
offering them two seats more than they asked for (13 out of 30100), on condi-
tion that reaching an agreement on a common political program, which is 
based upon the Seven Points, the implementation of the decisions reached in 
the national dialogue sessions, and, most importantly, full implementation of 
UNSC Resolution 1701. Although Berri, the speaker of the parliament and the 
leader of the Amal movement, agreed, naturally, Hizbullah rejected the offer 
because this would eventually lead to its disarmament. However, Hizbullah 
did not put it bluntly; rather it argued that it was unwilling to participate in 
a government headed by Sanyura, whom the opposition holds responsible 
for the economic crisis since he served as the Minister of Finance for twelve 
years in the previous Hariri governments. It seems that the Sanyura initiative 
fell on deaf ears.101 Unfortunately, after the ‘Second Lebanon War’, in its bid 
to monopolize the public sphere, Hizbullah’s leaders, cadres, and intellectuals 
failed to “read and hear alternative points of view.”
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Change of heart
Since “modern ideas of legitimacy depend on the notion that a government 
or political power [should] serve the interests of its people”,102 and because 
Hizbullah’s aim is to maximize aggregate interests, on 5 May 2007, Hizbullah 
revoked its earlier acceptance of the Seven Points. Hizbullah’s intellectual par 
excellence Sayyid Nawwaf Al-Musawi, the political council (politburo) mem-
ber and foreign relations officer, and the pragmatist MP Muhammad Fnaysh, 
the Minister of Power103, argued that the party did not approve the Seven 
Points, “which were Condoleezza Rice’s orders to Sanyura”, as al-Musawi con-
tended.104 On the same day, Nasrallah affirmed the contentions of al-Musawi 
and Fnaysh.105 This runs contrary to the minutes of the council of ministers 
and Nasrallah’s earlier public declarations106 in support of the Seven Points, 
which were also publicly endorsed by Berri. Two days later Sanyura catego-
rized the Hizbullah establishment as ‘oppressors’. Was Hizbullah’s initial aim 
behind its gradual integration into the Lebanese public sphere the sheer exer-
cise of power?
 
More dialogue
On 14-15 July 2007, attempts were made at breaking the standoff during dia-
logue sessions in Saint Cloud, France, among second class cadres of the March 
14 and March 8 groups, formally invited by the French foreign minister, Ber-
nard Cuisenaire, through his special envoy ambassador Cousseran. 31 repre-
sentatives of Lebanon’s fourteen leading parties participated in closed door 
talks. Cuisenaire was scheduled to visit Beirut on 28 July in order to follow 
through the French initiative aimed at breaking the political deadlock that 
had been rupturing the country for more than eight months. No substantial 
or tangible results were reported from either the dialogue sessions or Cuise-
naire’s visit. In addition to the representatives of the leading politicians in the 
country, the French introduced representatives of civil society organizations, 
although they do not yield much power on the ground.
5.3 Conclusion: The tug of war
The al-Akhbar columnist Nikolas Nasif said107 that there are three main junc-
tures in the tug of war between the Sanyura cabinet and the Hizbullah-led 
opposition: the International Tribunal108, the national unity cabinet109, and 
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the presidency. Nasif purported that Hizbullah lost the first two, and the third 
is not determined yet. He questioned what would happen to Hizbullah’s cred-
ibility following these “defeats”. What seems to substantiate Nasif ’s analysis 
is that the discourse of all the parties shifted to the issue of the presidency, 
which dominated the public sphere. Qasim admonished that the president110 
should be elected by a 2/3-majority of the parliament, and not 50 + 1, as the 
March 14 Trend were lobbying for. In turn, ‘Aun proposed ratifying the con-
stitution once so that the president could be directly elected by the people. 
Since the March 8 Group did not recognize the legitimacy and constitution-
ality of the Saynura cabinet, it proposed either holding early legislative elec-
tions or obtaining the one-third veto power in any future cabinet. In turn, the 
March 14 Trend insisted on electing the president first before discussing the 
formation of the national unity cabinet and the agreement on a new electoral 
law to base the June 2009 legislative elections upon. Although both parties 
(March 14 and March 8) agreed on the Lebanese army commander, general 
Michel Sulayman, as a consensus candidate to the presidency, the tug of war 
did not end. Indeed, a distinctive feature of the public sphere is that “it is 
created and reproduced through discourse… public sphere exists uniquely 
in, through, and for talk.”111 And since a public sphere could be “shaped by 
struggle against the dominant organization of others”112, every party is try-
ing to manipulate the constitution and interpret it to its own advantage. How 
could a zero sum game, or the late PM Sa’ib Salam’s statement of “no winners 
and no losers” be achieved in this regard remains to be seem.
 On 24 July 2007, in an attempt to pressure the two parties into reaching a 
compromise, general Michel Sulayman threatened to resign in case anoth-
er cabinet was formed, whereby Lebanon would have repeated the negative 
precedent of 1988, when the country was split between two cabinets, where 
each one controlled a certain geographical area.113 If this scenario material-
ized, it would have eventually led to the dissolution of the military establish-
ment and the disintegration of Lebanon.
 In his 17 August 2007 Friday prayer speech, Ayatullah Fadlallah admon-
ished that the political crisis was so severe to the extent that the issue was not 
about Lebanon’s future, but about the very existence of Lebanon. The Maroni-
te patriarch reiterated the same concern in his 19 August 2007 Sunday ser-
mon.114 The late Gebran Tuéni’s father, the 80-year old veteran politician and 
journalist, MP Ghassan Tuéni, depicted the sixteen-year Lebanese civil war 
as a proxy war fought on behalf of others, rather than a war of others, as the 
title of his book suggests: A War for Others.115 In this regard, Sayyid Fadlallah 
stated that Lebanon has become a battleground for regional and international 
struggles, struggles that have rendered the Lebanese as chess pieces.116 Keep-
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ing in mind that since 1976 the Lebanese president has almost always been the 
result of mediation between Syria and the US, would the precept of practice 
prove Ghassan Tuéni right?
 Even though it seems far-fetched that Lebanon is going to plunge into civil 
war in the near future, the country is not immune to discord (fitna)117, espe-
cially after the assassination of two March 14 MPs.118 In the wake of the war 
that erupted on 20 May 2007 between Fatah al-Islam militants and the Leba-
nese army in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli and its 
vicinities119, the former conducted its retribution assassination of Lebanese 
army brigadier general François al-Hajj.120 In its bid to power Hizbullah was 
endeavoring to exploit its military triumph in the 2006 July war by seeking 
a substantial slice of the pie, at least equivalent to its demographic strength. 
The party was buying time till the tide turned in its favor. Hizbullah exercised 
patience for more than one year to affect change. Did it wait for another year 
till the next legislative elections of June 2009, as Nasrallah said in one of his 
speeches, or did it attempt to change the political system by force?121
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   139 26-4-2011   13:42:38
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   140 26-4-2011   13:42:38
141
6 The Doha 2008 Accord and its 
Aftermath
6.1 Coups d’état: From 8 March 2005 to 8 May 2008
Hizbullah’s bid for power laid the cornerstone for a new phase in which 
it seeks to dominate the public sphere and national political arena. Under 
the slogan of partnership and the reformulation of the political system (al-
musharaka wa i‘adat intaj al-sulta) and after eighteen months of a wavering 
political stalemate, Hizbullah affected change by force on the ground gaining 
its long awaited veto power in the Lebanese cabinet. In a politically charged 
atmosphere, the cabinet decided to confront Hizbullah for the first time since 
Ta‘if. After a long meeting on 6 May that went on till the early hours of the 
morning, the council of ministers deemed Hizbullah’s telecommunications 
network an “onslaught against the state’s sovereignty and its financial resourc-
es” (i‘tida’ ‘ala siyadat al-dawla wa al-mal al-‘amm) or as illegitimate and a 
threat to the state’s financial security. The cabinet affirmed that it was going 
to bring to justice all those who participated or were involved in deploying 
this network, which was tantamount to an arrest warrant against Nasrallah. 
Also, the cabinet dismissed the pro-Hizbullah-Amal Beirut Airport head of 
security, Lebanese army general Wafiq Shuqayr,1 who had been serving in this 
post since 2000, accusing him of deploying cameras across Beirut Interna-
tional Airport’s lane number 17 in order to monitor the travellers. Hizbullah 
exploited a general strike called on by the Labor unions on 7 May and the 
aforementioned two governmental decisions as pretexts to storm and occupy, 
by military force in the night of 8-9 May, West Beirut, where most govern-
ment ministries are located. By 12 May Hizbullah was able to control the Shuf 
region, a Druz den. The party managed to strike a ‘silent consensus’ deal with 
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the Lebanese army not to interfere in the crisis. Knowing that at least 60 per-
cent of the army are Shi‘ites and that it is made up of a further seventeen 
confessions that form the Lebanese myriad, involving the army in the clashes 
would have led to its disintegration, as was the case during the civil war. The 
Hizbullah-led opposition waged a campaign of civil disobedience blocking 
vital routes and key arteries to the Lebanese economy such as the national 
airport and the Beirut port. In scenes reminiscent of the civil war, turf bat-
tles between the warring factions left more than 65 people dead2, including 
at least sixteen Hizbullah fighters, as Nasrallah conceded in a press confer-
ence.3 In an unprecedented development – which did not even take place 
during the Israeli fourteen-day occupation of West Beirut in 1982 – Hizbul-
lah cracked down on the media supporting the cabinet silencing Future TV, 
al-Sharq Radio, al-Mustaqbal and al-Liwa’ newspapers, and al-Shira‘ weekly 
journal, threatening them with total annihilation if they resumed broadcast-
ing or publication. In fact, Future TV’s old offices were ransacked and burned, 
and many TV and radio antennas and transmitters belonging to Future TV 
and al-Sharq Radio were destroyed. This situation continued till 14 May, when 
Hizbullah handed the aforementioned media outlets to the army. Although 
Hizbullah’s al-Manar TV and MP Hasan Fadlallah, the head of the media and 
communications parliamentary committee, paid lip service in condemning 
such events, such a condemnation did not revoke the damage caused by Hiz-
bullah’s actions, which again tarnished its image as an advocate of free speech 
and expression.
 With the arrival of the Arab League delegation on 14 May, the cabinet 
annulled its two decisions as Nasrallah demanded in his 8 May press confer-
ence, thus setting the pace for an end to the crisis. The guns were completely 
silenced on 15 May after the Arab League delegation was able to negotiate a deal 
between the warring factions. The ‘Beirut Declaration’ stipulated the traveling 
of the warming factions’ representatives to dialogue sessions in Doha, Qatar, 
aimed at reaching a final settlement to the eighteen-month deadlock. After 
five days of intensive negotiations, Hizbullah obtained its long awaited veto 
power in the cabinet. This was consolidated by the political agreement of 21 
May known as the ‘Doha Accord’ between March 14 and March 8, mediated 
by the Arab League, granting Hizbullah veto power in the next national unity 
30-member cabinet by a margin of eleven ministers, while March 14 acquired 
sixteen ministers and the president three. The considerable achievement of 
the Doha Accord is that it barred the use of weapons in domestic feuds. Hiz-
bullah ended its sit-in in downtown Beirut and dismantled its tent city after 
537 days. The party was very pleased with the performance of the army and its 
commander Michel Sulayman, who had been in his post since 1998. After six 
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months of vacuum in the seat of the presidency, something unprecedented in 
Lebanese history, the consensus president Sulayman was elected on 25 May 
by 118 votes out of 127 MPs.4 On the next day Hizbullah celebrated the eighth 
anniversary of the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon through 
a fiery speech by its secretary-general, Nasrallah, who stressed that Hizbullah 
would abide by the Ta’if Agreement and would honor the Doha Accord to the 
letter.
 Although the Hizbullah-‘despised’ PM Sanyura headed the new cabinet, 
the formula of a zero sum game between March 14 and March 8 did not mate-
rialize as the secretary-general of the Arab League ‘Amr Musa contended. 
Instead, Hizbullah obtained, by force5, its long awaited veto power in the 
council of ministers, the main executive body that runs the country. Since the 
cabinet conceded to Hizbullah’s demands and revoked its two earlier deci-
sions – although it was adamant in its initial stance not to do so – it seems 
that Hizbullah appropriated more political capital from its coup d’état and 
its campaign of civil disobedience more than it has appropriated after the 
July 2006 war, in the sense that it can, from now on, veto government deci-
sions that might reflect negatively on it or its constituency or that are deemed 
against its interest, strategy, and policy. Will the Doha Accord constitute a 
springboard for another Ta’if Agreement, whereby the Lebanese Shi‘ites wield 
more political power, especially after Mufti Qabalan, the deputy of the Islamic 
Shi‘ite Higher Council, called for instituting the post of a Shi‘ite vice presi-
dent, which unequivocally runs contrary to the present Lebanese constitu-
tion? Thus, Hizbullah succeeded in exercising hegemony over the Lebanese 
public sphere and political system through a bottom-up process by engaging 
in the political game through alliances, mainly with the FPM as well as other 
members of the Lebanese opposition, as long as such alliances suit its pur-
poses and serve its policies, until the political system falls prey to its whims or 
it manages to produce a complete overhaul. Aiming at more hegemony, on 18 
August 2008, Hizbullah reached out to its ideological enemies, the Salafists, 
and signed with them an understanding aimed mainly at warding off Sunni-
Shi‘ite discord (fitna) in the future.
6.2 The Understanding with the Salafi Movement6
After less than three months, at a time when tensions were still running very 
high and people did not forget about their lost blood and destroyed posses-
sions, Hizbullah’s public relations campaign paid off when an understanding 
was reached with the Salafi movement. After intensive negotiations that lasted 
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for months, on 18 August 2008, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, the current 
head of Hizbullah’s political council, representing Hizbullah, and Shaykh 
Hasan al-Shahhal representing the Salafi movement in Lebanon, signed an 
understanding aimed at organizing the relationship between the two parties, 
defusing the chronic tensions in the Islamic sphere, and warding off any pros-
pect of fitna. In a well-attended press conference, the Salafi Shaykh ‘Abd Al-
Ghaffar Al-Zu‘bi, the political aide of the Islamic Heritage Endowment, read 
the eight points of the understanding below:
1 Starting from the prohibition of shedding the blood of a Muslim, we 
prohibit and condemn any aggression committed by any Muslim group 
on another Muslim group. In case of any aggression or onslaught, the 
aggrieved party has the right to recourse to any legitimate means to 
defend itself.
2 Avoiding sedition and provoking the public because this ultimately 
leads to discord, thus slipping the carpet from underneath the feet of 
the religious scholars (‘ulama) and placing the decision in the hand of 
the rash, vile people or the foes of the Islamic umma.
3 Standing firm in the face of the Zionist-US project, which aims at dis-
seminating discord through the dictum of “divide and conquer”.
4 Doing our utmost best to uproot infidel (takfiri) thinking that is existent 
among both the Sunnis and the Shi‘ites because branding all Shi‘ites as 
infidels is rejected by Salafis and vice versa.
5 If Hizbullah or the Salafis are oppressed or attacked by any domestic or 
foreign actor, then the other party must stand firm with the aggressed 
party as much as its capabilities allow.
6 Forming a committee from Hizbullah’s ‘ulama and those of the Salaf-
ist movement to discuss points of contention between the Sunnis and 
Shi‘as, which contributes to confining disagreement among the mem-
bers of the committee, thus avoiding any spillover to the public, to the 
street.
7 Every party is free in what it believes in. No party has the right to impose 
its ideas and its jurisprudential concepts on the other.
8 Both parties (Hizbullah and the Salafis) regard this Understanding as a 
means to ward off discord among Muslims, and promote civil peace and 
coexistence among the Lebanese.
Although the Understanding did not survive long after Hasan al-Shahhal’s 
cousin, Shaykh Da‘i al-Islam al-Shahhal – the head of the largest puritan 
Salafi movement in Lebanon – vehemently criticized Hizbullah’s move as an 
attempt to place a wedge between the Salafis, in particular, and divide the 
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Sunnis, in general; the eight points above are telling since they portray the 
possibility of finding a common ground between Sunnis and Shi‘ites if juris-
prudential differences are set aside and common political, ideological points 
are addressed.
6.3 The run-up to the June 2009 elections
On 7 June 2009, Lebanese voters went to the polls to elect a new parliament. 
These were the fifth legislative elections since the end of the civil war in 1990 
and the first time they were held in one day. The Lebanese state deployed 
around 50,000 army and security forces, almost two-thirds of Lebanese mili-
tary capabilities. Forecasts expected the Hizbullah led-opposition (March 
8) to win the majority of seats, thus gaining almost complete control of the 
country. One week before the elections, the Hizbullah leader delivered an 
empowering speech in which he promised to strengthen the Lebanese state by 
fortifying its army through acquiring Iranian weapons. The results of the elec-
tions would affect the domestic tug-of-war between the two opposing camps 
in Lebanon, and was expected to have a bearing on the regional dynamics in 
the Middle East and geopolitical implications, in light of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) or the UN-backed internationalized tribunal investigat-
ing prime minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination in 2005, as well as the Iranian 
nuclear file.
Hizbullah’s 2009 elections program
In this context, Hizbullah announced its 2009 election program on 1 March, 
aimed at reaching out and allaying the fears of the other. Shaykh Na‘im 
Qasim, deputy secretary-general of the party, highlighted the most salient 
points based on the slogan ‘we resist [Israel] together and together we build 
Lebanon’. The program was divided into two parts: one on the resistance (Hiz-
bullah’s military wing), the other dealing with socio-economic development. 
The former included: a) total independence and rejection of foreign tutelage 
in any form; b) liberation of the land still under occupation and standing firm 
to ‘Israeli dangers and aggression’; c) development of a viable defense strategy 
with the Lebanese army to fend off any aggression against the country, and 
commitment to the principle of non-violence in respect to domestic rivalries: 
“our central enemy is Israel…We do not have domestic foes and we will not 
respond to violence with violence.” The latter section included: a) prioritiza-
tion of the economic situation, especially agriculture and industry; b) social 
security and healthcare for everyone; c) urban development concomitant 
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with rural development; d) the stamping out of corruption in all aspects of 
life; e) a meritocratic approach to governmental institutions.7
 However, this positive program contrasts sharply with political devel-
opments. Two international events weighed in. First, on 27 April 2009, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) ordered the release of the four gener-
als detained four years ago on suspicion of having a role in the 2005 Hariri 
assassination. Second, the UK resumed the dialogue with the political wing 
of Hizbullah. Both events seem to have boosted the electoral prospects of 
the Hizbullah-led March 8. Mass firing of MK47s in the air to celebrate the 
former event contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation and defiance. 
Meanwhile, March 14 was waiting for a balancing act from the international 
community to pressure Israel to withdraw from the border Ghajar village, 
which was occupied after the July 2006 war. Instead, there was another Israe-
li goodwill gesture, with the release of the cluster bomb maps as stipulated 
under UNSC resolution 1701. However, March 14 considered this move insuf-
ficient to turn the tide to its favor.
 Meanwhile, on the domestic scene, on 13 May 2009, the supposedly neutral 
president of the Lebanese Republic entered the debate and announced that 
the March 8 camp would win a narrow majority in the legislature. It is not 
clear if this was a tactical move aimed at calming the March 8 camp so that 
the elections would pass without violence, or if it reflected his own opinion 
and preferences. Nasrallah’s fiery 15 May 2009 mobilization speech in celebra-
tion of the first anniversary of the 8 May 2008 show of force further antago-
nized the situation. March 14 interpreted this as March 8 camp’s expectation 
of imminent power − either through electoral victory or another ‘coup’.
 According to the Doha Accord, the 2009 election law is based on an 
appended version of the 1960 election law, which divides the country accord-
ing to 26 small election districts (aqdiya) instead of the previous five election 
districts (muhafazat). March 14 claim that the elections in all districts were 
scheduled on the same day (7 June), unprecedented since the Ta’if Agree-
ment, in order to disadvantage Sa‘d Hariri in his bid to win in both Beirut and 
Tripoli as he did in 2005. It is worth mentioning that in 2005 the Hariri-led 
March 14 was able to secure the 28 seats in the north where Hizbullah has no 
constituency. This was conducive to obtaining a majority in the legislature 
after Hariri also secured Beirut, leaving only one seat vacant for Hizbullah. 
The prime minister was then inevitably selected from the March 14 bloc, as 
the constitution requires that the legislature names the prime minister. Past 
practice and the situation on the ground made it doubtful whether Hariri 
would be able to do the same in 2009.
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 In an interesting turn of events, a recent article in the German weekly Der 
Spiegel, which implicated Hizbullah’s role in the 2005 Hariri assassination, 
led indirectly to a diffusion of tensions. One of the most notable in a wave 
of domestic condemnations of the article was by the March 14 leading cadre 
and head of the PSP, Druz MP Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt’s statement was well 
received by Nasrallah, who reiterated it to the letter in his 25 May speech, 
leading to rapprochement between the two parties after tensions erupted in 
violent military confrontations in May 2008. In a reconciliatory discourse − 
aimed not only at defusing tensions with the Druz, but also with the Sunnis 
− Nasrallah reached out to the Sunnis of Beirut and explained what he meant 
when he termed 8 May a ‘glorious day’ in the sense of warding off Sunni-Shia 
discord (fitna). Nasrallah also conceded that it was a ‘sad and painful day’ 
since people died and others lost their possessions.
 Nevertheless, in the countdown to the 7 June 2009 elections, the war of 
words between the opposing parties reached an unprecedented high, which 
ran contrary to the détente presented in Hizbullah’s election program and 
agreed upon at the national dialogue sessions, headed by the president. But 
this is to be expected in Lebanese politics in such decisive elections, which 
might herald the inauguration of the ‘third republic’, namely, the Hizbullah-
led opposition governing on its own. The March 14 camp voiced this concern 
in a poster that represented Hizbullah as holding the ministries of defense, 
foreign affairs, and labor, in a cabinet headed by the late Shaykh Fathi Yakan.8
Hizbullah’s strategy and internal policy
There seems to be no tension between Hizbullah’s domestic and regional 
ambitions, since the party has stuck its feet deep in the Lebanese domestic 
quagmire and flexed its military might in May 2008 in order ‘to impose cer-
tain shares and conditions’, in other words attaining veto power by force. This 
has tarnished Hizbullah’s record of not having participated in the civil war, 
and also risks it being labeled as a militia, shattering the halo of the Resis-
tance, all for short-term political gain. Nasrallah had promised in a speech 
that if the Hizbullah-led opposition would win a majority in the parliament, 
it would grant veto power in the cabinet to March 14, a proposal vehement-
ly rejected by Sa‘d al-Hariri and March 14 cadres. More recently, Nasrallah 
extended a hand to March 14 to join the March 8 group in forming a national 
unity government. Will Nasrallah honor both promises or will he backtrack, 
as was the case with his earlier assurance that the party would never use its 
weapons domestically, come what may? If so, then a real change in the status 
quo is unlikely, since whichever scenario materializes, the political system 
will remain an easy prey to Hizbullah’s ambitions. Knowing that the Christian 
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vote is the determinant vote that will impact the whole result, on the eve of 
the elections cardinal Sfeir indirectly admonished the voters not to vote for 
Hizbullah and especially the FPM, warning that a March 8 victory poses an 
existential threat to the Lebanese entity and compromises Lebanon’s identity.
 The Israeli government has made direct references to this election, with 
Ehud Barak, the Minister of Defense, warning the Lebanese of dire conse-
quences if they voted for the Hizbullah-led opposition, while foreign minis-
ter Avigdor Lieberman has called for an international arrest warrant against 
Nasrallah. These calls coincided with Israeli military drills and the charging, 
by the Lebanese military prosecutor, of more than 100 people for spying for 
Israel, a charge punishable by death according to the Lebanese penal code.
Election results
To the dismay of the Hizbullah-led opposition, 71 seats were won by March 14 
and 57 seats went to March 8, in an election that witnessed 54,8 percent turn 
out.9 Hizbullah won twelve seats: ten for party members and two for Sunni 
allies. Due to its alliance with the FPM, this time Hizbullah had no Christians 
on its election list.10 The results put the veto power to the test and kept it 
hanging on the balance after its inefficiency in achieving its presumed goal 
of hegemony. Thus, one year after the Doha Accord, March 8 failed to affect 
change by democratic means and, most likely, will be forced to work under 
the status quo ante that prevailed after the 2005 legislative elections.
 The elections were neither an epitome of disorder nor did Hizbullah close 
the door to compromise with its opponents. On the contrary, one day after 
the elections, the party’s secretary-general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah conceded 
defeat, called for burying the hatchet and placing skeletons in the closet, con-
gratulated and extended a hand to the victorious March 14 ruling coalition to 
form a national unity government, and stressed that bygones were bygones. 
Rapprochement between Nasrallah, the March 14 Druz leader and seasoned 
politician Walid Jumblatt, and the parliamentary majority leader Sa‘d al-Hari-
ri seemed to be inevitable after the elections. In marathon meetings, after a 
freeze of almost three years, many misunderstandings and mutual fears were 
addressed.
 So, many tensions were defused. In accordance with the dictum of ‘I’ll 
scratch your back, if you’ll scratch mine’, Nabih Berri was elected as speaker 
for a fifth consecutive term since he first assumed office in 1992. Since he 
received 90 votes out of 128, when the Hizbullah-led opposition controlled 
only 57 seats, it meant that 33 MPs from March 14 voted for him. This was 
reciprocated when on 28 June Sa‘d al-Hariri was nominated as incumbent 
prime minister by 86 MPs, when March 14 only controlled 71 seats of the leg-
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islature, which implies that the thirteen members of the Berri parliamentary 
bloc along with two Armenians from the Hizbullah-led opposition nomi-
nated Sa‘d al-Hariri. In this atmosphere, ‘Aun toned down his demands from 
seven ministers to five after he previously argued that since he won 50 percent 
of the Christian vote, he should be entitled to half the Christian ministers. 
This along with the groundbreaking meetings between Nasrallah, Jumblatt, 
and al-Hariri serve as indicators of a tendency towards national unity and 
reconciliation. In a positive turn of events, Jumblatt dispatched his son Tay-
mur and MP Akram Shihayyib, and Sa‘d al-Hariri and PM Sanyura sent MP 
Muhammad Qabbani to represent them in Hizbullah’s third ‘divine victory’ 
celebration on 14 August. March 14’s gesture was well-received by Hizbullah, 
where Nasrallah delivered a reconciliatory speech trimming down March 8 
demands on the cabinet formation to ten ministers, thus wavering its earlier 
demand for veto power. Nasrallah classified the Israeli rhetoric in the domain 
of impeding the cabinet formation, pressuring Hizbullah not to participate, 
and trying to change the UNIFIL’s rule of engagement, something that did 
not materialize when the mandate was renewed for a third time without any 
alterations. Nasrallah added that the best response to Israeli threats would 
be to promptly form a national unity cabinet in which his party would play 
a constructive role in defusing Israeli threats. In the same speech, Nasrallah 
introduced a new ‘balance of terror [power]’ formula aimed at deterrence, 
namely that if Israel were to bomb Beirut or the Dahiya, Hizbullah would 
then strike Tel Aviv.11
The longwinded formation of the cabinet
This atmosphere of optimism was shattered after 72 days when Hariri submit-
ted a 30-seat cabinet line-up to the president on 7 September 2009, but March 
8 rejected it, prompting al-Hariri’s resignation on 10 September as a politi-
cal maneuver and tactical move. This warrants some explanation. In light of 
the May 8 coup, Hizbullah considers the Telecommunications Ministry and 
the Ministry of Interior as ‘security ministries’. Since March 14 is unwilling 
to hand these to Hizbullah, the party’s only bid is on the FPM to get these. 
Already, ‘Aun’s son-in-law MP Gebran Basil was the Minister of Telecom-
munications in the outgoing Sanyura cabinet. So in the proposed ministerial 
line-up, Hariri appointed Basil as a minister of state and kept the ministry of 
interior with Ziad Barud on meritocracy, in recognition for his ‘outstanding 
performance’ before, during, and after the elections.12 Naturally this move 
angered ‘Aun, prompting Hizbullah and the speaker to side with him, which 
ultimately resulted in a rejection. Again, Cardinal Sfeir weighed in on the 
debate siding with the March 14 argument, namely, that those who failed in 
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the elections cannot become ministers, since this would be against the ‘popu-
lar will of the people’.13 In turn the Association of Catholic Schools called on 
‘Aun to support the ministerial line-up since the ministry of education was 
given to a Christian from the FPM, when it was handed in for decades to a 
Sunni. After mandatory consultations, on 16 September, Hariri was renamed 
with 73 votes, 71 from the March 14 coalition and two Armenians from March 
8. However, conceding to its March 8 allies, most notably Hizbullah, the FPM, 
and Berri’s parliamentary bloc did not nominate anyone, which unprecedent-
edly prompted the ex-PM Salim al-Hoss to vehemently bash them for not 
exercising their duties as MPs, questioning how they were going to partici-
pate in a national unity cabinet, when they refused to nominate anyone. It is 
worth mentioning that in 1969 Lebanon remained without a cabinet for nine 
months from April till December, when during the ‘constitutional crisis’ the 
late PM Rashid Karami was conducting the affairs of the country as deputy 
PM.14 Al-Hoss’s criticism prompted Berri’s parliamentary bloc to assert that 
not naming anyone amounts to a vote of confidence (tazkiya) to al-Hariri.15 
Nasrallah’s ‘Jerusalem Day’ speech of 18 September, which is always primar-
ily dedicated to supporting Palestine and the Palestinian people, stressed the 
need for national reconciliation, dialogue, and cooperation, wishing al-Hariri 
success in forming the cabinet. Nasrallah clarified that March 8’s move of 
not nominating anyone should be viewed in the positive light of fending off 
any civil strife, calling on everyone to remain calm and release the tension 
through democratic, constitutional practices, as was the case after the elec-
tions. He said that it was better to take our time in forming the cabinet than 
hastily forming one that would lead Lebanon into ‘the unknown’.16 Nasrallah’s 
views were in line with Ayatullah Fadlallah who calmed the waters stressing 
that the national unity cabinet would take a long time to be formed, assuring 
the citizens that Lebanon would not remain without a cabinet indefinitely.17
Consociational democracy: Hizbullah’s reading of Arend Lijphart
What is the real problem behind this political bickering? More likely, each 
party has its own understanding and conception of what democracy is. It 
seems that the predicaments characterizing the Lebanese cabinet formation 
process have little to do with pro- and anti-democratic tendencies. For almost 
all political parties, the question was not whether democracy was desirable, 
but what kind of democracy should be preferred, and what sort of political 
system should be connected with it? While March 14 promoted a majoritarian 
democracy (50%+), March 8 preferred a consensual democracy, proportional 
representation, and lowering the voting age to eighteen, which, in practice, 
boils down to demographic majority rule since, as mentioned in chapter two, 
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Muslim voters number around 75 percent, while the Christian voters number 
around 25 percent.
 The Lebanese system, which is based on the philosophy of elite accommo-
dation, is the most well-known example of consociationalism. Arend Lijphart, 
who coined the term, proposes that a consociational democracy has to fit four 
main criteria. First, the elites representing the leading societal groups should 
participate in an overarching decision-making structure. Second, this struc-
ture should incorporate a veto mechanism for each of these groups. Third, 
proportionality should be the guiding principle in all forms of political rep-
resentation. Finally, every group should be allowed to arrange their internal 
matters independently.18 March 8 and March 14 agree on Lijphart’s first and 
fourth point, but disagree on the second and third. Hizbullah was able to 
obtain veto power in Sanyura’s 2008-2009 cabinet, a short-lived experience 
that impeded the proper functioning of the cabinet, but was not continued in 
the 2009 Sa‘d Hariri cabinet. Nevertheless, March 8 still calls for proportion-
ality to give Lebanon’s eighteen ethno-confessional communities more equi-
table representation. So, in Lebanon, contrary to Lijphart’s stipulations, veto 
power seemingly does not work, while the issue of proportional representa-
tion remains debated. However, as ‘Ali Fayyad noted, the institutionalization 
of structures fostering consensus between the societal elites remains the core 
of Lebanon’s political system and its success – political stability – depends on 
the extent to which elites manage to agree on structural political dilemmas.19
The views of the Shi‘ite opposition and cardinal Sfeir
Both Sayyid ‘Ali al-Amin, the head of the Shi‘ite opposition, and cardinal 
Sfeir attributed the current deadlock in forming the cabinet to foreign inter-
vention, more than local dynamics. Sfeir called on Hizbullah to surrender 
its weapons and stop promoting the Syrian-Iranian relations in the region: 
“March 14 and March 8 cannot coexist in one government.” In reference to 
‘Aun’s FPM, Sfeir argued: “Domestically there are those who are empowered 
by foreign players in order to seek more parliamentary and ministerial gains.” 
Concerning Hizbullah, Sfeir argued that it is working more for Iranian inter-
est than the interest of Lebanon. In spite of that, he said that other foreign 
players than Syria are delaying the formation of the cabinet. In reference to 
the party’s arms, Sfeir affirmed that militia weapons and democracy do not 
match: “The arms should be in the hands of the army. We fear that we will 
reach a stage where everyone will have recourse to arms, an eventuality that 
will ignite another civil war.”20
 Sayyid ‘Ali al-Amin, the ex-Mufti of Sour and Jabal ‘Amil21, questioned how 
could the institution established by Imam Musa al-Sadr further the interest of 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   151 26-4-2011   13:42:41
1526 The Doha 2008 Accord and its Aftermath
armed militias that confiscate the Shi‘ite public space and stifle the freedom 
of expression.22 Al-Amin attributed the deadlock more to Syria and its stance 
from the international Hariri tribunal. He said that Iran is aiding a militia 
that constitutes a state within a state, in a country with weak security forces. 
He admonished that when the cabinet is formed by March 14 under the fake 
banner of national unity it would be the best pretext for March 8 and Hizbul-
lah to further the Iranian agenda. He added that such a cabinet would be a 
legal cover for a minority that will actually rule by the power of weapons. He 
said that the Lebanese state is still unable to enforce the results of the 7 June 
elections, i.e. the majority (March 14) to take the helm of things and form an 
efficient cabinet. He did not hide his fear of an explosion of fitna (Sunni-Shi‘a 
discord), especially in light of the international community’s will to naturalize 
the Palestinians in Lebanon and Hizbullah’s ambitions to control the political 
system. Al-Amin stressed that political differences neither sanction fighting 
between the Shi‘a and Sunnis nor the destruction of the Lebanese state and its 
institutions. According to him, in May 2008 Hizbullah illegitimately spilled 
innocent blood without due cause.23 He ended up by stressing that his intel-
lectual and political thought is totally against Hizbullah deciding the fate of 
Lebanon and the Shi‘a sect.24
 On 8 November 2009, Shaykh Muhammad Al-Hajj Hasan25 – the leader 
of the Free Shi‘ite Movement (Al-Tayyar ‘Al-Shi‘i Al-Hurr) and member of 
the Unified Nationalistic Union (Al-Tajamu‘ al-Qawmi al-Muwwahad) – stat-
ed that the atmosphere of optimism surrounding the formation of the new 
cabinet amounts to nothing after March 14 succumbed to the demands of 
the minority (March 8) that is reaping its political capital resulting from its 
‘military coup’ of May 2008. He added that May 2008 cannot be forgotten 
even though the politicians seem to give lip service to the dictum of ‘bygones 
are bygones’, in direct reference to Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. The “paralyzed 
cabinet”, as Al-Hajj Hasan termed it, amounts to a bowl of stone soup fed to 
the miserable Lebanese people. He questioned how the loser (March 8) could 
enforce its conditions on the winner (March 14) of the 7 June 2009 legislative 
elections. He concluded that there is no democracy in Lebanon; rather just 
power politics that started with the May 2008 Doha Accord. In a reference to 
legitimizing Hizbullah’s weapons – the “plague” as he called it – al-Hajj Hasan 
called on March 14 ministers and MPs not to give in; rather to fight any policy 
statement contrary to the cherished values of the Independence Uprising or 
Cedar Revolution and to remember and give tribute to the martyrs of inde-
pendence. Finally, he lashed the “hypocritical discourse” of ‘Aun, the leader of 
the FPM – who had a big hand in persuading the US administration in impos-
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ing the ‘Syria Accountability Act’ and UNCR 1559 – arguing that if he had had 
the chance he would have fought the Shi‘a till death.
 After five months of the elections, the 24th cabinet since independence saw 
the light. The national unity cabinet was based upon the previously agreed 
political framework and power-sharing formula: fifteen seats for March 14; 
five for the centralist coalition of the president; and ten for March 8: five for 
the Shi‘a (two ministers for Hizbullah, two for Amal, and one neutral); and 
five for the FPM. Although March 8 insisted on obtaining the two security 
ministries of interior and telecommunications26, the ministries of interior 
and defense were included in the president’s share and the ministry of tele-
communications went to Hizbullah’s ally, the FPM. The cabinet included six-
teen old faces and fourteen new, including two women.27
 According to the NNA, on 25 November 2009, Shi‘ite opposition figure 
Ahmad al-As‘ad met with Sayyid ‘Ali al-Amin to discuss current develop-
ments. Al-As‘ad was unhappy with Hizbullah’s founding in October 2009 of 
its NGO ‘Qiyam [Values]’ and its ‘Order is an essential part of Faith’ campaign 
which aimed at giving a facelift to al-Dahiya by inculcating civic education, 
specifically teaching the people about keeping law and order and obeying the 
state and its institutions. Al-As‘ad claimed that Hizbullah was incapable of 
stopping drug trafficking and addiction, as such manipulating the govern-
ment and using it as a scapegoat in facing the drug problem, claiming that 
Hizbullah was not genuine in its collaboration with the Lebanese state in 
that area. He contended that Nasrallah’s affirmation in his 11 November 2009 
speech of exposing felons was just a charade. Al-As‘ad ended by posing the 
fundamental question on Hizbullah’s weapons, which, according to him, were 
heavily deployed in the Dahiya outside the framework of the sovereignty of 
the Lebanese state. He pointed out that these very weapons were aimed at fel-
low Lebanese in May 2008, thus shattering the claim that their only purpose 
is to fight Israel. Al-As‘ad wondered whether the state would only monitor 
the party’s weapons from a distance, knowing that certain areas are off limits 
to the security forces.28 Rhetorically, al-As‘ad questioned whether Hizbullah’s 
weapons would dictate on the Lebanese state what is right and what is wrong.
 These statements echoed the March 14 worries one day before the cabi-
net’s 22-page policy statement saw the light after ten29 extensive, marathon 
sessions of the drafting committee. The result was that there were no drastic 
changes to the post-2005 security statement which continued to balance the 
dynamic between Hizbullah’s resistance identity and the Lebanese state’s sov-
ereignty. Article six read: “From the stance of the duty to uphold Lebanese 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the cabinet affirms the right of Lebanon, 
its government, its people, its army, and its resistance (Hizbullah) to employ 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   153 26-4-2011   13:42:42
1546 The Doha 2008 Accord and its Aftermath
all legitimate means in order to liberate all Lebanese territory.”30 As such, the 
cabinet stressed its commitment to the full implementation of UNSC Resolu-
tion 1701 and the need of finding a unified stance at the dialogue sessions 
towards reaching a national defense strategy. As a ritual practice and from 
the stance of upholding state sovereignty par excellence, five March 14 min-
isters registered their reservations to the policy statement: the two Lebanese 
Forces ministers Ibrahim Najjar and Salim Wardé ; the two Phalangist min-
isters Michel Phar‘un and Salim al-Sayyigh; and Butrus Harb. A day earlier 
Shaykh Na‘im Qasim made it clear that Hizbullah’s weapons were not open to 
discussion, not even on the national dialogue table.31 On 22 November 2009, 
the president announced in his independence day address the resumption 
of the national dialogue sessions as soon as the cabinet is confirmed by the 
parliament. President Sulayman admonished against the national-dialogue 
body taking the prerogatives of the cabinet while attempting to enact reform. 
This sentiment was echoed by the ex-PM Salim al-Hoss who argued that the 
body, which was formed under special circumstances that have changed now, 
should be dissolved in favor of the cabinet that is supposed to be the ultimate 
arbitrator. If needed, thorny issues could also be referred to the legislature for 
adjudication.32
6.4 Conclusion: Mending the ties, rapprochement, and 
more political power
Tensions were defused after a series of groundbreaking reconciliatory meet-
ings. On 25 November 2009 a reconciliatory meeting took place at the presi-
dential palace in B‘abda between ‘Aun and Jumblatt, the first since Jumblatt’s 
visit to ‘Aun in Paris mid-April 2005. While the cabinet officially approved 
the policy statement, a watershed reconciliatory meeting between ‘Aun and 
cardinal Sfeir took place after the two exchanged bitter rhetoric for over three 
years.33
 After the policy statement was approved by the drafting committee and 
the ‘Id al-Adha holiday was over, on 30 November 2009, Nasrallah dropped 
a bomb: he held a press conference in order to introduce Hizbullah’s new 
Manifesto or ‘Political Document (al-wathiqa al-siyasiyya)’, which resulted 
from its eighth conclave that was held in the summer-autumn of 2009. This is 
most likely the best proof of Hizbullah’s continuous identity construction and 
reconstruction, bearing in mind the dictum that the party changes as circum-
stances themselves change.
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7 The Eighth Conclave: A New 
Manifesto (November 2009)
This chapter surveys Hizbullah’s identity construction from the time of the 
propagation of its first Manifesto, the Open Letter in 1985, passing through all 
of its eight clandestine conclaves, to the publication of its second watershed 
Manifesto in 2009. I begin by analyzing the Open letter.
7.1 The salient points of the Open Letter
Hizbullah’s political declarations, al-‘Ahd, the discourse of its leaders and 
cadres, and most notably the Open Letter specify the constituents of the 
party’s political ideology: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic state; relations 
with Christians, anti-Zionism, pan-Islamism, anti-imperialism, and jihad 
and martyrdom.1 Hizbullah employs Qur’anic legitimization of its political 
ideology in the form of Qur‘anic verses to justify its stance. One may notice 
that only the first section of the ‘Open Letter’ explicitly refers to Hizbullah’s 
religious ideology: belief in Shi‘a Islam, wilayat al-faqih, and jihad in the way 
of God.
Oppressors and oppressed
The concept of oppressors (mustakbirin) and oppressed (mustad‘afin) is cen-
tral to a proper understanding of Hizbullah’s political ideology. Although Hiz-
bullah seems to employ an exclusivist discourse2 in which it classifies people 
according to the Qur’anic classification/dichotomy of Hizbullah (The Party 
of God) (5:56) or Hizb al-Shaytan (The Party of the Devil) (58: 19), Hizbullah 
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uses the Qur’anic term or Islamic expression of oppressed and reproduces it 
as an all-inclusive concept in order to uphold political and social justice. On 
the face of it, it appears that Hizbullah is using Marxist terminology, which is 
translated or interpreted in Islamic terms along the lines of economic, politi-
cal, and social justice, thus producing a kind of Islamic socialism, as some 
scholars have claimed.3
 However, Hizbullah clearly argues in the Open Letter and its political dec-
larations that its friends are the oppressed of the entire world, irrespective of 
their color, race, or religion. The party interprets and applies the contempo-
rary concept of mustad‘af by stressing that it is a Qur’anic concept that came 
to prominence with the advent of the Islamic Revolution. Hizbullah empha-
sizes that this usage conveys and is in conformity with its identity as an Islam-
ic jihadi movement struggling to address and redress the injustices that the 
oppressed suffer from. However, the party clarifies that its usage of the term 
mustad‘af is different from the political concept that is used by the socialists 
to refer to the poor peasants or the proletariat, the Qur’anic concept being 
more encompassing and holistic in its orientation because it touches upon 
the existential level of oppression and offers prescriptions and remedies in 
dealing with the oppressors and warding them off. Hizbullah emphasizes that 
mustad‘afin applies to the wronged, unjustly treated, tyrannized, and impov-
erished who do not own their daily bread, and who are oppressed in their 
freedom, dignity, and endeavors without any consideration whether they 
are Christians or Muslims. Therefore, Hizbullah’s political ideology stresses 
the universality of the Qur’anic concept – as opposed to the specificity of the 
Marxist concept – that cuts across class, cultural, and religious cleavages.
 Even though Ayatullah Fadlallah is not part of the main establishment 
of Hizbullah, Hizbullah might have been influenced by Fadlallah’s views on 
oppression. The point of convergence is that both Fadlallah’s and Hizbullah’s 
Islamic theory of oppression differ from liberation theology. Although libera-
tion theology places the oppressed, marginalized, discriminated minorities, 
women, workers, etc. at the center of its discourse, siding with the oppressed 
in their struggle for their rights, it does not call for an overall Christianization 
of society nor does it aim at establishing a religiously based society and politi-
cal system. Rather, liberation theology builds on religious sources reinterpret-
ing them for secular-Marxist aims by supporting the struggle of the oppressed 
“wretched of the earth” for social justice. In spite of that, there seems to be a 
considerable difference between the two views since Fadlallah’s political-ideo-
logical legitimization conveys specificity in his characterization of oppression 
that is at variance with Hizbullah, especially his Qur’anic legitimizations that 
distinguish between two groups of the oppressed. It seems as if Fadlallah is 
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insinuating a distinction between negligent, idle oppressed who let grass grow 
under their feet and do not even exercise persuasive jihad, on the one hand, 
and committed oppressed who mobilize in order to confront their oppressors 
(smaller military jihad) or alter their condition of oppression by emigrating 
to the Muslim heartland, if they are capable of doing so, on the other.
Anti-Zionism
Hizbullah’s anti-Zionist political ideology often seems to conflate Jewish 
identity with Zionist ideology, thus equating Jews with Zionists. Also, there 
seems to be a contradiction between Hizbullah’s views concerning the people 
of the book and how it treats the Jews in Israel. However, the Open Letter and 
the political declarations clearly state that Hizbullah equates all Israelis with 
Zionists. Further, Hizbullah’s al-‘Ahd and the discourse of its leaders clarify 
that the party does not discriminate against the Jews as a race or religion 
and it would accord them their human and civil rights as the constitution of 
Medina had done, in spite of their discouraging Qur’anic and historical prec-
edents of treachery, hypocrisy, and breaking the covenant with the Prophet 
and fighting him at Khaybar.
 Hizbullah’s doctrinal behavior is also warranted by Khumayni’s ideology 
that distinguished between the Jews living in Muslim countries under Muslim 
rule and the Zionists in Israel. Simply stated, Hizbullah’s political ideology 
considers that there are no Jews in Israel, only Zionists. That is why, the Zion-
ists can be driven out and their country annihilated. From this stance, Hizbul-
lah unleashed its venom towards the ‘Zionist Entity’ that has occupied Pales-
tine by military force. Hizbullah characterizes Israel as an aggressive, racist, 
expansionist, anti-humanist, cancerous gland instated by Western colonial 
powers in Muslim heartland. Hizbullah’s political ideology conveys no recog-
nition of Israel, calls for wiping it out of existence, and stipulates a continual 
commitment to the liberation of Palestine. This political-ideological stance 
mirrors that of the Islamic Revolution: “Today Iran, and tomorrow Palestine”, 
i.e. the liberation of Iran from the Shah would be followed by the liberation 
of Palestine from the Zionists. From a principal and doctrinal perspective, 
Hizbullah’s political ideology seeks to restore Arab-Muslim historical rights 
in Palestine and is totally against any cease-fire, truce, land for peace, peace 
negotiations, or normalization of relations with Israel.
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   157 26-4-2011   13:42:42
1587 The Eighth Conclave: A New Manifesto (November 2009)
Pan-Islamism
Hizbullah’s political ideology heeds Imam Khumayni’s call for pan-Islamism, 
especially in the wake of what he termed the worldwide conspiracy against 
the unity of the Muslims. Hizbullah’s political ideology has always called for 
unity, both in the Islamic and domestic fronts, in order to avoid the dangers of 
discord. In its Open Letter, Hizbullah allotted section 22, entitled “God is with 
the Unity of the Muslims”, to advocating pan-Islamism in order to render 
special attention to the dangers of discord, stressing a revolutionary distinc-
tion between upright Muslim religious scholars and the corrupt ones, or state 
jurists who follow the injunctions of the imperialist colonizers by applying 
the precept of divide and conquer. Hizbullah based its call for the unity of 
Muslims and warding off of fitna on a host of Qur’anic verses: (3:103); (6:159); 
(2:191); (2:193); (8:28); (8:73).
 On the basis of what has been presented in section 2.5, it seems that the 
conspiracy theory has governed a lot of Hizbullah’s visions. That is why Hiz-
bullah considered any political or military dispute between Sunnis and Shi‘as 
as an oppressor-colonizer’s conspiracy aimed at spreading discord and dis-
sention among the Muslims. Thus, Hizbullah blames internal discord on the 
West. Hizbullah has repeatedly warned against this and called upon the Mus-
lims to uphold common grounds that ultimately lead to enforcing the power 
of the Muslims in the face of the mounting challenges facing the umma.
 Hizbullah’s discourse is general, in the sense that it does not give specific 
examples on Sunni-Shi‘ite disagreements, since this would lead to discord, 
when Hizbullah’s aim is to unite all the Muslims. However, Hizbullah’s efforts 
to unify the Muslims remained on a theoretical level as a kind of persua-
sive smaller jihad by the tongue and heart, rather than real Sunni-Shi‘a unity, 
mainly due to mutually branding each other with infidelity (khutab al-tak-
fir) and the disintegration that the Islamic community was passing through. 
Nevertheless, in the local Lebanese context ‘The Union of Muslim ‘Ulama’4 
has covered some grounds on the way to unifying Islamic work among the 
Sunni and Shi‘a ‘ulama as well as their respective populace. Hizbullah argues 
that respecting the jurisprudential differences among the Sunni and Shi‘ites 
does not preclude unity and cooperation among the Sunni and Shi‘a Islamists 
on common political-ideological concepts such as anti-imperialism, anti-
Zionism, ‘the liberation of Jerusalem’, etc. In fact, such political-ideological 
concepts forged a unity of interests and common goals between Hizbullah 
and Sunni Islamists such as the Lebanese Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami and 
Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya5, as well as Palestinian Sunni Islamists, who all receive 
material support from Iran.
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Anti-imperialism
Hizbullah stresses that it is exercising its legitimate right of defending the 
rights and the dignity of the umma by confronting its basic enemies: the US, 
France, and Israel. Imam Khumayni clarified that the sensitivity of the Irani-
ans is not towards the American people, rather the American government.6 
Thus, Hizbullah is against Westoxification7 and does not practice xenophobia 
(antipathy to the West and East). Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s Westoxification is 
rooted in its hatred to the US administration, not the US people.
 Hizbullah employs a specific reading of Khumayni since it took one aspect, 
namely reforming the individual before reforming others, and integrated it in 
another debate as a critique of Western concepts of revolution. By this, Hiz-
bullah intended to convey the superiority of the Islamic order – that is holis-
tically concerned with all aspects of life, especially the spiritual dimension 
– over the materialist outlook of the East and West, socialism and capitalism. 
Hizbullah does not address the assumption that Western capitalism is rooted 
in specific cultural and societal traits.
 Thus, Hizbullah’s political-ideology claims a sense of moral superiority 
vis-à-vis the West. By building a holistic, coalescent individual, Hizbullah 
purports that the project of the Islamic Revolution does not aim at modern-
izing Islam, but rather that Islam aspires to Islamize modernity, which poses 
a binary threat to materialism and rationalism that are found in the West. 
According to Hizbullah, this is what Islam has to offer in response.
Jihad and martyrdom
Hizbullah distinguishes between smaller military jihad and greater jihad, rel-
egating the role of the former to defensive jihad in the battlefield against the 
enemies of Islam and the latter to the internal struggle against one’s self. Hiz-
bullah practices the smaller military jihad against the local enemies of Islam, 
the political Maronites, as well as against the regional and international ene-
mies – Israel, France, and the US. Hizbullah emphasizes the ideological-polit-
ical dimension of greater jihad whereby mere membership of the Hizbullah 
amounts to engaging in the greater jihad in the generic, overall encompassing 
metaphorical sense of membership in the community of ‘the son’s of Hiz-
bullah’s umma’. By this Hizbullahis would accomplish their legitimate politi-
cal responsibility (taklif). Therefore, Hizbullah amplifies the greater jihad to 
encompass all stages of membership in Hizbullah’s activity. Employing a 
high-level theological discourse, Nasrallah distinguishes between greater 
jihad and smaller jihad arguing along the lines of Khumayni that the greater 
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jihad should be practiced before engaging in the smaller military jihad. Based 
on Khumayni and Fadlallah, it could be inferred that Hizbullah’s conception 
of greater jihad, as spiritual-transcendental jihad, aims at constructing a dis-
tinct Islamic identity of the individual.
 Hizbullah consciously extolls martyrdom as a religiously sanctioned legiti-
mate defensive jihadi act conducted in order to face a superior invading or 
occupying army equipped with a high-tech arsenal. While Hizbullah views 
the reward of martyrdom as eternal life in heaven, it vilifies suicide as a ticket 
to hell in a moment of despair, hopelessness, and frustration. Hizbullah legiti-
mizes its martyrdom operations on the basis of religious edicts and reiterates 
its prohibition of conducting them if the same objectives could be realized by 
smaller military jihad.
The obsoleteness of the Open Letter
The events that have occurred since 1985 changed some of the basic details 
of Hizbullah’s vision, especially after the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 and 
after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, which 
led to the emergence of a unipolar system and New World Order headed by 
the US. In Hizbullah’s reading, this garnered more and more support for Israel 
from the US and the international community at the expense of the Arabs, 
and specifically the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these events 
acted as catalysts to change Hizbullah’s orientation and tactics, as well as some 
of its near- and medium-range interests and targets. Indeed, the intellectual 
foundation and background to Hizbullah’s Manifesto did not change much 
because it is based upon jihad against Israel and its allies, spearheaded by the 
US and the UK.8 Also, Hizbullah’s classification of foes and friends has under-
gone a radical revision dictated by domestic changes in Lebanon and the 
regional and international state attitudes towards the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran. However, Hizbullah’s animosity towards Israel and its existence remains 
a fixity in Hizbullah’s thinking, at least on the rhetorical level.9
7.2 Hizbullah’s eight conclaves
First three conclaves
Bearing this in mind, in 1989 Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the 
identity of its leaders and cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the 
post of the secretary-general and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   160 26-4-2011   13:42:43
1617.2 Hizbullah’s eight conclaves
Hizbullah’s first secretary-general and the nomination of a Shura council that 
included Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, one of the founding members of the party.10
 Starting 22 May 1991, Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid 
‘Abbas Al-Musawi as its second secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim 
as his deputy. Unlike the first conclave in which the seven-member Shura 
council was nominated, in the second conclave they were elected. The con-
clave set written moral precepts upon which dialogue would be conducted 
with the Christians.11 Thus, the most salient decision of the conclave was Hiz-
bullah’s infitah. This development was reflected in Hizbullah’s 1991 political 
program, authored by Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi. In the early summer of 1993, 
Hizbullah held its third conclave, in which it re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasral-
lah as its secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as deputy secretary-
general. It is important to note that the Islamic Resistance was rewarded by 
electing Hizbullah’s ‘Central Military Commander’, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, 
as one of the seven-members of the Shura council.12
Fourth conclave
In July 1995, Hizbullah held its fourth conclave. Some of the basic organiza-
tional changes that Hizbullah made were the following: 1) The Politburo was 
renamed as the ‘political council’ and its jurisdiction was enlarged; 2) The 
creation of the ‘Jihadi council’, headed by Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, the 
only new member of the Shura council; 3) The ‘executive council’ replaced the 
‘executive Shura’ with, more or less, the same jurisdictions; 4) In order to eval-
uate Hizbullah’s experience in the parliament, the party formed a new body 
called the ‘parliamentary bloc council’. In addition to its pledge to liberate 
Lebanese occupied land from the Israeli army, Hizbullah reiterated its com-
mitment to continuing dialogue to consolidate ties with all the constituents of 
the Lebanese myriad. The secretary-general and his deputy were re-elected. 
Hajj Hasan Khalil was elected as Nasrallah’s political aide or advisor and MP 
Muhammad Ra‘d as the head of the ‘political council’. Shaykh Nabil Qawuq 
replaced Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine13 as Hizbullah’s political representative 
in the South; MP Muhammad Yaghi was elected as the party’s political repre-
sentative in the Biqa‘; and ‘Ali D‘un remained in his post as Hizbullah’s politi-
cal representative in Beirut. Nayef Krayyem replaced ‘Ali Rashid as the head 
of the party’s Central Information Office, while the latter became the head 
of a specialized committee within the political council; and Abdallah Qasir 
remained the head of the executive council.14
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Fifth conclave
Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a politi-
cal declaration issued on 24 January 1998. On 30 January a violent military 
confrontation erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s support-
ers, who occupied Hizbullah’s religious seminary in ‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak, 
by military force. The bloody face-off – which resulted in some casualties, 
the most important being the deaths of a Christian army lieutenant and ex-
Hizbullah MP Khudr Tlays, Tufayli’s son–in-law, and many others wounded – 
ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and the Lebanese state’s 
issuing of an arrest warrant against Tufayli. However, till this day, he is still 
at large.
 After solving the problem of internal discord, Hizbullah held its fifth con-
clave between 20 June and the end of July 1998. Nasrallah was elected for a 
third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal 
bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary-general cannot serve for 
more than two consecutive terms. Shaykh Na‘im Qasim was elected as deputy 
secretary-general; Hajj Hasan Khalil as Nasrallah’s political aide; Muhammad 
Ra‘d as the head of the political council; and Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine 
as the head of the executive council. Thus, out of sixteen incumbents, seven 
were elected to the Shura council, the ones who harmoniously and efficiently 
could work together, according to Shura council member Muhammad Ra‘d. 
Ra‘d clarified that the party evaluated its performance on four main junc-
tures: 1) the 1996 Israeli ‘Grapes of Wrath’ and means to boost Hizbullah’s 
military readiness in any future confrontation with Israel, especially in light 
of the deterioration in the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement 
between Israel and the Arabs; 2) al-Tufayli’s uprising and its repercussions; 3) 
the 1998 municipal elections; 4) the 1996 legislative elections. Ra‘d added that 
the conclave also discussed the necessity of rehabilitating the party’s cadres 
culturally and politically. Hizbullah’s leaders also discussed the most efficient 
means to attract leading personalities in the social, economic, artistic, and 
intellectual domains to the party, without being organizationally tied to it, 
thus guaranteeing their independence. The Shura council is incumbent on 
following the progress on this matter and reporting to the rest of the cadres 
the progress achieved in this regard. Ra‘d stressed that in domestic Lebanese 
politics, Hizbullah pursues ‘the Lebanese national interest’ over any narrow 
interest in its alliances and dealings with the state and the political groupings 
in the country. In answering criticisms about Hizbullah’s alleged authoritar-
ian nature of appointing its leadership and cadres, Ra‘d claimed that making 
drastic changes or a complete overhaul to the leadership and cadres in every 
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conclave would lead to instability, rather than being conducive to democratic 
practice.15
Sixth conclave
Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on 30 July 2001 had a different flavor. The 
party evaluated its eighteen-year struggle against the occupying Israeli forces 
that withdrew in May 2000 due to the relentless Lebanese resistance and war 
of attrition spearheaded by the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah’s military wing. 
Concerning the party’s organizational changes, Nasrallah was re-elected for 
life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad Nureddine (Imad 
Mughniyyé’s pseudonym) replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin 
Shakar in the Shura council. Hizbullah placed its media institutions under 
the direct command of Nasrallah, aided by the head of the political council 
and that of the executive council. This was done in order to upgrade the role 
of Hizbullah’s media, and pursue its ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah 
abolished its central planning council, and strengthened internal audit and 
accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, the roles and duties of the 
municipal councils were expanded (horizontally) and upgraded (vertically).16 
Most importantly, the party took the decision to revise its Open Letter in light 
of the changing political arena and dynamics since 1985. This would only bear 
fruit in 2009.
The controversy over a new Open Letter, Manifesto
Acknowledging the difficulty of implementing the stipulations of the Open 
Letter in the Lebanese public sphere and its clash with the political system, 
in October 1994 Nasrallah hinted at a possible rewording of the Open Letter: 
“The Open Letter conveyed general precepts and general guidelines of our 
identity… some time ago, we have reviewed the Open Letter and I do not 
consider that there are major alterations that have occurred to our overall 
doctrines and orientations although we should account for the changes and 
eventualities that took place in the previous years.”17
 In October 2002, rumor surfaced that Hizbullah was in the final phases 
of launching a new updated version of its Open Letter in conformity with 
an earlier decision taken in its sixth conclave. The rumor was substantiated 
by Qasim’s interview in the Daily Star on 28 October 2002. Qasim argued, 
“Much has happened and much has changed between 1985 and now... Our 
basic principles remain the same because they are the heart of our movement, 
but many other positions have changed due to evolving circumstances devel-
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oping around us.” Locally, Qasim stressed that Hizbullah’s position towards 
the Phalangists had obviously changed, stressing that they were now partners 
in dialogue. Regionally, concerning Hizbullah’s stance towards Israel, Qasim 
affirmed Hizbullah’s outright animosity towards the ‘Zionist entity’ and the 
‘Small Satan’ from an immutable, doctrinal perspective: “Since many positions 
have changed, we need to be flexible and change ours too… But the resistance 
against Israel has been the core of our belief and that has never changed” 
since “the struggle against Israel remains the central rationale of Hizbullah’s 
existence.” Internationally, Qasim argued that Hizbullah’s relationship with 
the West had witnessed many changes in line with its infitah policy and the 
West’s changing perception towards the party, especially France: “The French 
were considered our enemy because they attacked our bases in the Bekaa… 
France’s position has changed towards us, so we have to change ours.” How-
ever, he added that Hizbullah’s perception towards the US18 was still the same, 
since the party still regarded it as the ‘Great Satan’.19
 Leenders observes: “Even earlier hints of a fundamental revision of the par-
ty’s outlook – such as amending its now largely obsolete founding document 
– have failed to materialise.”20 Well, not quite. In February 2003, a leading 
cadre – who is currently a member of the Shura council – told that the newly 
reconstructed, updated, and modified Open Letter/Manifesto was ready but 
that its launching had been postponed due to the deteriorating regional and 
international situations and the imminent US-led invasion of Iraq (March 
2003).21 Keeping in mind that the Open Letter delineates Hizbullah’s local, 
regional, and international stance, it seems that the regional dimension froze 
its launching for more than six years. Sobelman aptly remarks: “Today Hiz-
bollah views the original platform [Open Letter] as outdated… [There is] an 
increasingly apparent metamorphosis [identity reconstruction] in the orga-
nization at the declaratory level and in the practical sphere… [Hizbollah] 
has traveled from the time of its founding and its more recent decision to 
choose pragmatic integration into the Lebanese system over pure ideology.”22 
Sobelman attributes this stance to Hizbullah’s infitah policy. He argues that 
Hizbullah’s decision to publish a new and updated version of its Open Letter, 
“which according to Na‘im Qasim will be more moderate in its relations with 
the Lebanese Christians and Western countries like France, a country under-
stood to oppose against Hizbollah’s inclusion on the European Union’s list of 
terror organizations, is no coincidence.”23 Whatever the case, these instances 
illustrate Hizbullah’s serious attempts to aim at identity construction and 
reconstruction, since over the years its ideology, political strategy, and future 
outlook has undergone drastic and dramatic changes.
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Hizbullah’s seventh conclave
From early June to 16 August 2004, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. Unlike 
the previous conclaves where information was leaked to the media, hardly 
any information was disseminated. It seems that Hizbullah’s extra clandestine 
tactic maybe had to do with the dismantling of a network of underground 
operatives allegedly linked to Israel as well as the assassination attempts the 
party’s rank and file suffered from in the previous two years.24
 It is worth mentioning that the followers of Subhi al-Tufayli released a 
political declaration chastising the conclave and asking to reinstate him and 
his followers to their ‘natural, normal position of leadership’ in the party after 
being ousted due to conspiracies that occurred a few years back. The politi-
cal declaration added that the convening of this conclave offered a historical 
chance to conduct honest elections in Hizbullah’s rank and file in order to 
choose leaders who would retain Hizbullah’s earlier glory as a religious, Shi‘ite 
social movement. The declaration accused Nasrallah of planting discord in 
the Shi‘ite house (milieu) by his “total hegemony and tyrannical control” over 
the party and its capabilities and directing them in a way that was not con-
ducive to the Shi‘ites, for instance, as exemplified by the criticisms directed 
towards Ayatullah Fadlallah in favor of some (Iranian) personalities and mar-
aji‘ (pl. of marja‘).25
 Hizbullah released a political document in the form of two political dec-
larations. The first political declaration conveyed that no changes took place 
within Hizbullah’s seven-member Shura council, which included the follow-
ing members: Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-general and the 
head of the Jihadi council; Shaykh Na‘im Qasim deputy secretary-general; 
Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine head of the executive council; Sayyid Ibrahim 
Amin Al-Sayyid, the head of the political council; Hajj Hasan Khalil, Nasral-
lah’s political aide or advisor; Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik head of the religio-
judicial council, or the one “responsible for the dossier of the shar‘i matters 
and Islamic scholars’ affairs”; and Sayyid Jawad Nureddine (Imad Mughni-
yyé’s pen name/alias). In its second political document, Hizbullah listed four 
priorities and eight basic modifications or amendments. The most salient 
amendment was Hizbullah’s division of the south into two administrative geo-
graphical areas: the first south of the Litani river, and the second to its north. 
Both function under the auspices of one central organizational leader in order 
to secure organizational structures that are capable of improving local admin-
istration and activate polarization. In addition, Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd 
was appointed as the head of Hizbullah’s social institutions and Shaykh Hasan 
Izzeddine, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed 
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as Hizbullah’s political representative in the south. He was replaced by Nasral-
lah’s media aide or advisor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif.26
First woman appointed to a prominent political role
In the beginning of December 2004, and in light of the decisions taken in Hiz-
bullah’s seventh conclave, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, appoint-
ed the head of its Women’s Organization, Rima Fakhry, as a member of its 
eighteen-member political council (Politburo). Also, Hizbullah appointed 
Wafa’ Hutayt, the person responsible for political programs in al-Nour radio, 
as deputy of Hizbullah’s Central Information Office.27 These two moves came 
as a result of internal debates among Hizbullah cadres and of amending some 
of the party’s bylaws.28
 As a practical political dimension, Hizbullah founded its Jihadi council 
in 1995 in order to closely monitor and supervise its jihadi activities. The 
Jihadi council gained more importance after the May 2000 nearly complete 
Israeli withdrawal, since in its seventh conclave, the secretary-general himself 
became its head. However, this turned out to be a hoax and a smart maneuver 
aimed at hiding the real identity and function of the infamous Imad Mugh-
niyyé – Hizbullah’s ex-military cadre on whose head the US put a $ 25 million 
reward – who was assassinated by a car explosion in Damascus on 12 Febru-
ary 2008.
Hizbullah’s eighth conclave
The eighth conclave was supposed to take place in 2007 – in accordance with 
the every three years dictum – but, in conformity with Realpolitik, the situ-
ation on the ground dictated another course of action. The repercussions of 
the July 2006 War and fear of assassination of the leaders and cadres were 
conducive factors that kept on postponing the eighth conclave, till the leader-
ship took the decision to hold it in spite of all the political and security threats. 
Starting the summer of 2009 and lasting for around four months, thousands 
of middle- and high-rank party cadres embarked on an intensive evaluation 
of previous policies through a long and thorough political, organizational 
workshop that witnessed, in conformity with the party’s scalar principle, the 
election of the primary electoral college that elects its representatives to the 
Shura council.29 On 19 November 2009, the party released the following polit-
ical declaration:
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Hizbullah ended its general congress, which lasted for several months30, whereby 
a new political document was adopted, the second of its kind after the Open Letter 
of 1985. It also approved a number of organizational amendments commensurate 
with the nature of new developments in its movement over the last few years at 
various levels. The election of members of the Shura (consultative) council took 
place and their responsibilities were nominated for the new mandate. They are the 
following:
1. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, secretary-general.
2. Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, deputy secretary-general.
3. Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, chairman of the Religio-Judicial Council.
4. Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, chairman of the Political Council.
5. Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, chairman of the Executive Council.
6. Hajj Husayn Khalil, political aide to the secretary-general.
7. MP Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, head of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc.
The secretary-general of Hizbullah will hold a press conference in the next few 
days, God willing, to announce the new political document.31
What the party did not reveal was that an eighth member was added to the 
Shura council. However, fearing assassination32, the name of the leading 
resistance cadre in the council was not revealed. Electing Hajj Muhammad 
Ra‘d is telling since it reflects an innovative trend that accords parliamentary 
work a great status. It could also be regarded as a personal recognition for all 
the hard work and dedication on his part since he represented the party in the 
national dialogue sessions after a failed assassination attempt on Nasrallah’s 
life made the latter shun public events. This move is also indicative of the role 
Hizbullah is according to its MPs in order to reveal its new face in light of the 
new manifesto, since many of them have already met EU diplomats, includ-
ing foreign ministers and ex-foreign policy chief Solana. In a similar vein, the 
party established a special unit in an attempt to boost its involvement in the 
cabinet’s work and take an active role in the administrative apparatus of the 
state in an endeavor to stamp out corruption. The great achievement of the 
eighth conclave is par excellence the new Manifesto, rather than the slight 
changes to the party’s organizational structure or structural formations.
 Finally Hizbullah’s decision in its sixth conclave bore fruit. After almost a 
quarter of a century, on 30 November 2009 the party revealed its new Mani-
festo/Political Platform delineating its domestic, regional, and international 
policy dynamics.33 The party’s spokesman, Sayyid Ibrahim al-Musawi, told 
me: “It will send waves of awareness about the party and help shatter nega-
tive, preconceived ideas.”34 The Manifesto also addresses issues such as the 
resistance; political, social, economic, administrative, and judicial reform; 
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and contains a stance on the abolition of political sectarianism and the imple-
mentation of the Ta’if Agreement. The Manifesto outlines the party’s political 
and intellectual vision in light of a dynamic world.
 From the perspective of the party’s call to the establishment of a strong, 
capable, and just state, Hizbullah started to give the Dahiya a facelift a month 
before announcing the Manifesto, whereby law and order were being imposed 
by the Lebanese police and all breaches to public facilities and criminal offenc-
es were penalized. As part of its campaign, entitled ‘Order is an essential part 
of Faith’ and headed by the general coordinator Sayyid Husayn Fadlallah, 
the party founded a new NGO called ‘Qiyam (Values)’ in order to spread and 
inculcate civic consciousness among the population through a combination 
of Qur’anic verses, hadith prohibitions, and popular sayings and aphorisms 
exhorting the masses to employ their religious discipline in order to uphold 
law and order. Some of the banners and slogans read: “It is prohibited to make 
use of water and electricity through illegal means; God has organized your 
daily dealings; encroaching on public order is a haram; abiding by traffic signs 
is a measure of intelligence; be careful in using water, etc.”35 The same mes-
sage was reiterated again in a lengthy speech by Nasrallah on the seventh day 
of Muharram, where he stressed to his followers the religious duty to abide by 
law and order, citing a consensus among the jurisprudents to the obligation 
of complying with laws that uphold public order.36 So no wonder that in its 
eighth conclave Hizbullah added new political, organizational, media, and 
cultural units in order to accommodate this new development. The need for 
drastic organizational changes concomitant with the party’s rotation policy, 
not only in its military structure but also in its civil organs, has been growing 
ever since the end of the July 2006 War, where great deficiencies have been 
noted in this regard.37
7.3 Analysis of the new Manifesto
Hizbullah’s world view
Hizbullah’s world view did not drastically alter in its 2009 Manifesto. In line 
with its 1985 Open Letter, its first Manifesto, it replaced the bipolarity of the 
West facing the East with Imam Khumayni’s ideological bipolarity that divides 
the world into the Qur’anic notions of ‘oppressors’ and ‘oppressed’. Hizbullah 
upheld its ‘liberation theology’ and called for the ‘unity of the oppressed’:
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According to Hizbullah’s vision and approach, the criteria of divergence and con-
flict are based upon political-moral grounds, primarily between the arrogant and 
wretched, the oppressor and oppressed, the haughty occupier and a pursuer of 
freedom.38
The central goal of the American hegemony resides in dominating the nations 
politically, economically, culturally and through all aspects… as it is the base of 
controlling the world economy not to mention resorting to all merciless, inhu-
mane and unethical means including the use of extreme military power whether 
directly or through a mediator. To achieve this goal, Washington… provided the 
Zionist entity with stability guarantees, in such a way that allows this entity to play 
the role of a cancerous gland that absorbs and sucks out all the energies and capa-
bilities of the nation as to destruct its ambitions and aims.39
We look with great interest and appreciation at the liberalization, independence 
and dominance rejection experiences of Latin America countries. We see vast 
grounds for overlap between the endeavors of these countries and the resistance 
movements of our region, overlap which should lead to the creation of a more 
equitable and balanced international order… our motto ‘Unity of the Oppressed’ 
shall remain as one of the pillars of political thought, shaping our understanding, 
relationships and attitudes towards international issues.40
Hizbullah neither changed its stance towards the US nor Israel. In rhetoric, 
although the ideological slogans of the ‘Great Satan’ and the ‘Small Satan’ were 
dropped, the ‘Zionist entity’ and the ‘cancerous gland’ remained the most 
used descriptions of Israel.
The unlimited US support for ‘Israel’ and its cover for the ‘Israeli’ occupation of 
Arab lands, in addition to the American domination of international institutions, 
the double standards in the criteria of issuing and applying international poli-
cies… puts the American administration in the position of the aggressor and holds 
it responsible for producing chaos in the international political system.41
We categorically reject any compromise with ‘Israel’ or recognizing its legitimacy. 
This position is definitive, even if everyone recognizes ‘Israel’.42
In the question-and-answers session of the press conference, Nasrallah was 
careful to fend off any accusations of anti-Semitism against Hizbullah: “I 
have clearly stated in the Manifesto that our problem with the Israelis is not 
that they are Jews; our problem with them is not religious, ethnical, or racial. 
Rather, the core of the problem is that they are occupiers who are raping our 
land and holy places.”43
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 However, Hizbullah’s stance towards NATO’s Western European countries 
and the EU, which now comprises 27 countries, did undergo serious revi-
sions. Nevertheless, based on a common historical experience of war and 
occupation, Hizbullah wanted to uphold its cherished distinction between 
‘resistance’ and ‘terrorism’:
The Bush Administration decided to establish a correlation between ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘national resistance’, and this in order to disarm the resistance of its humani-
tarian legitimacy and its righteousness of cause, and to justify the waging of all 
forms of wars against it… ‘Terrorism’ was transformed into an American alibi for 
hegemony.44
As for the European policies (EU), these hang between being barely effective on 
one side and being a follower of the American policies on the other, and this actu-
ally leads to the hollowing out of the moderate drift in Europe at the expense of 
and in service to the “Atlantic drift” (NATO) of colonial backgrounds.
The EU’s following of US policies constitutes a strategic mistake that will increase 
the problems of the Middle East and the world and will ultimately lead to more 
problems and complications in the European-Arab relations.
Europe holds responsibility for the damage it has caused due to the colonial 
“inheritance” it has left behind – of which our people still suffer the consequences 
and results.
Since some European people have a history in resisting the occupier, Europe’s ethi-
cal and humanitarian duty – in addition to being a political duty – is to acknowl-
edge the right of the people to resisting the occupier, on the basis of distinguishing 
between resistance and terrorism.
The preconditions of stability and cooperation in European-Arab relations require 
a European approach that is more independent, just, and objective (than that of 
the US).45
Thematic analysis
The 71-page 2009 Manifesto begins with a “Foreword” and is divided into 
three chapters: “Hegemony and Mobilization”; “Lebanon”; and “Palestine and 
the Settlement Negotiations.” I will highlight the most salient statements in 
each.
Lashing the US and Israel
Hizbullah contends that the US’s unipolar hegemony shatters world balance, 
security, and stability. The party claims that the US administration’s unwaver-
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ing support of Israel puts the former in the position of enmity towards the 
Arab and Muslim nation.
 Starting in the “Foreword” Hizbullah admonishes:
We are witnessing great historical changes that point in the direction of a retreat of 
the US role and decline in the hegemony of the Zionist Entity (Israel)… The path 
of resistance and opposition to hegemony, which is based upon military victories 
and political successes, is gaining ground (p. 11).
In Chapter 1 entitled “Hegemony and Mobilization”, Section 1: “The World 
and Western-American Hegemony”, Hizbullah continues lashing the US, and 
to a lesser extent, Israel.
Globalization reached a one-time high when it took a military shape through war 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza (p. 18)… American terrorism is the basis 
of all terrorism in the world (p. 22)… The grave fiasco of the US war on resistance 
(movements) in Lebanon and Palestine through Israeli hands led to the deteriora-
tion of the US credibility on the international scene (p. 22)…
The same trend continues in Chapter 1, Section 2, “Our Region and the Amer-
ican Plot” where Hizbullah contends that the main purpose of US colonialism 
is to exercise hegemony over the countries and their capabilities (pp. 24-6).
Lebanon and the political system
In Chapter 2: “Lebanon”, Section 1: “The Homeland”, contrary to its first Man-
ifesto, the Open Letter, Hizbullah stresses that it is against establishing can-
tons or states within the state and also in opposition to founding an Islamic 
state in Lebanon. Hizbullah regards Lebanon as its homeland par excellence:
Lebanon is our country and the country of our fathers and forefathers; it is also the 
country of our children and grandchildren and all future generations. We want it 
strong and unified… we reject partition and federalism… Lebanon is the country 
that we have offered the most precious sacrifices and the most dignified of martyrs 
for the sake of its sovereignty, honour, dignity, and the liberation of its land… (p. 
30).
However, this was not all. After Hizbullah recognized the ultimate sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity of Lebanon stressing the building of a “capable, 
strong, and just state” (p. 30), in Section 3 entitled, “The State and the Political 
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System”, the party voiced its demand to reform the political system in line 
with the Ta’if Agreement, Lebanon’s 1990 constitution:
The main ill in the Lebanese political system is political sectarianism… (p. 38) 
Consensual democracy represents a proper political formula to assure true part-
nership and contributes in opening the doors for everyone to join the phase of 
state building… (p. 39) The state that we are looking forward to taking part in is 
the one that upholds public freedoms and is concerned for national unity… (p. 40)
In Section 2 entitled “The Resistance”, Hizbullah exposes what it perceives as 
the Israeli threat calling for the adoption of a national defense to face it:
Because of its historical expansionist policy, Israel poses a perpetual existential 
danger to Lebanon…The Zionist entity, being a racist state, represents a peril to 
the very concept of multi-religious coexistence that Lebanon uniquely manifests… 
(p. 32) The perpetual Israeli military threat to Lebanon requires the founding of a 
national defence strategy… (pp. 35-36)
Lebanese-Palestinian relations
Although in Section 4, entitled “Lebanon and Palestinian-Lebanese Rela-
tions” Hizbullah is vehemently against naturalizing the Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon, it urgently calls on the Lebanese government to grant them their 
civil rights so that they can lead a dignified life while awaiting the right of 
return:
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should be accorded their civil and social 
rights in such a way to safeguard their identity and just cause, without naturalizing 
them… Upholding the Palestinians’ Right of Return and refusal of their perma-
nent settlement in Lebanon. (p. 46)
Relations with Syria and Iran
In conformity with the Open Letter and Lebanese reality, Hizbullah called on 
the Lebanese state to have privileged relations with Syria and good relations 
with Iran.
Syria has recorded a distinctive and steadfast stance in its struggle against the 
Israeli enemy. This came through its support of regional resistance movements 
amidst their most difficult of circumstances, and through seeking to concert Arab 
efforts towards securing the interests of the region and confronting its challenges. 
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We hereby emphasize the need to adhere to the distinguished relations between 
Lebanon and Syria, for this is in the common political, security and economic 
interest of both countries.46
Iran is a central and important state in the Islamic world and it is the main sup-
porter of the causes of the umma… Hizbullah considers Islamic Iran to be a focal 
nation in the Islamic world. For Iran was the country that thwarted the Zionist-
American scheme through its national revolution, supported resistance move-
ments in our region, and stood with courage and determination alongside Arab 
and Islamic causes, at the forefront of which is the Palestinian cause.47
Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism
Like its Open Letter, in its 2009 Manifesto, Hizbullah calls for pan-Arabism 
and pan-Islamism: “The Arabs should put their hands together in order to 
transcend conflicts that rupture Arab unity (pan-Arabism)…48 The Arab 
and Islamic world are facing challenges whose dangers should not be under-
mined…49
Hizbullah is an ardent advocate of the unity of the Muslims. In both Mani-
festos it called for the unity of the Muslims invoking Qur’anic verses and reli-
gious sensibilities. Section 22 of the Open Letter entitled: “God is with the 
unity of the Muslims” stressed the need to:
Be aware of the malignant colonial discord (fitna) that aims at rupturing your unity 
in order to spread sedition among you and enflame Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian feelings.
Be knowledgeable that colonialism was not able to control the natural resources 
and riches of the Muslims except after breaking up their unity… inciting Sunnis 
against the Shi‘as and vice versa. Later on the colonizer left this mission of spread-
ing dissention among the Muslims to its collaborators, be it the governing elite, 
the corrupt Muslim religious scholars (state jurists), or the feudal leaders (zu‘ama).
God is with the unity of the Muslims… It is the rock that breaks all the conspira-
cies of the oppressors; it is the hammer that crushes the evil schemes of the oppres-
sors…
Do not allow the policy of “divide and rule” to be practiced among you; rather fight 
it by recourse to the Qur’an:
“And hold fast to Allah’s bond [His religion], all of you, and do not fall apart. And 
remember Allah’s grace is upon you; how you were enemies, then He united your 
hearts [by becoming Muslims] so that you have become, by His grace, brethren. 
You were on the brink of the pit of Fire, but He saved you from it.” (3:103)
“Those who have made divisions in their religion and become sects, thou art not 
of them in anything.” (6:159)50
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In a watered-down version, the 2009 Manifesto reiterates:
We therefore remind you of the importance of unity among Muslims. The 
Almighty has said: “And hold on fast, together, to the rope of God, and be not 
separated.” (3:103) We take heed of those causes of division between the people, 
such as confessional provocations that are instigated especially between Sunnis 
and Shi‘ites. We count on the awareness of all Muslims in addressing what is being 
contrived against them at this level.”51
The Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process
Chapter III entitled, “Palestine and the Settlement Negotiations” repeats the 
same old story of the Open Letter with the same emphatic terms. Section 1; 
“The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist Entity” paints a grim picture of the 
creation of the state of Israel and the displacement of the Palestinians:
A crime against humanity was committed by the West when this extraneous entity 
(Israel) was implanted in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world, and was nur-
tured to become a hostile infiltration, standing as a leading front for Western plots 
of dominion, and posing as a base for control and dominion over the region (p. 58).
It adds that Israel is supported by the West, especially the US, branding both 
the US and Israel with ‘terrorism’:
The Zionist movement is a racist movement both in terms of thought and prac-
tice. It is the product of a despotic, authoritarian mentality the basis of which is 
founded on a Judaization project of settlement and expansion. The state entity that 
emerged from the Zionist movement has thrived through occupation, aggression, 
massacres and terrorism, all with the support and under the custody of colonial-
ist powers, particularly with the aid of the United States of America with which 
the Zionist state is strategically allied – a true partner in war, massacres and the 
practice of terrorism. The struggle that we are embarked upon against the Zionist 
project emanates from the duty of self-defence (p. 59).
In Section 2: “Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque”, Hizbullah warns that the 
serious attacks against the Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) constitute a real and 
present danger that might lead to serious consequences. Hizbullah adds that 
supporting Jerusalem and liberating it is a religious duty and a humanitarian 
and ethical duty (p. 62).
 In upholding its own resistance identity and its own model of resistance, 
Hizbullah gives legitimacy to the Palestinian resistance arguing that it is 
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“sanctioned by heavenly messages and international laws.” In the third sec-
tion entitled, “The Palestinian Resistance”, Hizbullah adds that the precepts of 
practice have proven the efficiency of military resistance to liberate the land 
and regain lost rights (p. 63):
Resistance is indeed the only viable alternative... [in 2006] the Lebanese Resis-
tance recorded a divine and historical victory, a strategic success that dramatically 
changed the shape of the conflict. This was the first defeat of its kind for the Israeli 
enemy, a gun-down to the all-time myth of an “invincible army.” (p. 64)
The fourth and final section entitled, “Settlement Negotiations”, reinforces the 
Open Letter’s dictum of no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with it, 
claiming that this policy embodies the will of the people: “We call upon the 
Arab rulers to be committed to the choices of their people by reconsidering 
the options of negotiations.” (p. 67)
Our standpoint towards the settlement process (peace negotiations)… is a posi-
tion of absolute rejection of the very foundation and principles of the settlement 
option with the Zionist entity. The settlement option is founded on legitimizing 
the Zionist entity’s existence and relinquishing seized Palestine land, an Arab and 
Islamic land. This is our immutable, permanent and final standpoint towards the 
negotiation option, one that is not subject to recoil or compromise, even if the 
entire world recognized “Israel” as a state (p. 67)… We call on the Arabs and Mus-
lims to reject all schemes for normalization with the Zionist enemy, to uphold the 
right of return of all Palestinian refugees to their lands and homes from which they 
were expelled, and to unequivocally reject all presented alternatives for Palestinian 
resettlement, compensation or relocation (p. 69).
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a good example of Hizbullah’s identity construction 
and reconstruction. It compares Hizbullah’s first and second manifestos and 
evaluates the party’s eight conclaves, all analyzed from the standpoint of the 
domestic, regional, and international dynamics. Drastic changes were noted. 
In 1985, when Hizbullah propagated its first manifesto, the party was a small 
fighting force whose overall resource mobilization was directed towards its 
war effort in fighting Israel to make it withdraw from the vast territories it 
occupied in Lebanon. In 2009, the dynamics changed. Hizbullah has become 
one of the constituent pillars of the Lebanese political system calling for its 
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reform along the lines of consensual democracy. At the time the party earned 
an Arab and Islamic recognition for liberating Lebanese territories from the 
Israeli occupation in May 2000 and for standing its grounds against the Israeli 
offensive in the 2006 July war. That is why its second Manifesto had to be 
along the lines of a pragmatic political document, rather than the ideologi-
cal utopian one propagated in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the 2009 Mani-
festo is not a political document par excellence, as Nasrallah claimed in his 
30 November 2009 press conference and as Hizbullah tried to portray it in 
its extensive media campaign; rather it has important ideological undertones 
such as the enmity towards Israel and the US. It seems Shaykh Na‘im Qasim 
was right in his 2002 predictions that Hizbullah’s hostility towards Israel and 
the US administration would not witness any change in the new Manifesto. 
However, this enmity is only in rhetoric and semantics since Hizbullah is a 
patriotic Lebanese resistance movement and does not operate in the US or 
Israel; it leaves it to the Palestinians to liberate their land, while granting them 
all kinds of moral and in-kind support, as I tried to argue in chapter four.
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8 Epilogue: Future Prospects – 
Disarmament and the Peace 
Process
Islam’s ability to dominate a state’s identity is highly contested. While powerful 
Islamic movements exist within several states in the region [Middle East], these 
groups are encountering alternative definitions of community, based on divisions 
within Islam (Shia versus Sunni), race and language (Arab versus non-Arab), or 
clan and tribe… While some of these movements and some states are trying to 
increase Islamic influence and identity in other countries, the success of these 
efforts is not assured.1
8.1 Introduction
Hizbullah’s specific religious ideology has been based upon mobilization, 
Jihad, and martyrdom, as determined by al-waliyy al-faqih, first Imam Khu-
mayni and after his death Imam Khamina’i. Based on the aforementioned and 
keeping in mind that religious ideology ultimately wields religious capital, 
one can argue that Hizbullah’s religious ideology is both 1): an exclusionary 
ideological identity based on belief in wilayat al-faqih, which is a “novel and 
almost unprecedented reinterpretation of religious canon”; and 2): a return 
to the fundamentals of Shi‘ite faith as a primary historical identity. “To most 
Islamists, Islam is the first and key identity [primary historical identity] but 
not the sole identity… In other words to grant a certain priority to the Muslim 
identity is to make a statement about the character of the challenge [problems] 
that individuals and societies face and about the nature of the solution”2, the 
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solution that is provided by Hizbullah’s adoption and application of Wilayat 
al-Faqih. In fact, belief and application of Wilayat al-Faqih is what distinguish-
es Hizbullah from other Shi‘ite political parties and Islamist movements, in 
general, thus endowing Hizbullah with a distinct religious identity stemming 
from its adherence to this specific Islamic cultural sphere that in the first place 
produced this collective unifying identity. On these grounds, wilayat al-faqih 
seems to be an elitist exclusionary doctrine that unifies the adherents of this 
distinct Shi‘ite religious identity that upholds martyrdom and victory as the 
expected fruits or rewards of jihad. Thus, building on its religious ideology, 
Hizbullah was able to accumulate religious capital based on the production 
of religious knowledge (Wilayat al-Faqih) through construction, appropria-
tion, dissemination, and adherence to the Islamic cultural sphere which com-
prises the party’s constituencies and followers. In other words, Hizbullah was 
able to manipulate and transform its religious ideology into religious capital, 
which commands following and allegiance on a doctrinal basis, by mobiliz-
ing its constituency as both a resistance identity and project identity through 
strengthening the already existing Islamic public sphere by transforming 
and changing the notions of disinherited, downtrodden, and oppressed into 
empowerment, not only through jihad and martyrdom that ultimately lead to 
victory in Hizbullah’s dictionary, but also through a shifting political strategy 
that upholds doctrinal-ideological foundations.
8.2 Hizbullah’s new face: From al-hala al-Islamiyya 
to al-saha al-Islamiyya
The transition from al-hala al-Islamiyya (Islamic religious-political sphere) 
to al-saha al-Islamiyya (Islamic cultural sphere) comports with the views of 
my interviewees from Hizbullah’s rank and file.3 In an interview conducted in 
August 2009 with Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the high-
est ranking Shi‘ite religiousus authority in Lebanon, he told me that a notice-
able transformation has occurred from al-hala al-Islamiyya to al-saha al-
Islamiyya, arguing that he is a strong advocate of the latter. He noted that the 
former was a transitory stage that has served its purpose. He explained that 
al-hala al-Islamiyya was mainly concerned with establishing an Islamic state 
where minorities, such as Christians and Jews, were treated as ahl al-dhim-
ma, i.e. residents holding limited rights and required to pay a tax in lieu of 
alms giving (zakat). Ayatullah Fadlallah clarified that in al-saha al-Islamiyya 
notions such as the Islamic state and ahl al-dhimma are ideological constructs 
that do not exist anymore.4 According to him, al-saha al-Islamiyya is a plu-
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ralistic Islamic cultural sphere where the concept of citizenship (muwatana) 
reigns; where all people have equal rights and duties and where coexistence 
and mutual respect is the main norm and asset among Lebanon’s eighteen 
ethno-confessional communities.5 My other interviewees from Hizbullah’s 
rank and file concur to the letter with Ayatullah Fadlallah’s views.
 In the 1970s and 1980s, al-hala al-Islamiyya, which was fundamentally 
concerned with doctrinal-ideological Islamization, unified various sectors of 
the Shi‘a community under the banner of an overarching Islamic ideology.6 
Members of al-hala al-Islamiyya converged and established Hizbullah in the 
wake of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Since its inception, the party 
has been keen to control the Lebanese political system, initially through a top-
down revolutionary process aimed at obtaining power and Islamizing society 
by military force. Al-hala al-Islamiyya portrayed itself primarily through Hiz-
bullah’s belief in pan-Islamism and the necessity of founding an Islamic order 
where the ‘oppressed’ reign over the ‘oppressors’. This radicalism proved futile 
in the 1980s. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah wielded power and influ-
ence over al-hala al-Islamiyya, being its godfather since the late 1960s. Many 
considered him Hizbullah’s spiritual leader, a charge both persistently and 
rightfully denied.7
 Hizbullah changes as circumstances themselves change. Al-saha al-Islami-
yya started to emerge in the early 1990s, when Hizbullah changed its political 
strategy and endeavored to control the political system through post-Islam-
ization or a bottom-up process of a gradual participation in the democratic 
system, starting with the parliament, the municipal councils, and the council 
of ministers, the main executive body of the country. Thus, the party shifted to 
acceptance of, and engagement in, the democratic process under a sectarian-
confessional political and administrative system in the wake of the emergence 
of a pluralist public sphere and mixed confessional space that dictated it to 
increase its openness toward other communities, political parties, and inter-
est groups in the Lebanese myriad.8 This led to the gradual waning of al-hala 
al-Islamiyya and contributed to the gradual growth of al-saha al-Islamiyya. 
In al-saha al-Islamiyya Hizbullah has repeatedly stated that its electoral cam-
paigns represent a consorted effort between its resistance identity, on the one 
hand, and its socio-economic, intellectual, and cultural work, on the other. 
Thus, contrary to many Islamic movements and the way Hizbullah is com-
monly perceived, the party has been holistic in its orientation by finding a 
viable solution to the socio-economic and political challenges and problems 
that its constituencies suffer from through the use of its social, economical, 
religious, and political capitals as forms of resource mobilization.
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 Al-saha al-Islamiyya is primarily concerned with Islam as culture and 
social practice. Iranian reformist president Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005) 
had a pioneering contribution in this regard since he gave prominence to cul-
ture. Khatami argued: “If freedom of thought were to be suppressed then it 
would continue to be nurtured in the minds and hearts of the people. There-
fore, the best system of government would be the one which would allow 
thought to be expressed without any limitation.”9 Khatami articulates his cul-
tural theory through the development of a ‘democratic Shi‘ite discourse’ on 
political freedom, pluralism, tolerance, and human rights. Khatami’s cultural 
reforms included the following enhancements of the Iranian public sphere: 
making civil society the subject of common discourse; easing of censorship 
on books and films; vigorous press and the releasing of dozens of new maga-
zines and newspapers; and the formation of cultural and political associa-
tions. Khatami’s domestic policy was directed towards civility and the rule of 
law, as the most salient pillars of democracy. When Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, 
Hizbullah’s secretary-general, visited Iran around mid-October 1997, Khatami 
called on the party to pursue a policy of cultural openness towards the other 
sectarian-confessional communities in Lebanon and to graduate intellectuals 
in addition to freedom fighters. Khatami’s discourse is paralleled by Nasral-
lah who argues that upholding ‘public freedoms’ are priorities that go hand 
in hand with the party’s ideology and Islamic doctrine and are conducive to 
the service of the Lebanese society at large. According to Nasrallah, the estab-
lishment of civil society in Lebanon does not contradict Hizbullah’s project, 
but is concomitant with it because one of the basic tenets of Islam urge the 
enactment of civil society.10 These claims have been reiterated in Hizbullah’s 
November 2009 Manifesto.
 The crux of Khatami’s argument is that Islam is not the normative, essen-
tialist, elusive concept; Islam is culture. From this perspective, it is interest-
ing to note that Khatami’s discourse was void of the use of the word ‘Islam’; 
in all his speeches and writings he employed culture (farhang), civilization 
(tamaddun), and religion (din). Thus, Khatami was recasting Islam in cul-
tural terms.11 To a lesser extent, the current leader of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Hizbullah’s ‘spiritual leader’ Imam Khamina’i asserted that cultural 
work is always a precursor to political and military work, and added that the 
Islamic Revolution needs to have a strong, enriching cultural background. In 
turn, Khamina’i stressed that any message, or call, or revolution, or civiliza-
tion, or culture, cannot be successfully disseminated if it is not expressed in 
artistic form12, which represents another level of discourse. Khatami identi-
fies Islam as culture, whereas Khamina’i and Khumayni believe that culture is 
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one of the means to achieve the aims of the Islamic revolution; in other words, 
an instrumentalist concept of culture is portrayed in al-saha al-Islamiyya.
 Hizbullah’s al-saha al-Islamiyya is trying to emulate the above concepts 
and put them into practice. Hizbullah argues that the shari‘a (Islamic law), 
as a socially constructed phenomenon, does not fall short of guiding a mod-
ern life, does have the flexibility and pragmatism to deal with man’s progress, 
and addresses both the generalities and particularities that have to do with 
man’s needs. From this perspective, one could argue that Hizbullah, as a post-
Islamist movement, has been engaging in pragmatic attempts to construct an 
‘alternative modernity’ that incorporates modern democratic and religious 
principles.13
 Thus, the old motif of al-hala al-Islamiyya gradually gave way to the new 
theme of al-saha al-Islamiyya. I view al-saha al-Islamiyya and al-hala al-
Islamiyya as discourses, or ways of thinking and acting belonging to different 
time periods. Thus, rather than analyzing al-saha al-Islamiyya as a manifesta-
tion of al-hala al-Islamiyya, I would argue that al-saha al-Islamiyya entails a 
substantial transformation that gives saliency to Hizbullah’s new phase.
 Linking this analysis to the opening quotation of the chapter, one could 
argue that Hizbullah’s ideology was to a greater extent successful in dominat-
ing the Lebanese state’s identity at least in Hizbullah’s major constituencies, as 
well as in the Islamic cultural sphere where it wields power. Thus, Hizbullah 
was triumphant in increasing Islamic influence and identity at the expense of 
the Lebanese state.
8.3 Hizbullah’s future
Hizbullah made it clear, as early as 2002, that its Resistance identity is a stra-
tegic choice, rather than a means for the liberation of a few meters of land.14 
Hizbullah declares that it would remain on guard and would not allow Israel 
to enforce its hegemony on the Middle East as it pleases. Hizbullah stresses 
that it did not come into being just to perform for a short while, or to execute 
a specific project, or to be a tool of policy for regional or international actors; 
rather, it originated from an immutable belief in God, the Almighty, and from 
the stance of its religious duty (taklif), which made it incumbent to pursue 
its continuous jihadi mission of reforming this world till the end of time. As 
such, Hizbullah would remain “as long as heaven and earth exist”15, according 
to Shaykh Na‘im Qasim. Such statements are often considered as rhetoric or 
propagandist statements. However, they can reflect the mentality that directs 
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the decisions made by Hizbullah, which can be categorized as extremist, aim-
ing at political gains.
 Qasim explained what he meant by “the party is here to stay”. He clari-
fied that the party decided to work in a holistic manner with the members of 
society. The party is not only a party for the elite which includes the religious 
scholars, the cadres, and the educated/cultured; it is not only a military party 
dedicated to the war effort and fighting; it is not only a party dedicated to 
public conscience raising and moral education aimed at preaching and guid-
ance (da‘wa); it is not only a party for the leader who is the fulcrum that ties 
the masses to the leadership (Majlis al-Shura: consultative council); it is not a 
political party that musters people around it without caring for polishing and 
furthering their religious commitment; the party is all of these combined. It is 
the party of all the people, where the children, the youth, men, women, edu-
cated, and illiterate feel that they belong; they are concerned about its success 
and are engaged in achieving its purpose. The party is an Islamic party that 
tries to express all the chief concerns of the umma.16
8.4 Future prospects: Disarmament and the peace 
process
The Western-backed March 14’s victory in the 2009 legislative elections and 
the formation of the first cabinet, the main executive body of the country, 
headed by Sa‘d al-Hariri are turning points in Lebanese history. New dynam-
ics emerged as a result of this eventuality. To the international community’s 
surprise, Hizbullah recognized the results of the 2009 elections, acknowl-
edged defeat, gave away its veto power in the cabinet, trimmed its represen-
tation in the parliament and cabinet, and agreed on the political framework 
of a cabinet in which sensitive issues, such as the UN-backed Hariri tribunal, 
would be discussed in the national unity consensus cabinet. Knowing that 
Syria and Iran are Hizbullah’s main backers, these new developments came 
at a time of an international change of heart towards Syria: 1) from regime 
change, 2) to diplomatic sanctions (in addition to the already imposed US 
sanctions under Bush’s ‘Syria Accountability Act’), 3) to world leaders rushing 
to Syria, including French president Sarkozy. In this atmosphere, Lebanon 
and Syria established diplomatic relations in 2008, after being the only two 
Arab countries without diplomatic recognition since the 1940s.17 Concom-
itantly, after the international community shunned Hizbullah, it started to 
knock at its doors. What prompted these changes? Not surprisingly, there has 
also been a European rush towards Hizbullah, especially after the elections, 
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most notably by the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner, British lawmakers, etc. and other low-level con-
tacts such as the British, Norwegian, and Danish ambassadors to Lebanon 
and other EU and US delegations. As MP Hasan Fadlallah put it: “We love this 
country and its political system. We lose the elections, but we get more than 
we ask for in the formation of the Cabinet.” He added, “Not only that, but the 
world flocks to our doors to give us recognition!”18
 The announcement of the formation of the Lebanese cabinet in November 
2009 came at a time when the Syrian president Bashar al-Asad was paying a 
state visit to France. Thus, he reaped political capital in taking credit for its 
formation; the timing could not have been better for him. In response to PM 
Netanyahu’s call for bilateral talks, al-Asad said that if Netanyahu was seri-
ous, he should send a committee of experts to Turkey in order to address 
the thorny issues, and Syria would do the same. Al-Asad added that shaking 
hands and posing for the press with Netanyahu were ritual things that lead no 
where. After the expert meetings solve the thorny issues, then posing for the 
press does not matter.19
 The US administration knows that the Palestinian track takes a lot of time 
because of its complexity and delicacy, which is why it is putting a lot of effort 
into negotiating a peace deal with Syria first. This is not the main reason. Syria 
wields enormous power over Hizbullah, Hamas, and the ‘ten allied forces’ 
(the ten renegade factions against the PLO and PA). This means that if Syria 
signs a peace deal with Israel, it goes without saying that these militant orga-
nizations will disarm or at least abolish their military wings. Hizbullah fairs 
better in peace than in war. Its future is independent of the fate of Iran and the 
peace process. Hizbullah enjoys relative independence from Syria and Iran 
and has all the financial resources in order to channel its recourse mobiliza-
tion and struggle to boycott Israeli goods and its cultural influences, while 
at the same time continuing to boost its NGOs, civil, and media institutions. 
More than one Hizbullah cadre told me, including two members of the Shura 
council, that the party is prepared for the eventuality of peace, as it is prepared 
for the eventuality of war; both are strategic concerns for it. Thus, Hizbullah’s 
role does not end when a ‘just’ peace settlement is reached in the Middle East; 
on the contrary, its role begins to flourish. Hizbullah does not only aim for the 
“will to live”; rather the “will to power”, as MP Sayyid Nawwaf al-Musawi told 
me.20 All this is in line with Qasim’s statement that “Hizbullah is here to stay.” 
In the previous section, Qasim even made the claim that Hizbullah will stay 
forever, till eternity!
 On the one hand, the state of Israel is worried about security, an intangible, 
immeasurable threat, which is subjective in nature and depends on one’s own 
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perspective. On the other hand, Arab states, Islamic movements, the Palestin-
ian refugees and the Palestinian Authority (PA) are worried about bread and 
butter, which is a tangible, measurable thing, although it is relative, i.e. some-
what objective. It is neither totally surprising nor unexpected that Hizbullah 
will give up its arms once a viable and comprehensive peace treaty is signed 
between Lebanon and Syria whereby Israel cedes land for peace, although 
the party’s rhetoric in its 1985 Open Letter and its 2009 Manifesto is against 
such a move. Hizbullah made it clear in more than one occasion that it does 
not want to ‘liberate Jerusalem’. These are only slogans, rhetoric; likewise, the 
terms ‘Great Satan’ and ‘Little Satan’, as I have already pointed out in chapter 
two. What points to this trend (upholding the security across the Lebanese-
Israeli border) is that after the July 2006 war, the Lebanese portion of al-Gha-
jar village remained occupied by the IDF, yet Hizbullah did not fire a single 
bullet against the IDF stationed there or those present in the occupied Shib‘a 
farms, which are considered Syrian by the international community, pending 
demarcation of the borders between Lebanon and Syria, a move Syria is not 
willing to take before an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.
 President Bashar al-Asad is much more pragmatic than his father and 
the old guard. During the Camp David talks between Syria and Israel, Hafiz 
al-Asad was uncompromising in his refusal to acknowledge Israel’s sense of 
security by swapping a Syrian portion of the lake of Tabarayya with another 
border area, arguing: “I used to swim there when I was a child.” Bashar is 
ready to compromise on this issue and informed the mediators, especially the 
Turks, on that issue as soon as he took office after his father died in June 2000, 
reportedly after his heart failed after seeing Israel withdrawing from Lebanon 
in May 2000. As one of his doctors and some political analysts claimed, “his 
heart could not take it after he lost the Lebanon card.”21 At the end of 2009, 
supposed negotiations between Syria and Israel mediated by the Turks were 
brought to a halt after Israel insisted on including the elimination of Hizbul-
lah’s arms in any deal with the Syrians over the 1967 occupied Golan Heights.
 Concerning the role of Turkey in the peace process, it is viewed as a fair 
negotiator acceptable to both parties: the Syrians and Israelis, as well as the 
US and the EU. It is a NATO Muslim majority country, but secular in its ori-
entation. This is the perfect model the US wants to promote Islam as: a com-
plete separation between the church and the state, a dichotomy between reli-
gion (din) and the state (dawla) in all aspects of life and the public sphere, 
yet remaining a modern model of progressive Islam. Turkey has been vocal 
against the Israeli ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in Gaza and enjoys good relations 
with both the Israelis and the Arabs.
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 What is the DNA of Hizbullah then? In conformity with its policy to change 
as circumstances themselves change, it is important to keep in mind that Hiz-
bullah is not monolithic. The party’s internal structure allows it to operate 
on a number of levels. Hizbullah is a sophisticated, complex, multifaceted, 
multilayered organization, composed of at least four main divisions: 1) the 
‘military wing’: the jihadi and ‘terrorist’ branch; 2) the social services, NGOs, 
and civil institutions branch; 3) the ‘political wing’; and 4) the cultural poli-
tics branch or ‘resistance art’.22 Hizbullah is speaking the same language the 
West understands: democracy and culture. Thus, the party engages the West 
using their own means and language. The rapid evolution of Hizbullah from 
a marginal splinter group to a dominant group in national and international 
politics, seems to justify Nasrallah’s 2007 statement that the movement was 
still in its early, and vigorous, youth: “We survived more than a quarter of a 
century and we are here to stay; the future is ours.”23
8.5 Conclusion: The shift from resistance identity to 
project identity
Although resistance identity is the main trait that characterizes a social move-
ment, its transformation into a mainstream political party aiming at empow-
ering society or exercising control and hegemony over it, depends upon to 
which extent the social movement is capable of reconstructing its identity 
by upgrading its resistance identity to a project identity. Castells stresses that 
integration alone into the system or state structures is not sufficient for a 
social movement to acquire a project identity since it might content itself 
with negotiations, bargaining, compromise, and dealings with other actors, 
thus behaving like any interest group or political party that plays according 
to the rules of the game as set by the system. He argues that a social move-
ment needs to transform the overall society to “dominant interests enacted by 
global flows of capital, power, and information.” (1998: 357) This seems not to 
be an easy task. Can Hizbullah accomplish that difficult, but not impossible 
task in the near future?
 Hizbullah seems to accommodate and change its identity within the guide-
lines of Islamic fixities/‘immutables’ (thawabit) and authenticity in order to 
accompany progress and development, thus constructively working within its 
humanistic agenda, which allows it to legitimize itself through accumulation, 
conversion, and transformation of social, economic, and symbolic capitals 
into political capital and vice versa. When Hizbullah earns political capital, 
the party spends it by investing it in acquiring, more and more, cultural and 
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socio-economic capitals in line with its civilizational mission of accomplish-
ing social justice according to the tenets of Shi‘ite jurisprudence. This is one 
way of demonstrating how Hizbullah employs its capitals as forms of resource 
mobilization, as its progressive identity allows it a large margin of maneuver.
 As a resisting public, through the resilience of its religious culture and 
identity, Hizbullah was able to shift from the restrictive politics of a narrow 
exclusive identity to the more encompassing project identity based upon the 
mobilization of its intellectual and cultural resources. This new jurisprudence 
leads to dramatic transformations that translate themselves into an Islamic 
project identity grounded in dominant interests. As an extension of its proj-
ect identity on the basis of communal resistance, the Islamic project identity 
relies upon an interdependent, conducive relationship between the leaders, 
the catalysts of social transformation, and the populace, the kinetic energy of 
that transformation. Thus, Hizbullah seems on the way to achieving “dom-
inant interests enacted by global flows of capital, power, and information.” 
And so, for Hizbullah jihad not only serves as a medium for the negotiation 
of power, but also becomes a space for resisting, weakening, and challenging 
the hegemonic ideology and authority of the state by enforcing the party as a 
‘resisting public’.
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Paradigm shift: a cry for freedom
‘There is something in the soul that cries out for freedom.’
Martin Luther King
Did the Arabs finally heed the call of the late Chinese communist leader Mao 
Tse-tung (who urged them to just march in order to realize their potential and 
actualize their power)1? Or, maybe, they listened to one of their indigenous 
nationalist leaders Antun S‘adé who repeatedly stated, “In you is a power, which 
if actualized will change the course of history”?2
 In less than a month, two Arab leaders were deposed by the people’s power. 
Are the 1989 winds of change blowing across the Arab world? As the Middle East 
is engulfed with protests portraying the affirmation of the will of the people after 
decades of authoritarian rule, Lebanon does not remain the anomaly; rather 
change has been instigated by an unexpected actor. The catalyst was Tunisia’s 
Jasmine uprising3 that ended the 23-year old rule of president bin ‘Ali after the 
army supported the uprising and ousted him into exile in Saudi Arabia on 14 
January 2011. This paved the way for the return, on 30 January 2011, of the mod-
erate Islamist intellectual Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the ‘Renaissance 
Movement’ (al-Nahda), who was forced to flee in the late 1980s.4 While in Tuni-
sia street politics5 led to a regime change, its domino effect swept throughout the 
region with varying degrees of success. In Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Jordan, Syr-
ia, Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia demonstrations were 
more restrained and did not gain the support of the army, thus failing to initiate 
regime change. From 25 January to 11 February 2011, after eighteen days of mas-
sive demonstrations that claimed the lives of more than 350 people throughout 
Egypt, the most populous Arab country with the largest army in the Middle East, 
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the social-network revolution succeeded in ousting president Mubarak after 30 
years of autocratic rule. In Libya, the ‘17th of February Revolution’ deteriorated 
into protracted civil war that claimed the lives of thousands. Belatedly, on 17 
March 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone and took ‘all neces-
sary measures’ to protect civilians. Two days later, operation ‘Odyssey Dawn’ was 
launched by France, Britain, the US, Italy, and Canada in order to impose 1973 by 
military force. Libya was the third Muslim country the US attacked after Afghan-
istan and Iraq, but this time not in an anti-terrorism campaign; rather in support 
of the democratic movement. We are yet to see how this new social movement 
is going to empower the people of the region and the Arab and Muslim world in 
general. It is interesting to note that Asef Bayat anticipated many of these sweep-
ing changes in one of his latest books.6
 Hizbullah issued political declarations blessing the Tunisian and Egyptian 
people, in particular, and the Arab masses, in general, for their drive for ‘free-
dom and dignity’. Nasrallah added, “This is the true path when people believe 
in their resolve… this is the new Middle East created by its own people”. He 
concluded, “Your Spring has begun; no one can lead you to another Winter. 
Your belief, vigilance, and resilience will overcome all difficulties and make you 
triumphant”.7 Within this regional context, Hizbullah managed to affect a tan-
gible change to the political system by democratic means.
 The watershed: Hizbullah gains the majority in 
parliament
In all my previous writings, I have repeatedly stated that it is a matter of time 
before Hizbullah governs Lebanon by democratic means. The main aim of the 
party’s gradual integration into the Lebanese political system and its project of 
post-Islamism materialized on 25 January 2011: Hizbullah virtually succeeded 
in ruling Lebanon after it obtained a majority of 68 MPs in the 128-seat legis-
lature, a constitutional move that allowed it to name the next prime minister. 
How did this take place? How did PM Sa‘d al-Hariri lose the legislature’s major-
ity after the March 14 victory in the June 2009 elections?
 Hizbullah already paralyzed the cabinet on 15 December 2010, when March 
14 refused to further the dossier of the ‘false witnesses’ to the Lebanese Judicial 
Council, arguing that doing so would interfere with the workings of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). This coincided with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ 
(LAF) discovery of sophisticated, camouflaged Israeli hi-tech spying material 
hidden in fake rocks in the highest mountain peaks of Lebanon: in the Druz 
heartland at the Baruk (at a height of 1,715 meters) in the Shuf; and in San-
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   188 26-4-2011   13:42:49
189 Afterword
nine (at a height of around 2,000 meters) in the Christian heartland. The LAF 
defused both. Hizbullah prided itself on supplying the information to the LAF, 
proving that it is on high alert to protect the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Lebanon.’
 On 16 December 2010, Hizbullah commemorated ‘Ashura’. Nasrallah deliv-
ered a fiery, mobilizational speech stressing: ‘The STL will become a bygone, like 
other plots contrived against us; we will abort the aims of the unjust accusa-
tion leveled against us.’ He asserted that Hizbullah is very careful to safeguard 
national coexistence and to protect Lebanon from the lurking fitna: ‘We reject 
fitna between the Sunni and Shi‘a and we stand firm against it; we will never 
have recourse to it since it is the option of the weak and because it serves Israeli 
interest.’
 On 12 January 2011, Sa‘d al-Hariri’s cabinet fell after more than one third of 
the ministers resigned: the 10 ministers of the Hizbullah-led opposition and a 
Shi‘ite minister from the centralist coalition of the president. In order to embar-
rass al-Hariri, this move coincided with his meeting with president Obama in 
Washington. Why did March 8 absolve itself from the Doha promise of not 
resigning en mass from the national unity cabinet? It justified its move by blam-
ing the March 14 ruling coalition who, instead of shelving contentious dossiers 
that failed to gain consensus, insisted on putting them up for the vote when it 
had the two-third majority. Consequently, the Doha formula fell.
 After being united for 11 years, the majority of the Druz veteran politician 
Walid Jumblatt’s parliamentary bloc ‘The Democratic Forum’ deflected to 
March 8, thus shifting the balance to Hizbullah. Invoking his father’s legacy, 
Jumblatt dubbed his new bloc ‘The Struggle Front’ (Jabhat al-Nidal), which in 
addition to Druz includes Sunnis and Christians, very important ingredients, 
in Jumblatt’s eyes, to ward off any sectarian label leveled against it. In addition 
to Jumblatt, it includes six other MPs: Akram Shihayyib, Elie ‘Aun, Ala’eddine 
Terro, Ghazi al-‘Aridi, Nehmé Tu‘mé, and Wa’il Abu Fa‘ur.
 The remnants of the dissolved ‘Democratic Forum’ joined March 14: Mar-
wan Hamadé, Antoine Sa‘d, Henri Helou, Fu’ad al-Sa‘d, and Muhammad al-
Hajjar. Nevertheless, this did not tip the balance to March 8; rather it resulted in 
a deadlock: 64 seats for both March 8 and March 14.8
 Actually, four independents tipped the balance after reviewing their calcula-
tions. Sa‘d al-Hariri considered the deflection of the March 14 MPs to March 8 as 
‘treason and rebellion’ against the will of the voters. Therefore, al-Hariri lost by 
eight votes: 60 MPs named him, and 68 named Najib Miqati.9
 The events in Tunisia and Egypt had already influenced Lebanon when Saad 
al-Hariri’s supporters conducted ‘The Day of Rage’ on 25 January 2011, the day 
Miqati was named to form the cabinet. Al-Hariri argued that what seemed a 
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democratic game is really a Hizbullah coup in the name of democracy, a coup 
that betrays the people’s will, which refused to grant a majority to the Hizbul-
lah-led opposition in the 7 June 2009 elections. In turn, Hizbullah gave strict 
orders to its supporters not to engage the Hariri supporters at any cost, even if 
their lives were in danger. Although Hariri proved that he has a say in Lebanese 
street politics (which was dominated for a long time by the Hizbullah-led oppo-
sition) and proved that he wields influence and can mobilize 70% to 80% of the 
Lebanese Sunnis, this public rage, which caused mayhem and violently targeted 
media outlets such al-Jezzera, has negatively effected his image and portrayed 
al-Hariri as the ‘villain’, as Hizbullah’s al-Manar TV labeled him.
 Al-Hariri stressed that he is now the opposition and affirmed that Hizbullah 
hijacked March 14’s victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections with the power 
of the gun. He avowed that the STL would deliver justice, not only concern-
ing the assassination of his father, but also in relation to the political assassina-
tions that targeted many March 14 politicians, mainly Christians.10 Although 
al-Hariri and Miqati reconciled, the situation remained tense.
 Since Hizbullah’s maneuver occurred within the narrow confines of the Leb-
anese constitution and the democratic rules of the game that encourage nego-
tiations, bargaining, and compromise, the US, France and the EU did not label 
what has happened as a ‘coup’, as al-Hariri and March 14 hoped for.
 The British foreign minister, William Hague, said when he visited Syria on 28 
January 2011 that he neither views the Miqati cabinet as a Hizbullah cabinet, nor 
Miqati as a Hizbullah man. Instead, the cabinet will be judged by its deeds, as 
he said. I think he is right. Miqati agreed to run for the post of the PM as a com-
promise candidate, benefiting from his centralist position, and does not aim 
to face the international community and the Security Council, especially since 
its decisions will be implemented under chapter 7. This would be detrimental 
to his business, his family, and his overall political career. While al-Hariri has 
almost 80% of the support of the Sunnis, Miqati is only a ceremonial figure and 
has hardly any following on the ground. If he is able to form the cabinet, like the 
2005 precedent, his presence will be for a short period heading a transitional 
technocrat government. It is well known in Lebanese politics that a techno-
crat cabinet cannot accomplish much; only politicians who wield influence and 
power on the ground can do so.
 Beside shielding itself from what it called the politically motivated accusa-
tions of the STL, Hizbullah’s aim is to shelve the discussions pertaining to its 
weapons and the national defense strategy. This is concomitant with lending 
legitimacy to Hizbullah’s resistance role and its right to bear arms, as would be 
reiterated in the new government’s policy statement, as all policy statements 
previously stressed, especially after the Syrian army’s withdrawal in April 2005.
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Ahl al-dhimma, dhimmis non-Muslim residents within an Islamic state 
holding limited rights and required to pay a 
poll tax (jizya) in lieu of zakat
‘Amma ordinary people
Ajr remuneration
Arkan al-Islam the five pillars of Islam: al-shahadatayyn 
(Muslim credo: testimony that there is no 
god but Allah (God), and that Muhammad is 
His Prophet), salat (prayer), sawm (fasting), 
hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and zakat (alms 
giving)
Awliya’ saints
Dahiya the southern suburb of Beirut that houses 
around 850,000 Shi‘ites
Batin esoteric
Din religion
Faqih jurisprudent or jurisconsult: an authority or 
expert in fiqh; in Shi‘ism faqih is synonymous 
with mujtahid
Fara’id religious duties
Fatwa a guiding, non-binding religious edict
Fiqh religious jurisprudence, elucidation, and 
application of Shari‘a
Fitna discord, internal strife
Fuqaha’ jurists
Hadi guide
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Hadith (Sunna) traditional accounts of the sayings and doings 
of Prophet Muhammad, which became an 
important source for determining Islamic law. 
They are made up of two parts: the names of 
the transmitters (isnad); and the text (matn).
Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca
Al-hala al-Islamiyya Islamic religious-political sphere
Halal religiously sanctioned
Haqiqat truth
Haram religiously prohibited
Hikma divine wisdom
Hisbi (obeying) the religious and moral instructions 
of Islam. It could also cover a wide range of 
financial, administrative, political, and social 
matters. In short, hisbi matters are things that 
God does not allow us to forsake.
Hizbullah ‘Party of God’
Hizbullahi A member or follower of Hizbullah
Hujja apodictic proof
Husnayayyn outcomes or rewards of jihad (martyrdom 
and victory)
Ijtihad: making religious decisions on the basis of 
independent reasoning
Ilgha’ al-ta’fiyya al-siyassiyya 
fi al-nufus, qabla al-nusus
the abolition of political sectarianism in the 
mentality, before abolishing it in the texts
‘Ilm religious knowledge
Al-‘ilm al-muhit or al-ihatah 
fi al-‘ilm
the Imam is the most learned in all branches 
of religious knowledge
Infitah ‘opening-up’ or Hizbullah integration into the 
Lebanese public sphere
‘Isma (ma‘sum) entails impeccability, sinlessness, and infal-
libility of the Imams
Al-istikhlaf bi al-nass wa al-
ta‘yyin
the Shi‘ites consider the Imamate a divine 
appointment
Al-istikhlaf bi al-shura wa 
al-bayy‘a
the Sunnis consider the caliphate as a political 
process that is the product of consensus
Istishhad martyrdom
Jahiliyya pre-Islamic pagan period in Arabia
Al-Jihad al-asghar (smaller jihad): struggle (holy war) against 
the enemies of Islam
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Al-Jihad al-akbar (greater jihad): struggle against the self (jihad 
al-nafs) or individual’s service for the cause of 
religion
Jizya poll tax
Juhhal ignorant people
Kafir infidel
Khass wa ‘amm private and public
Khums (one-fifth) a religious tax comprising 20% of a person’s 
surplus of income over necessary living 
expenses. Half is paid to the marja‘ as the 
representative of the Imam (sahm al-Imam), 
and half to the Sayyids.
Kitman concealment
Khususiyyat specificities or particularities
Lebanonization Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domestic 
political life
Ma‘nawi moral influence
Madad support and reinforcement
Marja‘ al-taqlid/ muqallad The supreme Islamic legal authority to be 
emulated or accepted for emulation by the 
majority of the Shi‘a in matters of religious 
practice and law
Marja‘iyya religious authority
Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya legitimate and religious responsibility to the 
marja‘ or muqallad
Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya 
wa al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi 
(taklif)
is loosely translated as ‘legitimate and reli-
gious responsibility’
Mubaya‘a homage and pledge of allegiance, usually to 
God
Mujahidin those who carry out jihad or freedom fighters
Mujtahid a ‘alim or a high ranking Shi‘ite jurist who 
exercises ijtihad or independent reasoning
Muqallad see marja‘ al-taqlid
Muqalidin followers of the muqallad in law and ritual
Murshid ruhi spiritual guide or leader
Mustad‘afin oppressed
Mustakbirin oppressors
Muwatana citizenship
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Nass textual designation, or the specific designa-
tion of an Imam by the preceding Imam
Al-Qada leaders
Rahbar leader of the Islamic Revolution. This title was 
assumed by Khumayni, and after his death, it 
was accorded to Khamina’i when he became 
the official marja‘ al-taqlid in 1995.
Fi sabili Allah in the way of God
Salat prayer
Sawm fasting
Shahada martyrdom
Shahid martyr
Shari‘a (divine or Islamic law) The whole set of norms, morals, and laws 
derived from the Islamic sources (mainly 
Qur‘an and hadith) pertaining to the various 
aspects of life of individual Muslims and the 
Muslim umma
Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim The ‘Straight Path’ or the path of the righteous
Sunna (hadith) Traditions: the sayings and doings of Prophet 
Muhammad, which are considered the second 
source of Islamic law (shari‘a), the Qur’an 
being the first.
Al-ta‘a strict obedience and discipline, which con-
veys a religious connotation
Ta‘bi’a mobilization
Tafsir textual, literal, or scriptural interpretation of 
the Qur‘an
Tahkim arbitration
Taklif religious-legal obligation
Al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi delegated responsibility/obligation of the 
muqalidin towards the muqallad
Taqiyya expedient dissimulation
Taqlid emulation
Taqwa piety
Ta’wil Shi‘ite hermeneutics or allegorical interpreta-
tion of the Qur‘an
Thawabit fixities, immutable principles, established set 
of values and norms
‘Ulama Muslim religious scholars
Umma the entire community of Muslims
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‘Urfan Shi‘ite theosophy
Wajib religious duty or obligation
Wakilayn shar‘iyyan religious deputies
Wilaya spiritual guidance
Wilayat al-Faqih governance of the jurisprudent or 
jurisconsult.
Wilayat al-umma ‘ala nafsiha the governance of the umma by itself
La yughsl wa la yukaffan neither washed nor wrapped in a burial 
shroud
Yaqin strong conviction
Yutashhad/ istashhadu martyred
Zahir exoteric
Zakat alms giving
Zu‘ama feudal leaders
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Additional Reading1
Why is it that so much of the research on Hizbullah is plagued by factual 
errors and misinterpretations? From its inauguration till the present Hizbul-
lah has issued seemingly divergent declarations and statements, thus indicat-
ing the need to think of its identity in evolutionary terms, rather than regard-
ing it as monolithic. When Hizbullah released its Open Letter or Political 
Manifesto in 1985, it propagated its political ideology, but hardly any discern-
able political program. The confusion of equating Hizbullah’s political ideol-
ogy with its political program leads to a problematic in the understanding of 
Hizbullah’s role as a political party, as it developed after the Ta’if Agreement. 
What adds to the confusion is that Hizbullah states in its Open Letter: “We 
in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow political 
framework. Rather, we are an umma tied to the Muslims in every part of the 
world by a strong ideological, doctrinal, and political bond, namely, Islam.” 
This seems to imply that Hizbullah abides by Imam Khumayni’s theory that 
considers political parties in the Islamic context as a Western phenomenon. 
Thus, in its political ideology, Hizbullah clearly states that it is not a political 
party, yet it developed a political program and participated in the national 
elections. Authors who have adopted this relatively undifferentiated approach 
with respect to Hizbullah’s ideology have misunderstood and misrepresented 
the party’s identity. The confusion arises especially when some authors use 
quotations from Hizbullah’s pre-Ta’if discourse and apply these to the post-
Ta’if era trying to generalize them as a whole on Hizbullah, irrespective of the 
historical period in which they are contextualized from.
 For instance, a reading of Smit2 suggests that he tends to confine Hizbul-
lah’s ideology to its religious ideology. He narrows the latter solely to wilayat 
al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent), without referring to the other two 
components, namely, “belief in Shi‘a Islam” and “jihad [holy war] in the name 
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of God”.3 Relying mainly on secondary sources, Smit tends to conflate Hiz-
bullah’s political ideology with its political program. This seems evident, for 
example, in his reference to Hizbullah’s Open Letter as the party’s political 
program, when it constitutes Hizbullah’s political ideology (pp. 249ff). Hiz-
bullah’s Open Letter is not an embodiment of the party’s political program, 
rather its religio-political ideology, as Norton and Sobelman already argued. 
Norton labels the Open Letter as Hizbullah’s “ideological framework”,4 and 
Sobelman5 explicitly considers the Open Letter as Hizbullah’s political ideol-
ogy or its “first political, ideological platform” (p. 23). Hizbullah’s political 
program appeared for the first time in 1992 when the party contested the par-
liamentary elections. What adds to the unlikelihood of considering the Open 
Letter as Hizbullah’s political program is that the Open letter rejected any 
participation in Lebanon’s sectarian-confessional political system – which 
rendered Hizbullah as a rejectionist, seclusionist, and reactionary movement, 
at the time – while its political program sanctioned such a practice.
 Since the end of the civil war in 1990 and its acceptance of the Ta’if Agree-
ment, Hizbullah has been confronting major developments in Lebanon: 
prominently, the emergence of a pluralistic public sphere and increasing 
openness toward other communities, political parties, and interest groups in 
the Lebanese myriad. Due to a new interpretation of wilayat al-faqih, Hizbul-
lah altered its discourse, priorities, and overall political outlook. The mixed 
confessional space in Lebanon led Hizbullah to move from marginalization to 
infitah (‘opening up’), through which the party became a major player in the 
Lebanese public sphere by participating in the parliamentary and municipal 
elections as well as joining the cabinet. In short, since the early 1990s, Hizbul-
lah started promoting its Islamic identity and agenda by following a pragmat-
ic political program, mainly to lull Christians and other Muslims who were 
opposed to the Islamic state. In the meantime, Hizbullah remained faithful 
to its Shi‘ite constituency by employing a bottom-up Islamization process 
through engaging in a pluralistic process, working within the Lebanese state’s 
political and administrative structures, while, at the same time establishing 
Islamic institutions within the civil society. Thus when the party decided to 
contest the parliamentary elections of 1992 and subsequent legislative and 
municipal elections, it had to develop a down-to-earth, pragmatic political 
program, and concentrated on addressing broad problems and concerns that 
are deeply embedded in society and that worry the majority of the voters irre-
spective of their denomination or political orientation.
 Harik6 reiterates Hamzeh’s and Norton’s premise that Hizbullah is a pop-
ular nationalist resistance movement when she rightly argues that “during 
the course of Hezbollah’s seventeen-year struggle with Israel along the Leba-
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   198 26-4-2011   13:42:52
199 additional reading
nese/Israeli frontier in southern Lebanon, it has never been established by 
any party directly involved (including the United Nations contingent on the 
ground) that the Party of God has perpetuated a single terrorist attack against 
Israeli civilians… Hezbollah made an early strategic decision to exclude ter-
rorist tactics from its jihad against Israeli occupation and stuck to it.” (pp. 2; 
168). Unlike Hamzeh7 who relies on a good number of primary sources, Harik 
makes very scanty and frugal references to primary sources; she takes pride 
in interviewing Nasrallah, but does not produce any reliable evidence to sub-
stantiate her claim (p. 78).
 She brags that her book was the product of twenty years of work and 
research; she also prides herself in situating her book within the terrorism 
paradigm and within the terrorism-resistance debate or controversy. She 
claims that other works on Hizbullah fail to do so. She writes,
Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism differs from other works on Hezbollah 
by dealing in depth with its strategic and foreign policy thrust and focusing on the 
interrelationship, dynamics and manifestations of the terrorist/resistance contro-
versy. In contrast most recent books on Hezbollah have focused on the interplay 
of Shiite religious doctrine on the Party of God’s political positions, Hezbollah’s 
origins and development during the first decade of its existence and the party’s 
alleged involvement in the terrorist activities that followed the 1982 Israeli inva-
sion. (pp. 4, 203n2)
Although Harik refers to Norton’s earlier article in which she claims he “brief-
ly review[s] Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon and possible directions as a 
fighting force” (p. 203, n2), she fails to mention his seminal article8 in which 
he, as far as I know, initiated the trend of distinguishing between terrorism 
and resistance as well as offered a general definition of terrorism and applied 
it to Hizbullah.9 Norton’s definitions circumvented her alleged “focus”. Even 
though Harik’s book was published in 2004, her data stops in 2002.10 In her 
conclusion, she briefly mentions the US-led invasion of Iraq that occurred on 
20 March 2003. It seems that she does not live up to her promise of “dealing 
in depth” with Hizbullah’s “foreign policy thrust and focusing on the inter-
relationship, dynamics and manifestations of the terrorist/resistance contro-
versy” because she neither discusses the effects of the Iraqi and Afghani crises 
on Hizbullah’s identity construction nor relates these to Hinnebusch’s11 three 
levels: the global, the regional, and the domestic. Harik’s alleged original con-
tribution to the field has been circumscribed by Norton.
 Unlike Harik, Hamzeh offers a good typology and discussion on jihad. 
One serious liability is that his tables and statistics are mostly appropriated 
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from Hizbullah’s propaganda material, as such unoriginal and unimpressive. 
On the contrary, Harik’s most serious liability is her sketchy treatment of the 
extremely timely and topical subject of ‘martyrdom’ or suicide operations 
as such, and in relation to the resistance/terrorism controversy. Harik just 
adumbrates what she labels as ‘suicide/martyrdom attacks’, mainly from the 
perspective of or in relation to the Intifada and the Palestinian resistance (p. 
26). However, she neither relates this to Hizbullah’s resistance identity as an 
Islamic jihadi movement nor refers to Hizbullah’s twelve martyrdom opera-
tions. For this and other reasons, Harik’s book became dated and unoriginal 
even before it was launched into the market. On the whole, her book seems a 
mundane book since it reads like Lebanese daily newspapers’ editorials and 
analyses: in effect, there seems to be nothing fundamentally new in Harik’s 
book.
 On the contrary, in spite of his difficulty in obtaining primary sources, 
Sobelman offers a sound analysis in his monograph. Like Harik, Hamzeh, and 
Norton, Sobelman’s book is free from the Smit fallacy. He conveys important 
insights on Hizbullah’s identity construction and reconstruction. He writes,
the organization’s revolutionary fervor and ideological devotion often clash with 
the process of establishing political legitimacy and compel Hizbollah to make 
ideological compromises so it can adapt to the new reality and survive in it. This 
does not, however, imply in any way that Hizbollah is going through an identity 
crisis. The organization sees itself as entirely Lebanese, and its leaders are careful 
to express themselves publicly on domestic socio-economic issues, such as support 
for the working class and the struggle against corruption and unemployment.” (pp. 
20-21) He adds, “Today Hizbollah views the original platform [Open Letter] as 
outdated… [There is] an increasingly apparent metamorphosis in the organization 
at the declaratory level and in the practical sphere… Hizbullah has traveled from 
the time of its founding and its more recent decision to choose pragmatic integra-
tion into the Lebanese system over pure ideology. (pp. 21, 23)
In commenting on Hizbullah’s alliances in the 2000 parliamentary elections, 
Sobelman argues, “Hizbollah apparently thus agreed to compromise on its 
principles and ideology, and to cooperate with an individual with previous 
blatant connections with Israel.” (p. 39) Hizbullah is an extension of the Islam-
ic revolution within Lebanese society. Hizbullah is a political party function-
ing within a non-Islamic state and a multireligious, confessional-sectarian 
state. While the Iranian Hizbullah was instrumental in building a state, the 
Lebanese Hizbullah cannot go beyond being a political party operating with-
in the Lebanese public sphere.
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* * *
Two recent books by N. Noe12 and A.R. Norton13 look at Hizbullah from 
other angles and perspectives.
 According to Nicholas Noe, his Voice of Hezbollah “is intended as an intro-
duction to Nasrallah’s thinking, and not as any kind of a comprehensive, 
final word.” (p. 17) In this, it represents a laudable effort. Noe provides useful, 
straight to the point, and sometimes insightful introductions to each of the 
thirty-two texts included in the volume, thereby attempting to place each of 
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s speeches and interviews in context.
 The book is composed of thirty-two speeches and interviews, one of which 
offers a biography of Nasrallah – it is a bit dated, however, having been written 
in 1993 (pp. 116-143). The rest delineate Hizbullah’s stances concerning domes-
tic Lebanese politics and its position toward regional and international issues 
ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the status of Palestine to the 2003 
US-led invasion of Iraq, to Hizbullah’s stance regarding its strategic alliance 
with Syria and its ideological/religious ties with Iran.
 Noe has divided the material into three sections. The first, “Radicalism 
and Resistance 1986-1999,” comprises thirteen statements. Only the first of 
these deals with the issue of radicalism as such, making explicit that Hizbul-
lah regarded the Lebanese state as an apostate that needed to be toppled by 
military means in order to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon as part of 
an overall worldly Islamic order. The second statement highlights the proxy 
war between Amal and Hizbullah and the efforts to curb it. The remaining 
eleven statements portray Hizbullah as a political party that has accommo-
dated its protest, recognized the Lebanese state, and contested the legislative 
and municipal elections.
 “Repositioning 2000-2004” offers another thirteen statements, most of 
which cover the period from what Hizbullah calls ‘liberation’ – the near-
complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 – until 
just before the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri. Finally, “February 14, 2005, 
and After” contains six statements dating from Hariri’s assassination through 
Nasrallah’s August 2006 postwar interview with Lebanon’s New TV.
 Since its inception, Hizbullah has been keen on controlling the Lebanese 
political system, initially through a top-down process: “We support a military 
solution because we do not see a better alternative (…) we do believe in a 
single Islamic world governed by a central government (…) We do not believe 
in a nation whose borders are 10,452 square kilometres in Lebanon; our proj-
ect foresees Lebanon as part of the political map of an Islamic world in which 
specificities would cease to exist, but in which the rights, freedom and dignity 
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of minorities within it are guaranteed.” (pp. 31-2) Starting in the 1990s, Hiz-
bullah endeavored to control the political system through a bottom-up pro-
cess by means of a gradual participation in the democratic system, beginning 
in parliament, the municipal councils, and the cabinet.
 Reading some statements in light of Hizbullah’s May 2008 demonstration 
of military power in the streets of West Beirut and the Shuf region is an inter-
esting exercise. Hizbullah’s purpose in May was to attain veto power by force, 
even at the expense of killing Lebanese citizens; this runs contrary to Nasral-
lah’s earlier assurances that Hizbullah “with its huge military capabilities (…) 
could have staged a military coup and taken control of the country (…) We 
were capable of that and still are (…) My weapons are to defend the country, 
and all Lebanese (…) Have we ever used our weapons as a source of strength 
in municipal or parliamentary elections, or to impose certain shares and con-
ditions? Never.” (pp. 402-403)
 Noe, founder of Mideastwire.com and a doctoral candidate at the Uni-
versité Libanaise in Beirut, offers handy, to-the-point, sometimes insightful 
introductions to each of the statements, positioning each speech and inter-
view in context. He does not satisfactorily address the question of how he 
selected the speeches and interviews for inclusion, however. In his introduc-
tion, he blames the July 2006 Israeli war for having destroyed Hizbullah’s 
think tank, the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, and thus 
limiting access to Nasrallah’s speeches. The center’s material is well preserved 
on microfilm, however, and all of Nasrallah’s speeches are readily available 
from Hizbullah’s yearly bound volumes of its mouthpiece, al-‘Ahd (these were 
displayed at Hizbullah’s bookfair, organized by al-Ma‘arif Institute, immedi-
ately after the 2006 war, with each volume priced at about $ 50). Al-‘Ahd was 
established in 1984 and renamed al-Intiqad in 2001, but Noe describes it as 
“an invaluable resource that only became accessible to us in November 2006 
– bound volumes of Hezbollah’s weekly magazine Al Intiqad, going back to its 
founding in the mid-1990s.” (p. 16)
 Journalist Nicholas Blandford writes a satisfactory introduction to the 
book, although he appears not to know that Nasrallah was elected for life 
in the party’s sixth conclave, held in the summer of 2001. He further seems 
unaware of the rule of thumb and precedent that the head of Hizbullah’s exec-
utive council – the post Nasrallah held from 1987 to 1992 – replaces the secre-
tary-general in case of incapacitation or death. Blanford rightly mentions that 
Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, the current head of the executive council, will 
replace Nasrallah in case something happens to him, but he does not offer any 
explanation for this (p. 13).
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 Noe also acknowledges that he obtained Hizbullah’s approval of the trans-
lations: “It is also important to say that Hezbollah was informed at various 
points about the materials we were interested in obtaining and translating... A 
final set of proof pages was provided to a third party, approved by Hezbollah, 
for comment on issues related to the accuracy of the translation, as well as the 
accuracy of the original text.” (pp. 17-18) Such close cooperation creates the 
appearance of party sponsorship and supervision of Noe’s work, which raises 
serious questions about its overall objectivity.
 However, a more significant shortcoming is Noe’s failure to subject some 
of Nasrallah’s most important public pronouncements to critical analysis. 
This is particularly the case with Nasrallah’s varying and misleading accounts 
of Hizbullah’s founding and of his whereabouts during the critical period of 
1978. Noe reproduces, without comment, Nasrallah’s assertions that he was in 
either “Baalbek” (p. 124) or “Najaf ” (p. 110) when Musa al-Sadr disappeared 
(31 August 1978) and Israel’s first invasion of Lebanon occurred (14 March 
1978). These seemingly minor details are crucial, for they undermine Hizbul-
lah’s official narrative, which states that the party was not founded until 1982, 
in response to the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Again, this raises ques-
tions about Noe’s objectivity vis-à-vis his subject.
 Finally, the five-page concluding section of the book entitled “Further 
Reading” – in addition to excluding Arabic and French sources – is highly 
selective in its choice of English sources. Noe again appears to endorse Hiz-
bullah’s official narrative by including deputy secretary-general Na‘im Qas-
sim’s Hizbullah: The Story from Within and deeming it “indispensible” due 
to the presence of party documents in its appendix (p. 412). At the same 
time, other works that contain these and many more documents, in addition 
to critical analysis of them – the author’s The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology 
(2006), for example – do not appear.
 A.R. Norton paints another story. The purpose of Norton’s 2007 book – 
authored by the co-editor of the series entitled “Princeton Studies in Muslim 
Politics” – “is to offer a more balanced and nuanced account of this complex 
organization [Hizbullah]... an honest account of the leading Shi‘i political 
party in Lebanon – Hezbollah.” (pp. 8, 186) Compared to Norton’s, Harik’s 
and Hamzeh’s books read like a compilation of their earlier works. Norton’s 
book seems original although, on a separate page, he thoroughly acknowl-
edges using some of his earlier publications (p. 187), something that Harik 
and Hamzeh do not. The book is composed of six chapters and a conclu-
sion. Chapter one surveys the “Origins and Prehistory of Hezbollah”; chapter 
two deals with “The Founding of Hezbollah”. The parachuted chapter three 
entitled, “Being a Shi‘i Muslim in the Twenty-first Century” seems unrelated 
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to the main thrust of the argument. It is basically a summary of Norton’s 2001 
book Shi‘ism and the ‘Ashura Ritual in Lebanon. Undeniably, the chapter is 
very well written, but it is very detailed, longwinded, and an unnecessary 
digression in a book aimed at giving a short history of Hizbullah, not Shi‘ite 
rituals. Thus, removing the chapter would not diminish the value of the book. 
Chapter four discusses the topics of “Resistance, Terrorism, and Violence in 
Lebanon”; chapter five “Playing Politics” portrays how Hizbullah abandoned 
its revolutionary fervour and started integrating into the political system 
through its participation in electoral processes. Finally, chapter six “From 
Celebration to War” addresses the July 2006 war and its repercussions.
 Norton’s book seems a fairly good synopsis of what is known about Hiz-
bullah, even though it does not offer any new startling insights. Nevertheless 
Norton’s elegantly, compact written book has drawbacks in terms of inaccu-
rate facts, which might weaken its overall conclusion and lead to errors in 
scholarly judgment. My aim is not to highlight the merits of this book, as 
other reviewers have already done; rather to correct some very basic factual 
errors, which will give the book a better read. I wonder how the well-versed 
scholars, who reviewed the book, including the ones who originate from Leb-
anon, did not notice these trivial mistakes.14
 Norton’s book has some historical gaps. He ignores to mention the semi-
nal 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved Lebanon and the current Arab 
states in the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (p. 11). In 
a 187-page book, Norton belatedly mentions the Ta’if Agreement on page 83, 
when he refers to it for the first time on p. 12. He does not refer to the Cairo 
Agreement and its annulment, which is central to understanding the chang-
ing dynamics between the PLO and the Shi‘ites (p. 14).15
 Norton adopted a simple, inconsistent transliteration system that distorts 
words. For instance, on page 13 he writes “Beqaa” and “Hirmil”, not Hermel, 
for the sake of coherence at least. If he writes “Hirmil”, then he should write 
Biqa‘. Another obvious inconsistency appears on pp. 110-111 where he writes 
“Khomeini” and “Tufayli”, instead of Tofeili, or he should have written Khu-
mayni in the first place. On page 15, he writes “Bra‘sheet”, when it should be 
Bar‘ashit, etc. The book is also plagued with transliteration errors in principle, 
such as the serious mistake of referring to the Iranian leader as “rakbar” (p. 
90). Irrespective of which transliteration system one employs, and whether 
the word is written in Arabic or Farsi, rahbar is always spelled with an ‘h’ not 
a ‘k’.
 Even the “Index”, which Norton praised16, lacks some important key terms, 
such as ‘Mustapha Chamran’17 (p. 30); ‘cluster bombs’ and ‘mines’ (p. 63); and 
most notably ‘Samir Kuntar’ [sic] the oldest serving Lebanese prisoner (p. 
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134), whom Hizbullah’s integrity and probity depended upon, mainly because, 
in order to release him and a few others, the party kidnapped the two Israeli 
soldiers on 12 July 2006, an event that triggered a 34-day war that inflicted 
enormous devastation on Lebanon’s infrastructure and shattered its econo-
my. Although a simple search function would have identified all the pages in 
which a certain word is mentioned, the list is not exhaustive in many cases. 
For instance, ‘Abd al-Amr [sic] Qabalan is also mentioned on p. 64. (‘Amr’ 
means order, while his name is Amir, which is a direct reference to Imam ‘Ali, 
the Amir of the faithful or believers); ‘Ali Shariati is also mentioned on p. 29; 
etc.
 Concerning the map on page 1 in the “Prologue”, it is true that more than 
one religious group inhabits most of the areas in Lebanon. That is why, an 
absolutely accurate map that shows the exact distribution of the eighteen reli-
gious groups recognized by the state is almost impossible to draw. However, 
this does not give Norton license to swap Greek Orthodox representation, in 
the Kura region below Tripoli, with Greek Catholic, when Kura is represented 
in the legislature by three Greek Orthodox MPs, which unequivocally implies 
that that region is predominantly Greek Orthodox.
 The late PM Hariri was neither “blown to pieces by a bomb that also killed 
twenty-two of his colleagues” (p. 7) nor “twenty-two others traveling in his 
entourage” (p. 127) as Norton contends. Rather his body remained intact and 
many of the 22 victims were innocent civilians who were passing by at the 
moment of the explosion.
 Another trivial mistake appears in his third chapter, in the picture on page 
64. The person in the foreground is not Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, as Norton 
contends, rather Shaykh Raghib Harb, Hizbullah’s most influential resistance 
leader in the south, who was assassinated by the Israeli forces on 16 February 
1984. The Open Letter is dedicated to him, among other ideologues. Shaykh 
Raghib had a white turban, while Sayyid Abbas had a black turban. Sayyid 
Abbas was assassinated on 16 February 1992, on his way back from commem-
orating the eighth anniversary of the assassination of Shaykh Raghib. Anyone 
researching Hizbullah should know the difference between the two.
 Imam Musa al-Sadr did not establish Harakat Al-Mahrumin (the Move-
ment of the Deprived) on his own, as Norton seems to suggest (p. 19). In 
1974, al-Sadr, together with Grégoire Haddad, a Greek Catholic archbish-
op, founded Harakat Al-Mahrumin in a bid to alleviate the suffering of the 
deprived people regardless of their sectarian or ethnic affiliations. As such it 
was open to all the ‘downtrodden’ from every sect, and not only restricted to 
Shi‘ites. However, this intercommunity openness did not last long enough, as 
the ruling elites were afraid this would undermine the community’s patron-
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age system. With the outbreak of the civil war, Harakat Al-Mahrumin soon 
developed into a Shi‘ite based movement under the leadership of al-Sadr. Fur-
thermore, the main aim behind al-Sadr’s visit to Libya was not “to attend cer-
emonies commemorating the ascent of the Libyan leader” Qadhaffi to power 
(p. 21). He went to Libya in an attempt to put an end to the Lebanese civil war, 
after the Algerian president told him that Qadhaffi was funding the militias 
across the sectarian divide, as repeatedly stated by al-Sadr’s sister Rabab, “one 
of the most admired woman [sic] in the Lebanese Shi‘i community.” (p. 19)
 Norton’s statements on Khamina’i and Sistani seem to suffer from errors in 
scholarly judgment and errors of attribution. Although Sistani is mentioned 
at least three times before in the course of the book (pp. 31, 100, 101), only in 
the conclusion on p. 151, does Norton make an unsubstantiated claim based 
on his ‘impression’, rather than on reliable surveys or scientific statistics based 
on representative samples of the Shi‘ite population: “… as of November 2006, 
at least 60 percent of all Lebanese [Shi‘ites] follow Sistani, with the rest fol-
lowing Fadlallah. Very few consider themselves ‘imitators’ of Khamenei.” It 
is worth noting that Khamina’i or al-Sayyid al-Qa’id, ‘The Religious Leader’, 
as Hizbullah supporters call him, is the marja‘ al-taqlid (official authority of 
emulation) in the Islamic Republic, and Hizbullah’s official marja‘ (religious 
authority), not marja‘i [sic] (p. 100). Without producing scientific evidence, 
Norton’s claim should be taken with a grain of salt. Keeping in mind that both 
Fadlallah and Sistani are vehemently against wilayat al-faqih, Norton seems 
to contradict himself when he writes that “Nayif Krayem” [sic], a Hizbullah 
cadre, fell out of favor after the Hizbullah establishment suspected that he was 
emulating Fadlallah (p. 118).
 Another mistake of principle surfaces on p. 100. It is too simplistic and 
factually wrong to write that Khamina’i “gave his blessings” to Hizbullah’s par-
ticipation in the electoral process. This is reductionism. As discussed earlier, 
Hizbullah requested Khamina’i’s formal legal opinion (istifta’) on the legiti-
macy of participating in the 1992 elections. As soon as Khamina’i authorized 
and supported (ajaza wa ’ayyada) participation, Hizbullah embarked on 
drafting its election program and officially announced its participation in the 
elections.
 Norton writes that the 2006 July war ended with a “cease-fire” (p. 113). Even 
after one year, UNSC Resolution 1773, which renewed UNIFIL’s mandate till 31 
August 2008, only reiterated what was achieved a year ago by UNSC Resolu-
tion 1701, namely, a cessation of hostilities, rather than a cease-fire, as Norton 
contended, misleading the reader and implying that the war is over.
 Norton does not refer to the national dialogue sessions (pp. 132-133), which 
started in March 2006 and lasted till June. Keeping in mind that the war broke 
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out in July, it is not a coincidence that the last two sessions of 8 and 29 June 
2006 were dedicated to addressing the controversy regarding Hizbullah’s 
weapons and Lebanon’s defense strategy.18
 Norton’s conclusion reads like a chronology of events, which seem to serve 
as an update to the main text of his book. He mistakenly refers to general 
Michel ‘Aun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as the ‘Free Political Movement’ 
(pp. 153; 175). Based on a wrong name, Norton draws wrong conclusions. He 
writes, “‘Aounists’ and the Shi‘a share a profound sense of victimization in 
what they see as a corrupt and unresponsive political system.”19 (p. 153) This 
is an error in scholarly judgment. Although victimization and the desire to 
stamp out corruption might be some common factors between FPM and Hiz-
bullah, these factors are marginal and not central to forging an understand-
ing, let alone an alliance based on mutual interest. A more plausible expla-
nation is that the Christian nationalists (FPM) and the Muslim nationalists 
(Hizbullah) put their hands together, in a church across the old ‘green line’, 
and signed a historic ten-point Understanding – addressing political, eco-
nomic, administrative, security issues, and relations with Syria – after the 5 
February 2006 civil unrest threatened to spark a civil war.20
 Only on the last two pages or so of the conclusion Norton offers some 
analytical insights, which, by the precept of practice, proved to be far off the 
mark and contradictory. This applies to his insistence that “half-solutions and 
compromise usually prevail, just as they will likely prevail in the 2006 crisis” 
(pp. 157-8) and his forecast of “pragmatic compromises” (p. 159) to the politi-
cal deadlock. How could Norton argue along these lines, when he contends 
that the FPM and Hizbullah are working “together to expand their share of 
power in significant measure at the expense of the Sunni Muslims”? (p. 153) 
Norton writes: “Following the resignation of an allied Sunni member and in 
conjunction with these demands [veto over all government measures], all five 
Shi‘i members of the government resigned from the cabinet…” (p. 156) This 
is factually wrong. The five Shi’ite ministers resigned on 11 November 2006, 
and after a few days Jacob Sarraf, the Minister of Environment, followed suit. 
Sarraf is a Greek Orthodox and not a Sunni Muslim; he is allied with the ex-
president Lahud, and thus only indirectly allied with Hizbullah.
 On the whole, in addition to its merits, Norton’s book contains numerous 
errors and contradictions, ranging from very basic factual errors, to errors 
in scholarly judgments, to errors of attribution. In some instances, the book 
reads more like a defense and justification of Hizbullah’s performance, rather 
than a scholarly analysis of it. For instance, Norton seems to exonerate Hiz-
bullah from some acts of terrorism, blaming these on Iran (p. 78). In the con-
clusion, Norton takes care to advertise Hizbullah’s point of view regarding the 
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July 2006 war by writing, “…it was utterly predictable that the Shi‘a would 
emerge from the war as a mobilized, assertive, and more militant commu-
nity.” (p. 158)
* * *
The fifth 2009 printing of Norton’s book is no exception. It is true some mis-
takes were corrected in the subsequent reprints, but many mistakes of prin-
ciple were left unattended. For instance, the map on the first page in the “Pro-
logue” remains deeply flawed. In fact, the latest figures in light of the June 
2009 elections reveal the composition of the Kura population as: 60 percent 
Greek Orthodox, 17 percent Maronite, 21 percent Sunni, and 2 percent Shi‘a. 
So where did the overwhelming majority of Greek Catholics come from?
 Other inaccuracies remain. This also applies to the new facts and informa-
tion added afterword (pp. 161-172). He asserts, “although Hezbollah has tried 
to downplay the hostility of the Sunni groups, it is noteworthy that the party’s 
attempts to reach a rapprochement with the most powerful Sunni Islamist 
groups have failed, at least through the summer of 2008 [sic]” (p. 171). Nor-
ton seems to be unaware of the 18 August 2008 eight-point Understanding 
between Hizbullah and Salafi movement, where, for instance, article five calls 
for mutual defense in case of any foreign or domestic aggression.
 Not being well-informed, Norton comes up with a flawed conclusion: “It is 
a good bet that new parliamentary elections in May [sic] 2009 will only repli-
cate the divisions and animosities represented in the post-Doha government.” 
(p. 171) By the concession of international observers and election watchdogs, 
the 7 June 2009 elections were the most successful elections after the end of 
the civil war in 1990, unprecedentedly held on one day without any bloodshed 
or serious feuds. So reading Norton’s statement in light of the 2009 legislative 
elections reveals just the opposite: the elections were neither an epitome of 
disorder nor did Hizbullah close the door to compromise with its opponents. 
On the contrary, one day after the elections, the party’s secretary-general, 
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah conceded defeat, put his differences aside with the 
March 14 ruling coalition and called for the formation of a national unity gov-
ernment. Rapprochement between Nasrallah, the March 14 Druz leader and 
seasoned politician Walid Jumblatt, and the parliamentary majority leader 
Sa‘d al-Hariri seemed to be inevitable after the elections. In marathon meet-
ings, after a freeze of almost three years, many misunderstandings and mutual 
fears were addressed.
 This culminated in the formation of a national unity cabinet on 9 Novem-
ber 2009, where, as previously agreed, five seats went to the FPM; two for 
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Hizbullah, two for Amal, and one for a ‘neutral’/technocrat Shi‘a personality. 
On 25 November, a reconciliatory meeting at the presidential palace in B‘abda 
between ‘Aun and Jumblatt took place, the first since Jumblatt’s visit to ‘Aun 
in Paris mid-April 2005. On 30 November, in this atmosphere of optimism 
(national unity and reconciliation), Hizbullah released its new Manifesto 
which dropped any mention of the Islamic state and wilayat al-faqih, stressing 
Lebanon as the homeland, calling for the establishment of a strong, capable, 
and just state, while working within the narrow confines of the political sys-
tem through upholding its consensual democracy formula. On 2 December 
2009, ‘Aun held a reconciliatory meeting with Cardinal Sfeir, while the cabinet 
officially approved the policy statement that sanctioned Hizbullah’s weapons 
by stressing “the right of Lebanon, its government, its people, its army, and its 
resistance (Hizbullah) to employ all legitimate means in order to liberate all 
Lebanese territory.” On 12 December, after a three-day parliamentary debate, 
the cabinet received an overwhelming vote of confidence from 122 MPs out 
of 128: one MP voted against, one abstained, and four were absent. The air of 
optimism continued when on 19 and 20 December Sa‘d al-Hariri performed 
a watershed visit to Damascus, where president Bashar al-Asad compromised 
the protocol and hosted him in the Tishrin presidential palace that is reserved 
for presidents and kings. The meeting resulted in “positive and construc-
tive talks” that diffused around five years of tensions between the two coun-
tries. Ironically, the visit and rapprochement between Syria and Lebanon not 
only put the cabinet’s policy statement into effect but also enforced Hizbul-
lah’s Manifesto that called for an urgent need to resume ‘brotherly’ relations 
between the two countries.
 Norton seems to reform his position of constantly defending Hizbullah’s 
actions by contending that the party’s “recent ‘victories’ have been costly on 
every level that matters. The Shi‘i party is as much constrained by its successes 
as its adversaries have been enlivened by its rise.” (p. 172) Nevertheless, this 
future prospect in the closing paragraph of his book seems also far off the 
mark. It is most likely that Hizbullah’s reconciliatory discourse and strategy 
of reaching out to allay the fears of the other after its defeat in the 2009 elec-
tions were conducive in defusing chronic tensions that had almost succeeded 
earlier in igniting another civil war.
 In the fifth reprint of his book, it seems Norton only corrected some 
embarrassing mistakes that might tarnish his reputation as an authority “for 
close to three decades”21 on the Lebanese Shi‘a and Hizbullah, but also com-
mitted other factual and analytically short-sighted blunders, which seem to 
downgrade the overall value of his book and scholarship.
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* * *
In short, the critique of the literature conveys an important weakness and 
apparent difficulty in construing the way Hizbullah’s identity has been per-
manently under reconstruction, thus failing to reveal its new multifaceted, 
complex face. These misconceptions give free reign to picture and depict Hiz-
bullah in a stereotyped, monotonous distorted pattern.
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sufficient to constitute a public sphere. For a public sphere to be said to exist, 
actors must use media to engage in public arguments… An open public sphere 
offers the structural possibility for public deliberation that might change 
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Interests and Public Spheres. New York: Colombia University Press, 1999. 
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are condemned in whichever place they occur”. See http://www.nasrollah.org/
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Giuseppe Cassini… termed as ‘laughable’ allegations that the Bekaa Valley 
housed bases or members of the notorious Al-Qaeda organization… [Cassini 
said] Lebanon was the target of ‘a series of Israeli rumors.’ The Bekaa… ‘is 
neither Afghanistan nor Baluchistan,’ referring to the large expanses there that 
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Foundation’ in Beirut (Majlis Umana’ al-Quds). Qaradawi, the ex-dean of the 
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(Ifta’)”, is also the president of the ‘Jerusalem Foundation’.
164 West Bank and Gaza.
165 Masa’il Jihadiyya wa Hukm Al-‘Amaliyat Al-Istishhadiyyah [Jihadi Issues and 
the Judgement of Martyrdom Operations]. Beirut: Dar Al-Wihda Al-Islamiyya, 
2002, 83.
166 “Armitage’s antipathy for Hizbullah is well known and likely stems from his 
service in the Reagan administration between June 1983 and May 1989. He 
served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and 
was involved with counter terrorism, special operations and Middle East secu-
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US administrations have blamed on Hizbullah”. Nicholas Blanford, “Nasrallah 
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167 A Political Declaration issued by the Central Press Office, 6 September 2002. 
168 Contrary to the US stance, the EU did not classify Hizbullah as a terrorist orga-
nization; rather, it referred to Lebanese citizens wanted by the US. (Al-Safir 29 
December 2001). Israel argues, “The EU has banned Hizbullah’s military arm 
but continues to recognize its political wing”. (See http://www.knesset.gov.il/
lexicon/eng/mia.htm). 
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while the French paratroopers suffered 58 fatalities due to a suicide operation 
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170 “Previously the EU proscribed… what it calls the Hizbullah External Secu-
rity Organization (ESO) in December 2001… Hizbullah, the political party 
represented by MPs in the [Lebanese] Parliament which pursues a broad social 
agenda and retains a military wing called the Islamic Resistance, was left of the 
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list… For several years, Hizbullah’s efforts have been confined to South Leb-
anon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Nicolas Blanford, “Hizbullah could 
end up on EU terrorist list”, Daily Star 13 September 2003.
171 See Hizbullah’s Political Declaration entitled “Hizbollah denounces the Cana-
dian Government’s decision for adding the party on its list of terrorist organi-
zations” issued by the Central Press Office, 12 December 2002; Al-Intiqad 983 
(13 December 2002), 5; Al-Safir and Daily Star, 13 December 2002. 
172 See Nasrallah’s speech, and Al-Intiqad 981-2 (29 November 2002), 12-13. 
173 See the program entitled “Ahzab Lubnan: Al-Hiwar [Lebanese Parties: The 
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4 Political Violence: Suicide operations
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“Hizbullah and Martyrdom.” ORIENT: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wirtschaft und 
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Open Letter or Manifesto. 
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11 See “Hamas declarers ‘open’ war on Israel after slaying of spiritual leader 
Sheikh Ahmed Yasin” and “Israel kills Sheikh Yasin, Hamas pledges all-out 
war”, AFP, 22 March 2004. 
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of and solidarity with the Intifada, when ‘the Brigades of the Great Martyr 
and Leader, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin’ targeted all the Israeli posts in Shib‘a with 
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massive fire power (65 rockets and mortar shells). Hizbullah even trespassed 
the ‘redline’, for the second time since March-April 2002, when it ‘silenced’ an 
Israeli artillery gunship, which was shelling Lebanese territory from the Syrian 
Golan Heights. (See Lebanese Daily Newspapers of 23 March 2004; Al-Manar 
and Al-Nour 22 March 2004). 
13 See al-Intiqad 1054 (23 April 2004).
14 http://english.bayynat.org.lb/se_002/news/rantese19042004.htm
15 For instance, see “IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers”, by Yaakov Lappin 
at: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1237727552054&pagename=JPos
t%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (Accessed 26 March 2009).
16 See “Medics identify 1,505th victim of Gaza assault”, at: http://www.maannews.
net/en/index. php?opr=ShowDeta ils&ID=39171 (Accessed 11 July 2009).
17 Juan Cole and Nikki Keddie (eds.), Shi‘ism and Social Protest. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986, 28. 
18 Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
19 “Prologue in Heaven”: cf. J.W. von Goethe, Faust. Baltimore, MD: Penguin 
Books, 1983. The Martyr’s Mother: cf. Hala Jaber’s “Introduction” in Hizbullah: 
Born with a Vengeance. New York: Colombia University Press, 1997; and cf. 
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. London: Pluto Press, 
2002, 127-133. 
20 For a distinction among the ‘four senses of martyrdom’ employed in this chap-
ter, see Section 4.3.
21 In its war of attrition against the Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon, 
Hizbullah conducted twelve martyrdom operations (‘amaliyyat istishadiyya) 
targeting only Israeli military and intelligence personnel occupying south Leb-
anon. See Hasan Fadlallah, Suqut al-Wahim: Hazimat al-Ihtilal wa Intisar al-
Muqawama fi Lubnan [The Collapse of the Illusion: The Defeat of the Occupier 
and the Victory of the Resistance in Lebanon]. Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2001, 233. 
22 This trait is attributed to Imam Husayn and Imam Ali. See the manual on 
jihad and martyrdom entitled, Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin, op. cit., 54. I 
interpret this statement as a reference to symbolic capital. 
23 This bears a striking resemblance to Nasrallah’s political discourse, especially 
his speeches – on 20, 22 and 25 May 2001; and 23 May 2002 – commemorating 
the first and second anniversaries of the Israeli withdrawal. Cf. André Mal-
raux, Man’s Fate. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
24 Compiled from Nasrallah’s speech delivered after his son’s death on 13 Sep-
tember 1997. See ‘Irs Aylul:Qissat al-Shahid Hadi Hasan Nasrallah [September’s 
Wedding: The Story of the Martyr Hadi Hasan Nasrallah]. Beirut: Dar Al-
Amir, 2001; and Sjil Al-Nur: Qanadil Ila Al-Zaman Al-Akhar [Al-Nur’s Record: 
Lanterns to the Hereafter]. A book by Hizbullah’s Central Information Office, 
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October 1998. 
25 Al-Jihad wa Khisal Al-Mujahidin, 31-37.
26 See Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les Nouveaux Martyrs D’Allah [God’s New Martyrs]. 
Paris: Flammarion, 2002, 12-20
27 Ahmad Moussalli, Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements 
in the Arab World, Iran, and Turkey. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999, 
98, 154-155. 
28 See Nasrallah’s speech on the first day of Muharram 1425 AH, 20 February 
2004. 
29 See Nasrallah’s speech in the weekly commemoration of the martyrdom of 
Youssef Mer‘i, 14 March 2004. 
30 For instance, Russett et al. argue, “terrorism is indeed the weapon of groups 
that are relatively weak.” See Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, 
World Politics: The Menu for Choice. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000, 
209. Hinnebusch also concedes that terrorism is the “weapon of the weak”. See 
Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policy 
of Middle East States. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 77. The 
same view is shared by Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations 
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hypothesis that propounds that the phenomenon of ‘relative deprivation’ is 
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“the individual’s perception of a discrepancy between his value expectati-
ons – economic, political, social – and gratification of those expectations” is 
the reason behind a ‘persisting deprivation’. This ‘persisting deprivation’ is a 
motivating state for anger that leads to aggression as its inherently satisfying 
response (James Davies (ed.), When Men Revolt and Why? New York: The Free 
Press, 1971, 294). Thus, theorists such as Ted Gurr and James Davies under-
score this discontented ‘state of mind’ as the chief determinant of revolution 
rather than the actual supply (or lack of) of material needs, social and political 
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source intensifies social conflict, especially when basic values are at stake that 
raises the potential for extremist political movements (Ibid., 299). 
34 See al-Musawi’s article entitled “Despair, oppression and faith are midwives to 
martyrdom”, Daily Star, 8 April 2002, 7. 
35 Moojan Momen, The Phenomenon of Religion: A Thematic Approach. Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 1999, 230.
36 According to Khamina’i, “martyrdom constitutes the highest level of jihad in 
the name of God”. See Al-Imam Al-Khamina‘i, ‘Itr Al-Shahada [The Perfume of 
Martyrdom]. Beirut: Al-Dar Al-Islamiyyah, 2001, 16-17.
37 Moussalli, Historical Dictionary…, 185-6. Antoun concurs with Moussalli that 
“martyrdom is the ultimate evidence of the activist orientation of fundamen-
talism–action to the point of death.” See Richard T. Antoun, Understanding 
Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements. Oxford: Altamira 
Press, 2001, 147. 
38 Based on fieldwork conducted three times in Lebanon: from 27 September 
2001 till 26 February 2002; from 20 June 2002 till 6 March 2003; and from 9 
November 2003 till 6 December 2003. 
39 As previously stated, she labeled her son as “an anti-Destin, a bronze hawk, a 
hard-core altruist, whose greatest duty and source of pride [honor and dignity] 
is to sacrifice himself for the well-being of his country”; “This is the greatest 
pride that can befall a mother”. (Italics added for emphasis). 
40 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1993, 7; In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990, 22, 111, as cited in Kane, Muslim Modernity…, 21.
41 See Hizbullah’s “Identity and goals”. 
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nity”. Hizbullah’s “Identity and goals”. 
43 Kane, Muslim Modernity…, 22. It is worth mentioning that (4:95) is not the 
only Qur’anic verse that conveys the idea of symbolic capital. There are so 
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and “death [is preferable] to humiliation”. As will be demonstrated later, 
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justify martyrdom operations against the Israeli occupying army, so do the 
relatives of martyrs when they endeavor to offer a rationale and justification 
for martyrdom. 
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victory”; “Our contact with the Jews is a contact of a foe to a foe.” S‘adé formed 
a brigade to fight Israel, and, in 1949, he was executed by the Lebanese state 
by a firing squad. For a discussion on the ideology of SSNP see, for instance, 
Labib Z. Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis. 
Harvard: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1966; Haytham A. Kader, The 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party: Its Ideology and Early History. Beirut: Dar Fikr, 
1990; and Christoph Schaumann. “The Generation of Broad Expectations”, Die 
Welt Des Islams, 41 (2001), 2, 174-205.
46 Although the Muslim tradition distinguishes among eight categories of mar-
tyrdom all referring to ‘premature or violent death’, in this chapter I mainly 
confine myself to the fist category, namely, martyrdom in the name of God 
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ral, Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, on the subject of ‘Al-Shahada wa al-‘Ithar’ [Martyr-
dom and ‘Preference’] in the program entitled “Al-Din wa Al-Hayat [Religion 
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184. 
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drastic was going to happen. So I boarded a KLM flight and landed in Beirut 
on 6 July. My presence in the field gave me the first-hand privilege to observe, 
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38 Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. The war led to the death of around 1200 
Lebanese, one-third of whom were children under the age of 12; wounded and 
handicapped 4000; displaced more than one million; and caused around $ 15 
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Figures”, in Yadi‘ot Ahronot (15 August 2006). 
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stability and security in the south; putting the 1949 Armistice Agreement 
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46 Idem, 244.
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statistics (Accessed: 2 August 2006).
48 The US banned dealings and froze the assets of the state-run Iranian Sadirat 
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Reuters, and Al-Safir (8-9 September 2006). 
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50 Al-Intiqad 1228 (17 August 2007), 4.
51 Al-Manar, 7:30pm News, 14 January 2010.
52 Aired on December 27, 2006.
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Haaretz, 9 April 2007. 
54 Interview with New TV.
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is an Apodictic Proof (Hujja)”.
56 Although Hizbullah already took precautions and dug elaborate dungeons, 
it would have sufficed if Israeli planes caused a sonic boom, which would 
have resulted in stampede and chaos. Fearing the worst the party canceled its 
annual show of force on ‘Jerusalem Day’, the last Friday of Ramadan.
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   258 26-4-2011   13:43:12
259notes to From Cooptation to Contestation to Political Power
57 Mawsu‘at Nasrallah, Volume III, 151-177.
58 The pun is that his name means ‘Victory of God’.
59 Calhoun, op. cit., 251.
60 Speaker Nabih Berri refused to convene the parliament for more than 10 
months after the resignation of the six ministers. Also, like the Lebanese oppo-
sition, the outgoing president considered the cabinet as unconstitutional after 
the resignation took place on 11 November 2006, thus refusing to ratify any 
bill submitted to him by it.
61 67% of the Christian voters voted for the FPM. 
62 He is the vice-president of Hizbullah’s political council and the head of Hiz-
bullah’s committee on Christian-Muslim dialogue. Salun Al-Sabt, Sawt Lubnan 
(Radio Voice of Lebanon), 6 May 2007.
63 Calhoun, op. cit., 252.
64 In Lebanon, the Muslims include Shi‘ites, Sunnis, Druz, and ‘Alawis. 
65 Had a parliamentary bloc of fourteen members. 
66 Composed of four big blocs and a few independents. 
67 Naturally Hizbullah benefited from the Understanding and its alliance with 
the FPM, before, during, and after the war. Before the war, by saving Lebanon 
from plunging again into civil war after the 5 February 2006 civil unrest, thus 
boosting Hizbullah’s image as a nationalist Lebanese political party. During 
the war, the Christian areas were no more off-limits to the Hizbullahis, where 
the Shi‘ite displaced were well treated and received all the aid they needed by 
members of the FPM (along other regional and international NGOs), which is 
unprecedented since the outbreak of the civil war on 13 April 1975. After the 
war, Hizbullah aspired for veto power through political alliance. 
68 Calhoun, op. cit., 249.
69 This is reminiscent of the 19 August assertion of the Lebanese Minister of 
Defense that the decision to wage war and peace should be the sole preroga-
tive of the Lebanese government.
70 Mustapha, Al-I‘sar…, 276-278. 
71 Hizbullah’s psychological warfare is not only confined to the battlefield; rather, 
as masters of public relations and publicity, Hizbullah exploit its media to such 
ends. 
72 For instance, see al-Intiqad 1189 (17 November 2006): 1-2, and 1191 (1 Decem-
ber 2006): 2.
73 Salun Al-Sabt, Sawt Lubnan (Radio Voice of Lebanon), 6 May 2007.
74 Hizbullah’s MPs approved laws dealing with prostitution, gambling (casinos), 
drinking, etc. See Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, op. cit., 161-165.
75 The position of the Egyptian street seemed to be in accordance with its 
government, after it was at odds with it during the war supporting Hizbullah 
through popular demonstrations. 
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76 The security arm of the Lebanese state killed thirteen Hizbullah supporters 
– including two women – and wounded 40 because they took to the streets 
when the Hariri government imposed a ban on demonstrations on 13 Septem-
ber 1993, when the party was protesting peacefully against the Oslo Agree-
ment. On 27 May 2004, demonstrations spread all over the country in protest 
of the pressing socio-economic situation. In Hizbullah’s southern suburb of 
Beirut, the Lebanese army fired at the demonstrators killing five and woun-
ding several others. 
77 Some Hizbullah cadres bragged that the government would resign in 33 hours; 
others affirmed that it would resign before 33 days. Neither materialized. 
78 See his 1 and 10 December 2006 speeches. This is another morally charged 
statement, which puts Hizbullah and its reputation and credibility at stake.
79 At a time when Lebanese public debt reached a high of 180% of the GDP, in the 
presence of 33 countries and international organizations, Lebanon received 
pledges of $ 6.7 billion in loans and $ 1 billion in donations.
80 Al-Intiqad 1199 (26 January 2007), 3. This was Nasrallah’s first fatwa in the 
political sphere. 
81 The Lebanese army imposed a curfew from 8:30 pm to 6:00am, which was the 
first measure since the May 1973 curfew, before the civil war erupted. 
82 Quoting a hadith by Prophet Muhammad, Al-Safir’s front page editorial admo-
nished against discord: “Fitna is slumbering; God damn [Those] who wake it 
up.” See al-Safir 10611 (26 January 2007).
83 Symbolizing the color of blood, the cover page of al-Intiqad portrayed the 
map of Lebanon surrounded by the color red, and the main slogan in yellow, 
Hizbullah’s color, “The Government of the Militias Confronts the Republic of 
the Opposition”, and a small headline in black, symbolizing the color of death, 
“The Wisdom of the Opposition and the [Tactical] Moves of the Lebanese 
Army Warded off Fitna”. Al-Intiqad 1199 (26 January 2006).
84 Sayyid Hani Fahs is a member of the legislative council of the Islamic  
Shi‘ite Higher Council in Lebanon and a founding member of the Arab team 
for the Muslim-Christian dialogue and the permanent committee for the 
Lebanese dialogue. 
85 Because of his views, on 16 May 2008, he was stripped of his position by the 
Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council and was replaced by Shaykh Hasan Abdallah. 
During his meeting with Shaykh Muhammad Al-Hajj Hasan on 19 July 2009, 
the latter condemned the decision arguing that the council is not a private 
property for a certain family or party (in reference to Hizbullah), warning 
them to carefully read into the wave of condemnations that occurred in Iran 
after the elections against the ‘unjust’ rulers. Al-Hajj Hasan questioned that 
since turbans have a certain sanctity, then why discriminate and differentiate 
among religious scholars on the basis of their views and opinions, in a country 
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where the freedom of expression is supposed to be sacred? Al-Hajj Hasan con-
demned the killing of one of his followers in the Biqa‘ calling on the Lebanese 
authorities to administer justice in this regard. See Lebanese daily newspapers 
of 20 July 2009 and http://www.lebanonfiles.com/news_desc.php?id=107657 
(Accessed 19 July 2009). 
86 On 15 April 2007, he accused Hizbullah of preventing him from holding a 
press conference in his home town, Shmistar, in the Biqa‘. He also claimed 
that Hizbullah intended to get rid of him by fueling a family feud, whereby he 
would be the victim. 
87 He continuously criticized Hizbullah’s ‘miscalculated adventure’ in the 
2006 July War. In defiance to Hizbullah, his rapprochement to the March 14 
Christians led him to go to church and participate in the funeral service of MP 
Pierre Jumayyel.
88 For instance, al-Amin’s elder son is finishing an 11-years study in Qum to 
become a mujtahid. His cousin Muhammad Hasan al-Amin is the chief judge 
in the southern city of Sidon; his nephew is also establishing a seminary, etc.
89 Al-Amin and Sharafeddine families constitute the two main pillars of Jabal 
‘Amil. 
90 From 1994 till his death in 2001. See http://www.shamseddine.com/ and http://
www.shiitecouncil.com/ (Accessed 5 June 2008).
91 The more followers a marja‘ has, the more powerful he is, both financially and 
religiously. See Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, op. cit., 73-75.
92 He has a distinguishably big turban. 
93 Khamina’i boasted that he would make Lebanon the place of defeat and humi-
liation for the US and Israel.
94 On 13 July 2007, Ahmad al-As‘ad, the son of the ex-speaker Kamel al-As‘ad, 
founded another marginal Shi‘ite opposition group to Hizbullah known as 
‘Tayyar Lubnan Al-Kafa’at’ (Lebanese Merit Movement). Later the name was 
revised to ‘Tayyar Al-Intima’ Al-Lubnani’ (Lebanese Belonging Movement).
95 Al-Intiqad 1428 (13 April 2007), 10-14.
96 From a demographic viewpoint, Nasrallah might be right. He stressed the idea 
of rebirth, not on the commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday; but waiting 
until Easter. The analogy between a movement’s rebirth after years of struggle 
and the Christian theology of resurrection was not accidental.
97 Most US media outlets referred to it as, ‘The pro-American government of 
Sanyura’. 
98 Jeffry Feltman was the US ambassador to Lebanon at the time. 
99 Dr Dawud al-Sayegh, a veteran political aide to the late ex-PM Rafiq Hariri 
and to his son Sa‘d, conceded that states have interests, but refused to use 
the term ‘foreign tutelage’ preferring instead ‘foreign attention’ (al-ihtimam 
al-khariji). As examples to support his argument, he cited the visits of the 
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Spanish PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and the Italian PM Romano Prodi 
in support of the French presidential candidate Ségolène Royal against Nicolas 
Sarkozy, and Vladimir Putin’s visit in support of Gerhard Schröder against 
Angela Merkel. 
100 Which, as mentioned earlier, reflects the power base in the parliament.
101 One political commentator argued that the precept of practice seemed to sug-
gest that Sanyura proved to be a statesman, rather than a tax collector.
102 Calhoun, op. cit., 254.
103 Currently Nawwaf Al-Musawi is an MP and Muhammad Fnaysh is the Minis-
ter of Administrative Reform.
104 Lebanese daily newspapers the next day, especially al-Nahar no. 22994. 
105 During a talk show with the Iranian Satellite TV ‘Al-‘Alam’ (The World) on 5 
May 2007.
106 For instance, on 9 August 2006, Nasrallah appeared on Lebanese TV stations 
unequivocally endorsing the Seven Points. 
107 In the morning talk show ‘Naharkum Sa‘id’ (‘Good Morning’) on LBCI on 27 
April 2007.
108 On 30 May 2007, the UNSC Resolution 1757 established, under chapter seven, 
the International Tribunal (STL) of the Hariri murder, effective 10 June 2007.
109 Berri’s initiative on the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the disappearance 
of Imam Musa al-Sadr seemingly eroded the Hizbullah-led opposition’s 
demand of the formation of a national unity cabinet, even “half an hour before 
the presidential elections”, and apparently shelved such a demand till the elec-
tion of a new president, as the March 14 Trend has repeatedly requested. (See 
Lebanese daily newspapers of 1 September 2007). Unfortunately, this was also 
a tactical move, and not a genuine policy shift.
110 The tenure of the outgoing president Lahud ended on 24 November 2007, with 
the failure of the parliament to elect a new president during the constitutio-
nal period between 24 September and 23 November 2007. Before the election 
of president Michel Sulyman on 25 May 2008, the speaker delayed the vote 
nineteen times. 
111 Calhoun, op. cit., 258.
112 Ibid., 259.
113 Back then BDL funded both cabinets. This possibility seems out of the questi-
on these days because of the estimated $ 55 billion public debt that is rupturing 
Lebanon. 
114 Although the patriarch stressed that the president should be elected by a two-
third majority in the parliament (as the Hizbullah-led opposition argued), he 
cautioned that boycotting the parliamentary session to electing the president 
is tantamount to boycotting Lebanon.
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115 Une guerre pour les autres. Preface by Dominique Chevallier. Paris: Jean-Clau-
de Lattès, 1985. 
116 Al-Safir 10876 (29 August 2007), 4.
117 Although Hizbullah does not work on the basis of speculations, this does not 
mean that the party does not have contingency measures and well-contrived 
anticipatory plans. 
118 MP Walid ‘Ido was assassinated on 13 June 2007, in a car bomb in West Beirut, 
the Muslim sector of the Lebanese capital. On 19 September, a powerful explo-
sion ripped the Eastern sector of Beirut killing the Phalangist MP Antoine 
Ghanem. Hizbullah vehemently condemned both explosions. Like the case of 
the six previously politically motivated assassinations, which all targeted anti-
Syrian politicians, March 14 pinned the blame directly on the Syrian regime.
119 Six other deadly explosions and the annihilation of four terror cells and the 
arrest of many others ripped the fragile peace that Lebanon was witnessing. 
According to the Lebanese Minister of Defense, after the Lebanese army took 
total control of the Nahr al-Barid camp on 2 September 2007, at least 150 Fatah 
al-Islam militants were killed and around 300 were arrested, while 170 Leba-
nese soldiers were killed and more than 1,000 were wounded. Also, a total of 
42 civilians died, including those who passed away as a result of the militants’ 
rockets that were fired on nearby villages (32 Palestinian civilians and 10 Leba-
nese civilians).
120 On 12 December 2007 al-Hajj, the chief of military operations and the pre-
sumed successor to Lebanese army commander, was killed by a car bomb in 
B‘abda, a Christian area where the presidential palace, many Western embas-
sies, and at the nearby Yarzé, the headquarters of the LA are located. Al-Hajj 
headed the ground operations at Nahr al-Barid. Also, Fatah al-Islam targeted 
UNIFIL three times with roadside bombs, fatally injuring three Spanish sol-
diers on 24 June 2007, and a US embassy reconnaissance vehicle on 15 January 
2008.
121 In the above piece, which I wrote in September 2007, I rightfully predicted 
Hizbullah’s show of force in May 2008.
6 The Doha 2008 Accord and its Aftermath
1 It is Ironic to note that Wafiq Shuqayr submitted his resignation to the Minis-
ter of Interior after the 20-year old Firas Husayn Haydar, who used to live two 
kilometres away in the Dahiya, was found dead on 10 July 2010 in the wheel 
compartment of Nasair, a Saudi airliner that was carrying important Saudi 
personalities, including high-ranking military officials. Since Haydar had a 
picture of Imam Khumayni in his wallet, some media outlets claimed that he 
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   263 26-4-2011   13:43:13
264Notes
was either a Hizbullah member or a sympathizer, implying an attempted ‘ter-
rorist attack’. (NNA, 13 July 2010). 
2 And also more than 200 wounded according to AFP estimates, while Reuters 
reported the death toll as 80. 
3 See Nasrallah’s speech of 26 May 2008.
4 The vacant seat of assassinated MP Antoine Ghanem was not filled because the 
parliament failed to conduct partial elections. 
5 See the editorial of al-Akhbar 524 (15 May 2008).
6 See al-Intiqad 1290 (15 August 2008); al-Intiqad 1291 (18 August 2008), 5; al-
Intiqad 1294 (29 August 2008): 3; Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 275-9; NNA, 
18 August 2008. 
7 NNA.
8 Yakan was the pioneer of Sunni Islamism in Lebanon and a principal founder 
of the Islamic Association (Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya). In August 2006, Yakan 
established the Islamic Work Front (Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami), an umbrella 
organization that aims to coalesce Lebanese opposition Sunni groups and 
personalities.
9 March 14 won 55% of the parliamentary seats, and March 8 appropriated the 
remaining 45%. Whereas in terms of public mandate, demographic factors weig-
hed in: March 8 earned 55% of the votes, and March 14 got 45% of the votes.
10 Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Muhammad Fnaysh (O); Husayn al-Musawi (N); Hasan 
Fadlallah (O); Ali Ammar (O); Walid Sukariyyé, Sunni (N); Kamel al-Rifa‘i, 
Sunni (O); Ali al-Miqdad (O); Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (O); Ali Fayyad (N); 
Nawwaf Al-Musawi (N); Nawwar al-Sahili (O). 
11 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=15765&cid=199 (Accessed 15 
September 2009).
12 Al-Hariri congratulated Barud for fulfilling his promise, extolled the ‘unpre-
cedented accomplishment’ of successfully holding the elections in one day 
without any tangible security threat or infraction. 
13 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 17 September 2009. 
14 See the editorials of al-Safir 11398 and al-Nahar 23818 dated 17 September 
2009. 
15 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 11255 (21 September 2009). Tazkiya literally means a pro-
nouncement of someone’s integrity or credibility. (Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of 
Modern Written Arabic. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1980, 380). 
16 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=16050&cid=199 (Accessed 19 
September 2009).
17 http://arabic.bayynat.org.lb/ (Accessed 9 September 2009).
18 Arend Lijphart, Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Evaluation. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 
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19 Personal interview, 18 January 2010. See also his book: Fragile States: Dilem-
mas of Stability in Lebanon and the Arab World. Oxford: International NGO 
Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), 2008 (ISBN 878-1-905240-13-5) (95 
pages). In order to inculcate democratic experience and practice among its 
members, in addition to Lijphart, Hizbullah indoctrinates them with the likes 
of The Federalist Papers, Alex de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, David 
Held’s Theories of Democracy, Carl Schmitt’s The Crisis of Paliamentary Demo-
cracy, Marcel Gauchet’s Situations de la democratie [The Conditions of Demo-
cracy] and Madness and Democracy, as well as other theoreticians on Western 
democracy, especially in the US.
20 NNA, 29 October 2009.
21 He vehemently criticized Hizbullah’s May 2008 ‘bloodbath’. In a show of 
solidarity with the Sunnis of Beirut, al-Amin prayed behind the Sunni Mufti 
of the Republic in the ‘Id al-Fitr prayer service commemorating the end of the 
fasting in the holy month of Ramadan 2009.
22 As he contended, Hizbullah and Amal stormed the headquarters of the Islamic 
Shi‘ite Higher Council (Dar al-Ifta’) in Tyre and destroyed his library and 
confiscated his publications.
23 He referred to the Qur’an (4: 93): “And he who kills a believer intentionally 
will, as punishment, be thrown into Hell, dwelling in it forever; and Allah will 
be angry with him, curse him and prepare for him a dreadful punishment.” 
24 “Mufti of Tyre Sayyid ‘Ali Al-Amin: The state does not beg, rather it [should] 
extend its authority and sovereignty on all Lebanese soil.” Interview with 
Hasan Shalha and Muhammad Mizhir, Al-Liwa’ 12719 (26 October 2009).
25 NNA, 8 November 2009. 
26 After May 2008, the ministry of interior was classified as a security ministry 
along side the ministry of interior. 
27 See Lebanese daily Newspapers of 10 November 2009. 
28 Mainly the residence of the party’s leading cadres and its security institutions.
29 In Abrahamic religions, including Islam, ten is a perfect number.
30 A reference to the Shib‘a Farms and the occupied part of the Ghajar village.
31 See al-Nahar 23887 (27 November 2009), 1, 6-7.
32 NNA, 22 November 2009. 
33 See “‘Aun Breaks the Barriers with Bkirké and Explains his Stance: A new page 
for the Christians and the Lebanese and a very successful visit”, al-Intiqad (4 
December 2009), 9.
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7 The Eighth Conclave: A New Manifesto (November 
2009)
1 Since ‘Islamic state’ and ‘relations with Christians’ were discussed in chapters 
one and two, I will not refer to these again below. 
2 Hizbullah is not monopolizing the use of religion, as Roy seems to imply, 
rather the party employs the word Hizbullah in an extended, inclusive, and 
progressive sense, which includes all believers from all religious denominati-
ons. Hajj Muhammad Al-Jammal, Hizbullah’s spokesman, argued along these 
lines on the occasion of receiving a Danish delegation – composed of students, 
researchers, and faculty, mainly from Aarhus University and the University of 
Southern Copenhagen, and some Danish journalists – at the Central Infor-
mation Office, 30 March 1999. Cf. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search 
for a New Umma. Revised and updated edition. London: Hurst and Company, 
2004, 249, 329.
3 Cf. As‘ad Abu Khalil, “Ideology and Practice of Hizbollah in Lebanon: Islami-
zation of Leninist Organizational Principles”, Middle Eastern Studies, 27 (July 
1991), 3, 395; and Roy, op. cit., 247-248.
4 ‘The Union of Muslim ‘Ulama’ was established in the wake of the Israeli inva-
sion in June 1982.
5 See Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan and Al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizbullah…, 
especially 147-163.
6 Imam Khumayni, Al-Kalimat Al-Qisar: Al-Islam wa A‘malina [Short Words: 
Islam and our Words], 193, as cited in: Rafiq Sulayman Fidda, Athar Al-Imam 
Al-Khymayni ala Al-Qadiyya Al-Filastiniyya [Imam Khymayni’s Impact on the 
Palestinian Cause]. Beirut: n.d., 170.
7 Westoxification, a term coined in the 1960s by an Iranian intellectual called 
Jalal al-Ahmad, denotes the venomous Western civilizational influence and 
hegemony on other civilizations and cultures.
8 The UK has replaced France, which is classified by Hizbullah as a neutral state, 
rather than the original position of being regarded as a foe. It is worth noting 
that France was on Iraq’s side during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war.
9 Abun-Nasr, Hizbullah: Haqa’iq wa Ab‘ad…, 72-73.
10 Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 172; and documents collected by the author 
from the party’s think tank the Consultative Center of Studies and Documen-
tation (CCSD). 
11 Hasan Fadlallah, Al-Khiyar al-Akhar…, 137.
12 Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 172-4; and documents collected by the aut-
hor from the CCSD. 
13 Nasrallah’s cousin from the mother’s side (ibn khaltu).
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   266 26-4-2011   13:43:14
267notes to The Eighth Conclave: A New Manifesto (November 2009)
14 See Hizbullah’s political declaration of 7 July 1995; Al-Madini, Amal wa Hiz-
bullah…, 174-5; al-Safir 8 July 1995: “Hizbullah Reelects Sayyid Nasrallah as 
Secretary General”, and al-Nahar 29 July 1995: “Leadership Changes in Hizbul-
lah.”
15 Al-Safir 6 August 1998; Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 178-9; and Imad 
Marmal, “The Results of Hizbullah’s Conclave”, al-Safir 1 August 1998. Marmal 
is al-Safir columnist and al-Manar political talk show presenter.
16 According to documents collected by the author from the CCSD. 
17 Interview with Al-Bilad 12 October 1994.
18 Hizbullah is careful to clarify that its animosity is towards the US administra-
tion, and not the US people. (This seems to be in conformity with Khumayni’s 
discourse on hakimiyyat Allah or ‘God’s Sovereignty’, which is tolerant towards 
the populace, but not the ruling elite. This stands in sharp contrast to Bin 
Laden’s nihilist discourse that does not distinguish between the two). 
19 See Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah to issue updated version of manifesto: New 
‘Open Letter’ will reflect changes”, Daily Star (28 October 2002), 2. 
20 Reinoud Leenders, “Hizbullah: Rebel Without a Cause?” ICG Middle East Brie-
fing Paper, 30 July 2003, 19. (http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/middleeast/
arab-israeliconflict/reports/A401070_30072003.pdf).
21 Interviewee wishes to remain anonymous. This person contended that 
16 February was the intended date of launching the new document.
22 Sobelman, Rules of the Game…, 21, 23.
23 Ibid., 103.
24 Two leading cadres in the Islamic Resistance were assassinated by blowing 
up their cars: Ghalib Awali on 19 July 2004 and Ali Husayn Salih on 2 August 
2003. The Lebanese government and Hizbullah accused Israel of being behind 
these assassinations; Israel repeatedly denied any involvement or responsibility 
in these attacks. 
25 See “ ‘Abna’ Al-Tufayli’ Yuhajimun Nasrallah [Tufayli’s Followers Chastise Nas-
rallah]”, Al-Safir 5 July 2004.
26 Compiled from Al-Safir 17 and 18 August 2004; Lebanese daily newspapers 
of 18 August 2004; and “Hizbullah’s Seventh Conclave: Vivid Organization, 
Stability of Leadership, and A follow up on Recent Events”, Al-Intiqad 1071 (20 
August 2004). 
27 At the time of the appointment, Rima Fakhry was a 38-year old mother of four. 
She has been a Hizbullah member since the age of eighteen. She also holds a BSc 
in Agriculture from the American University of Beirut. Al-Safir 5 January 2005; 
Daily Star 6 and 7 January 2005; al-Intiqad 1091 (7 January 2005). 
28 This seems to suggest, more and more, the credibility of Hizbullah’s infitah 
policy. 
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29 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 20 November 2009, especially al-Safir 11452; 
and al-Safir 11454 (24 November 2009).
30 No wonder the conclave took a lot of time; a new manifesto was also in the works.
31 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=16230&cid=199; http://
english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=9567&cid=214 
32 The leadership realized that the pen name of Jawad Nureddine did not save 
Imad Mughniyyé from assassination. So, they decided not only to keep the 
name a secret, but also not to announce the eighth member at all. 
33 After the Manifesto was released it attracted a lot of media coverage to the 
extent that it was item number one on the news and Nasrallah’s press confe-
rence took center stage by being portrayed on the front page and in editorials 
of most Lebanese dailies. 
34 Personal interview, 23 November 2009. 
35 Most of these rhyme in Arabic; so it is difficult to capture the exact meaning 
and implications/connotations in an English translation. See “Order Stems 
from Religious Belief and its Manifestations on the Street”, al-Intiqad (20 
November 2009), 4.
36 http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.
aspx?id=116716&language=ar [Accessed 24 December 2009]
37 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 20 November 2009, especially al-Safir 11452; 
and al-Safir 11454 (24 November 2009). Although in its 17 November 2009 
copy under “Press Secrets” al-Akhbar was the first to announce the end of the 
conclave, it is interesting to note that it is perhaps the only Lebanese daily that 
did not mention anything on the issue in its 20 November editorial. Al-Safir 
showed the most extensive coverage, but it mistakenly stated the seventh con-
clave instead of the eighth. 
38 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, 54. 
39 Chapter I, Section 2: “Our region and the American Scheme”, 24-25.
40 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, 56.
41 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, 54-55. 
42 Chapter III, Section 1: “Palestine and the Zionist entity”, 60.
43 Chapter III, Section 1: “Palestine and the Zionist entity”, 58.
44 Chapter I, Section 1: “The World and Western-American Hegemony”, 21.
45 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, 55-56.
46 Chapter II, Section 5: “Lebanon and Arab Relations”, 49
47 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, 51-2.
48 Chapter II, Section 5: “Lebanon and Arab Relations”, 47.
49 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, 50.
50 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 8, as cited in: The Shifts in Hizbul-
lah’s Ideology, 236.
51 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, 53.
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1 Stephen Saideman, “Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy”, 
in: Identity and Foreign Policy…, op. cit., 191.
2 (Italics in original). See Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. New 
York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2003, 18.
3 Some notable figures I interviewed in August and October 2009 and January 
and June 2010 are the following: Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, member of Hizbul-
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Praise for Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (1978-2010)
***
Alagha offers a nuanced and sophisticated look at how 
Hizbullah’s ideology and political tactics have evolved. His work sheds light 
on an important, but to Western audiences mysterious and opaque, political 
force in Lebanon.
Daniel L. Byman, Director of Georgetown’s Security Studies Program and 
the Center for Peace and Security Studies and Associate Professor at the 
School of Foreign Service
***
Joseph Alagha’s book is to date one of the most scrupulous 
and meticulously researched works on Hizbullah. Articulate, and 
devastatingly accurate, Alagha’s work is a refreshing departure from 
the bland panegyric hagiographies that have defined the canon of those 
plodding the marshes of Hizbullah’s murky history.
Franck Salameh, Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Arabic, and 
Hebrew, Boston College, USA. Author of Language, Memory and Identity 
in the Middle East: The Case of Lebanon (2010)
***
Joseph Alagha has written the most up-to-date study of the 
Shi‘i organization, Hizbullah. Through an analysis of Hizbullah’s identity, 
Alagha carefully follows the evolution of the organization’s political 
ideology as it has changed to respond to the challenges of the time. His 
book underscores the dynamism of Hizbullah and demonstrates the extent 
of the organization’s successes as well as predicaments and possible future 
challenges. To the best of my knowledge, there is no work that covers the 
evolution of Hizbullah’s ideology all the way to 2010, so extensively and 
meticulously.
Professor Asher Kaufman, a leading specialist on the tri-border area of 
Israel, Lebanon and Syria, and a Lebanon Identity expert, Notre Dame 
University, USA 
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Alagha offers a comprehensive analysis of a socio-religious 
movement whose importance both within the larger field of Lebanese 
political and social life and with regard to continued conflict and the 
chances for peace in the Middle East cannot be overstated. The book has 
the potential to become a reference work on Hizbullah and socio-religious 
movements more broadly across the Middle East.
Professor Armando Salvatore, Chair of Sociology, School of Islamic  
Studies, Oriental Studies University, Naples, Italy
***
Joseph Alagha’s portrait of Hizbullah reveals an 
organization that has gradually changed its identity and its policies, 
becoming more Lebanese and more political as it has had to cope with the 
harsh realities of the environment in which it operates. His discussion of 
“wilayat al-faqih” and the “New Manifesto” of 2009 will be particularly 
enlightening to most Western readers.
William B. Quandt, Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Politics,  
University of Virginia, USA
***
This is a fascinating and innovative exploration of one of 
the most controversial religio-political movements of the last half century. 
Alagha’s deep knowledge of Hizbullah and complete command of his 
sources provide new insights into both the theological uniqueness of 
Shi‘i Islam in Lebanon, and the complex relationship between Islam 
and nationalism that is used to justify the movement’s extreme violence, 
particularly through suicide bombings. A sure must-read for any scholar or 
policymaker looking better to understand Hizbullah’s history and possible 
futures.
Mark Levine, Professor of Modern Middle East History at the  
University of California, Irvine, USA
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Alagha’s book on Hizbullah’s ideology and history is a 
must-read for anyone interested in the politics of Islam and the modern 
Middle East. Based in part on fieldwork among Hizbullah’s members, the 
author offers a nuanced and original reading of the movement’s inner 
workings and ideological developments as well as the unvarnished views of 
many Hizbullahis.
Bernard Haykel is Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Director of the 
Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, 
North Africa and Central Asia (TRI) at Princeton University, USA
***
This is a thorough analysis based on deep knowledge of 
Hizbullah and Lebanese politics in its regional context. Hizbullah’s 
transformation and performance undergoes a rigorous critique that debunks 
main myths about the Party and demonstrates its phenomenal influence 
in Lebanese politics and its significant regional role. The work points out 
Hizbullah’s structural limitations despite its proven adaptability to changing 
circumstance. The methodology that the author employs and his painstaking 
research, allows him to reach conclusions that make the work a corrective to 
previous scholarship on Hizbullah.
Ibrahim G. Aoude, Professor and Chair, Department of Ethnic Studies, 
University of Hawai’i, USA, and Editor of Arab Studies Quarterly
***
Since its birth in the early 1980s, Hizbullah has emerged not 
only as the preeminent Shia organization in Lebanon and the Arab world, 
but also as the most effective link in the chain of ‘resistance’ to Israel and 
pro-Western Arab forces. For an organization that is so outwardly radical, 
it is extraordinary that it also behaves so pragmatically – joining the 
Lebanese government, on the one hand, and cultivating close links with 
militant Lebanese Maronite elements, on the other. Hizbullah then is an 
enigma, and its ability to successfully navigate the Middle East’s complex 
power relationships is mystifying. Hence the importance of Joseph Alagha’s 
new book on Hizbullah, for in this major new study he provides the most 
comprehensive account of the rise and staying in power of Hizbullah to date. 
This is a compelling read which demystifies Hizbullah and also the Middle 
East’s apparently contradictory relationships. A must-read. 
Anoush Ehteshami, Professor of International Relations,  
Durham University
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Joseph Alagha’s latest book is a major contribution to the 
understanding of Hizbullah’s position not only in Lebanon or the Shi‘ite 
world, but also in world politics. It combines the mastery on Hizbullah’s 
ideology through its major thinkers and its relation to the Shi‘ite intellectual 
production in Iran and elsewhere. It shows in particular the change within 
Hizbullah’s major political and ideological stances and their flexibility in 
terms of modernization, opening up the Islamic views to many modern 
ones, which were once thought as antagonistic to Islam. Alagha displays a 
rare mastery of ideological and socio-political analysis, combining them in 
a scholarly view that makes this book indispensable for understanding this 
movement within the Muslim world.
Farhad Khosrokhavar, Professor of Sociology at the École des Hautes 
Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris; Yale and Harvard Visiting 
Professor. Author of Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements 
Worldwide (2009) and Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (2005) 
***
Joseph Alagha remains one of the most thorough and 
careful analysts of Hizbullah’s political ideology and practice. Scholars, 
analysts, and policymakers will find in this work a veritable treasure trove of 
research and insights into this complex organization.
Michaelle Browers, Associate Professor of Political Science,  
Wake Forest University, North Carolina, USA. Author of Political Ideology 
in the Arab World (2009) and Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political 
Thought (2006)
***
Joseph Alagha’s Hizbullah’s Identity Construction is a 
fresh perspective on Hizbullah, whose hydra-like nature has perplexed and 
confounded laymen and scholars alike. Based on an expansive, impressive 
use of primary and secondary sources, the study offers an in-depth analysis, 
in theory and practice, on Hizbullah’s construction and reconstruction of its 
identity unrivalled in its minute details and exposition. 
Robert G. Rabil, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of 
Graduate Studies, Florida Atlantic University, USA. Author of Syria, the 
United States and the War on Terror in the Middle East (2006) and Embat-
tled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, Lebanon (2003)
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The political landscape of Lebanon is remarkable in its 
constant flux which keeps the country and its citizens in an enduring 
‘emergency’ mode, while at the same time maintaining an equally 
remarkable stability in its political groupings and their internal dynamics. 
The exception to this rule has been Hizbullah which introduced a new 
and powerful factor into Lebanese politics in the 1980s and which has 
also undergone extensive internal evolution in the three decades since its 
formation. This new book by Joseph Alagha continues his earlier work in 
carefully dissecting Hizbullah’s inner workings and transformations as well 
as its impact on the wider Lebanese public sphere. Meticulous in its detail 
and documentation, this is a must-read for anyone interested in Lebanon 
and in socio-religious movements in general.
Seteney Shami, Director of the Program on the Middle East and North 
Africa at the Social Science Research Council of America (SSRC)
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   313 26-4-2011   13:43:32
Alagha-PROEF-4.indb   314 26-4-2011   13:43:32
